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This dissertation argues that contemporary metafictions such as Margaret Atwood’s 
Cat’s Eye (1988), Colson Whitehead’s John Henry Days (2001), and Don DeLillo’s 
The Body Artist (2001) make elements of their narrative discourse (the language in 
which they are told) into important elements of their stories (the events about which 
they tell). Metafictions – fictions that formally or explicitly comment on the manner of 
their own telling – have almost always been read for the philosophical content of their 
self-reflexivity, some undermining readers’ epistemological certainty, others 
challenging readers’ assumptions about their own and the fictions’ ontological status. I 
argue, however that these contemporary novels use their self-commentary to 
underscore the materiality and agency of language in storytelling, in experiences of 
loss, and in quests for personal agency in a world where discourse often floats free of 
attribution. 
 
In emphasizing the agency of discourse, my readings of Cat’s Eye, John Henry Days, 
and The Body Artist also contribute to contemporary debates about literary-critical 
methodology. Each reading investigates the labor of producing and trying to sustain 
the critical distinctions between description and interpretation, and between story and 
discourse, in the face of textual objects’ manifestly hybrid natures. I develop a “flat 
narratology,” itself a hybrid descriptive-interpretive critical practice, which draws on 
the methods of narrative poetics and works to reconcile them with insights from 
science studies about the production of critical and empirical knowledge. My method 
  
shares attention among small units of discourse like sentences and phrases; 
conventional textual objects like the “existents” of a story-world (characters, settings, 
events); and also objects like Cat’s Eye’s frameworks for viewing that are not given 
by the conventional vocabulary of narrative poetics. I argue that narratives are neither 
only the utterances of their authors (real or implied) nor only arrays of words to which 
the reader or critic brings all the narrative and signifying force. They are, rather, a set 
of unusual real-world objects that, without being alive, nonetheless speak about 
themselves. 
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Introduction – Problems and Meta-Problems in Literary Critical Practice 
 
July 2017 — 
 This has been the year of “alternative facts” – assertions and statistics, 
insinuations and narratives whose sources are hidden behind online personae or lost in 
long transactional chains of social-media (or intelligence-service) sharing. As the 
source of a story, whether person, “bot,” or institution, recedes from the locus and 
moment of its reception, it becomes more and more difficult to authenticate or validate 
whatever is transmitted or shared, and audiences across the political spectrum today 
encounter unbelievable and all-too-perfectly believable accounts of what their 
ideological adversaries have done or mean to do. It has become difficult for many to 
know what to believe. Perhaps coincidentally, this last year also saw the publication of 
Michelle Tea’s Black Wave (2016), a novel that presents as a memoir that in turn 
confesses its own fictionality – just before proceeding to narrate the end of the world. 
Ostensibly, then, the book both tells the future and prepares a story for after the end. It 
posits its own language persisting in an unpeopled world, and thus it gives narrative 
form to the feeling of discourse overwhelming reality, of a multiplicity of 
unauthenticated stories taking the place of actual events. 
 The notion of an unbelievable present, or a present that feels, to some observer, 
like a speculative fiction, has literary precedent. For example, “Borges and I” (1960) 
briefly and brilliantly articulates the puzzlement of someone who cannot quite 
persuade himself of his own agency and who feels, as a consequence, the unreality of 
his experience. The first-person narrator begins by declaring, “The other one, the one 
called Borges, is the one things happen to” (Borges 324). In so doing, this narrator 
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distinguishes his own space from the one in which “things happen,” and it is obvious 
that he feels the evanescence of the former: “my life is a flight,” he says, “and I lose 
everything and everything belongs to oblivion, or to him” (ibid.). While describing his 
own activities and predilections, the narrator also acknowledges his dependence on 
Borges. He concludes with an epistemological puzzle, a gesture of uncertainty: “I do 
not know which of us has written this page” (ibid.). 
 Tea’s Black Wave differs from “Borges and I” in imagining the continuation, 
rather than the cessation, of the discourse that constitutes the story, and such 
differences exemplify the distance between modernist and contemporary metafictions. 
In the context of our present, collective crisis over how to handle the inextricability of 
the purely fictitious from the possibly real, this dissertation argues that both 
contemporary literary theory and contemporary metafictions – fictions that formally or 
explicitly comment on the manner of their own telling – offer rich resources for 
grappling with the unmoored narratives of our cultural and political lives. Fictional 
self-referentiality and self-examination are neither merely circular nor disengaged 
from public life. Rather, metafictions of the last several decades, such as Margaret 
Atwood’s Cat’s Eye, Colson Whitehead’s John Henry Days, and Don DeLillo’s The 
Body Artist afford insights into the materiality of story, experiences of loss, and quests 
for personal agency amid a deluge of public and collective cultural content. 
 But isn’t the field of literary criticism, like the humanities more broadly, in 
crisis? When notions of authentication are so suspect that major daily newspapers are 
routinely distrusted, is it likely that a discipline itself riven by methodological disputes 
and differences of priority can help? Since the rise of Derridean deconstruction in the 
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U.S. academy, it has not been too shocking to claim that there is no outside the text (il 
n’ya pas d’hors-texte), that our social and communicative lives are lived within a 
system of signification that has neither a central point of origin nor an outer boundary 
– and that therefore is never simply given (Derrida 158). This embrace of world-as-
text by the academy, and by American culture more broadly, meant that critics, artists, 
activists, and pundits all learned to talk about flesh-and-blood people (and real, 
material systems) as constructed, linguistic, and subject to interpretive reframing in the 
manner of, for example, fictional characters. No doubt there are scholars and novelists, 
policy-makers and private citizens who blame the “alternative facts” crisis on a 
relativist academy’s inability to combat cynical and poisonous strains of political 
discourse. Even years before the surprise election of Donald Trump to the United 
States Presidency, there was an identifiable impulse in several branches of the 
academy to return descriptions of complex systems, even systems of signification, to a 
realist or empirical foundation. In other words, the world-as-text way of thinking was 
falling out of favor with academics who sought to reaffirm both the reality of their 
objects of study and their capacity and authority to say things about them. 
 The resulting debate, at least within literary studies, has taken shape in the 
pages of academic journals in the last decade, including two special issues 
Representations (“The Way We Read Now,” 2009, and “Building a Better 
Description,” 2016), and through books like Criticism After Critique, edited by Jeffrey 
Di Leo (2014), Rita Felski’s The Limits of Critique (2015), and Elizabeth Anker’s and 
Felski’s co-edited collection of essays, Critique and Postcritique (2017). To the extent, 
however, that it has pitted opponents of “the hermeneutics of suspicion” against the 
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defenders of Marxist, psychoanalytic, and deconstructionist readings, the debate’s 
roots go back at least to Paul Ricoeur’s coining of that phrase in 1970 and can also be 
traced through Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s suggestion that “reparative reading” might 
present a less agonistic mode of critical engagement with the literary than efforts to 
decode texts by revealing what they don’t, won’t, or can’t say.  
 Rather than merely summarizing these debates here, I want examine why 
critics have turned to science studies (especially via Bruno Latour) and, less 
frequently, to speculative realist philosophy (via Quentin Meillassoux, Graham 
Harman, and Ian Bogost) in their efforts to make literary studies more empirical. Other 
fields might have provided this empirical grounding: cognitive science, for example, 
has been influential for some narrative theorists,1 and narrative theory more generally 
has striven to provide a science of narrative. Why, then, has this subdiscipline not been 
better represented in the debates over how we read now or in accounts of 
contemporary literary-descriptive practice? What ways of thinking and reading do the 
transdisciplinary borrowings from science studies afford, that literature’s own long 
tradition of narrative poetics does not? And how might narrative theory respond to or 
incorporate these new descriptive practices, which are oriented as much (or more) 
toward the meta-critical project of describing description as toward cataloging and 
testing literary forms themselves? 
 It may be in part that narrative poetics, and poetics more generally, sidelined 
themselves in the method wars by their own long-standing efforts to separate what 
they do from hermeneutics. In “Semiotics as a Theory of Reading,” for example, 
                                                
1 See, for example, David Herman’s work, including Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind (2013). 
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Jonathan Culler argues that the kind of knowledge literary studies is best suited to 
produce is not knowledge of what particular texts mean, but of “how it is that literary 
works have the meaning they do for readers” (Pursuit 52). This is because people 
disagree, sometimes vehemently, about what a text means; and because efforts to 
secure the meaning of a given text only lead, typically, to the proliferation of different, 
competing interpretations (ibid.). Hence, 
[i]nstead of attempting to legislate solutions to interpretive 
disagreements, one might attempt to analyze the interpretive operations 
that produce these disagreements […]. Such a program falls under the 
aegis of semiotics, which seeks to identify the conventions and 
operations by which any signifying practice (such as literature) 
produces its observable effects of meaning. (ibid.) 
 
In other words, semiotics or poetics (Culler’s equivalence) is not and should not be in 
the business of deciding among interpretive strategies. Interpretations (and other 
readerly responses) are the “observable effects of meaning” – not, themselves, 
knowledge – and only investigating the operations by which meaning is made might 
yield knowledge in the end. As recently as his 2001 preface to the Routledge Classic 
edition of The Pursuit of Signs, Culler reflects that the role of poetics in literary 
studies remains minor: “Critics are more interested in interpreting novels than in 
trying to spell out how we go about understanding them as we read”; “[i]nterpretation 
still reigns” (xvii). Since the method wars are explicitly about how critics should go 
about their interpretive business, rather than about how they do, it may come as little 
surprise that poetics has not been a part of them. Poetics does not aim to provide an 
evaluative framework for hermeneutics. 
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 And yet, while the present crisis over how to read has been prompted by 
critique’s apparent political shortcomings (rehearsed with rhetorical brio by Bruno 
Latour in “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern”), some of the most fascinating rejections of the hermeneutics of suspicion 
have, strangely enough, brought renewed attention to description. Since describing 
literary worlds – their possibilities, their structures, their contents; their genres and 
their governing rules (if any) – has been so large a part of the business of narrative 
theory, it is not obvious why new accounts of description haven’t treated this tradition 
of analysis (from Russian formalism, French structuralism, and more recent American, 
German, and Israeli narratology) as an intellectual resource. 
 My suspicion, if I may put it that way, is that narratology and narrative poetics 
have been too successful in arguing for the distinction between description and 
interpretation. Critics like Sharon Marcus, Heather Love, and Stephen Best  (and those 
critics whose work they collect in “Building a Better Description”) may be dissuaded 
from grounding their descriptive practices in semiotics or poetics just because such 
description purports to be about meaning making, but not part of it. Put another way, 
if poetics does not offer descriptions of texts themselves, but only descriptions of their 
meanings and how people make those meanings, then poetics doesn't seem to be 
solving the problem that current advocates of description are facing, namely what kind 
of objects interpretation is given to work with.  
 Best and Marcus’s “Surface Reading: An Introduction” shows, via its list of six 
different conceptions of textual “surface,” just how little agreement there is over what 
counts as a textual given, even among critics who share the outlook that the discipline 
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must progress, somehow, beyond the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”2 In casting so wide 
a net, Best and Marcus are constrained in the kinds of conclusions they can draw, and 
rather than delineating their own ontology of textual surface, they wind up their 
introduction to “The Way We Read Now” by addressing the concern that “[s]urface 
reading, which strives to describe texts accurately, might easily be dismissed as 
politically quietist, too willing to accept things as they are” (16). Although they defend 
against this critique by characterizing the goals of “immersion in texts” and 
“attentiveness,” as “a kind of freedom,” they have not only left the ontological 
question (“What are the givens of literary analysis?”) unanswered, they have even, in a 
way, put the cart before the horse, since after describing surface reading’s “striving” to 
describe in one clause, they shift very quickly to the idea that “things as they are” are 
readily apparent, to be accepted or not (ibid.). The appeal to descriptive practices as 
somehow liberating and potentially political suggest another reason for the sidelining 
of narrative poetics in the method wars, namely that the kind of empiricism that seems 
to be needed now is not neutral, but political; and it sheds light on the second question 
I posed above, “What ways of thinking and reading do borrowings from science 
studies and speculative realist philosophy afford, that narrative poetics does not?”  
 Whereas narrative poetics has presented its empiricism in neutral terms, the 
social sciences arguably embrace description as part of their critical practices, rather 
than holding it apart as either pre- or meta-critical. Heather Love has articulated the 
relationship between literary studies and social science in terms of how they fit 
                                                
2 I address two of these conceptions, “Attention to surface as a practice of critical description” and 
“Surface as the location of patterns that exist within and across texts,” in some detail in Chapter 2. 
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description into their interpretive schema: In “Close Reading and Thin Description” 
(2013), Love suggests that literary scholars since the 1970s have mostly discounted 
the importance of a first layer of description, “thin” rather than “thick,” in their 
embrace of Clifford Geertz’s “insistence on interpretation against observation” in 
social science (409). Love argues that Geertz understood the necessity of building 
interpretation atop observation, even as he recognized that ethnography could never be 
“a matter of mere recording” (408). Rather, “[c]ritiquing the concept of objectivity, 
and pointing to the cultural work that goes into even the slightest gesture, Geertz 
argues that the simplest ‘recording’ of behavior depends on interpretive protocols and 
the subjective analyses of the observer” (ibid.). 
Geertz’s critique of “objectivity” seems like a strange foundation on which to 
build a more empirical literary analysis, but Love’s reading of Geertz’s “Thick 
Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture” actually emphasizes Geertz’s 
own fear “that cultural analysis […] will lose touch with the hard surfaces of life” 
(Geertz 30, qtd. in Love 410). Even though cultural analysis always involves the 
application of some interpretive frame, in Love’s reading of Geertz “ethnographic 
practice brings the researcher into contact with the hard surfaces of behavior,” and this 
practice might find its literary counterpart in surface reading (410). Love calls surface 
reading “descriptive” in the sense that “it defers virtuosic interpretation in order to 
attempt to formulate an accurate account of what the text is like” (412). 
 So far, Love has sought and found in Geertz a model of reading that 
acknowledges the importance of description, the necessity of interpretation’s role in it, 
and also the necessity of interpretation’s somehow coming “into contact with […] 
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hard surfaces.” Poetics apparently has little to add to this account of how description 
and interpretation relate to one another, especially if poetics doesn’t examine how and 
whether description underpins interpretive practice. Yet neither in “Close Reading and 
Thin Description” nor, later, in “Description Across the Disciplines” (co-written with 
Marcus and Best) does Love enumerate the descriptions that might be most helpful in 
making literary analysis more empirical.3 The latter provides descriptive practices in 
the humanities with a preliminary defense as such, but leaves the question of how “to 
formulate an accurate account of what the text is like” very much open.4 Perhaps this 
is because Love’s goal in “Close Reading and Thin Description” is not, in fact, to 
settle the ontology of textual objects, but to try to pull the humanities away from the 
habit of textualizing culture, so that they “also make room for other practices such as 
description, observation, and natural history, as well as testing, polling, and coding.” 
(430). If I am reading Love correctly, then her expanded account of “reading” actually 
sets aside the intermingling of interpretation with description that Geertz 
acknowledged; the thinly descriptive methods she describes, such as microanalysis of 
recorded behavior, help “to challenge narrow hermeneutic definitions of reading” and 
“help us reframe reading as a social science, one that along with more traditional 
social scientific methods can contribute to the project of showing ‘what the real world 
is really like’” (ibid.). The world, rather than the text, is the object of Love’s analytical 
                                                
3 Marcus, Best, and Love seem not to be pushing for anything like the “distant reading” proposed by 
Franco Moretti, which makes literary history more empirical by including as much data as are available 
about as many texts as possible. Moretti, Franco. Distant Reading. London: Verso, 2013. 
4 In “Close But Not Deep,” Love’s emphasis is somewhat different than in “Close Reading and Thin 
Description.” The former (and earlier) article focuses on how descriptive close readings might draw on 
sociological (and other) descriptive methods to identify “the possibility of an alternative ethics, one 
grounded in documentation and description rather than empathy and witness” (375). 
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practice, and Love appears to suggest setting aside hermeneutics itself, not just the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, in her effort to put the humanities onto an empirical 
footing. 
 Although Love’s reading of Geertz might further a project of integrating 
description with interpretation, Love orients her argument in a different direction. Her 
call to “reframe reading” resonates rhetorically with projects to reground interpretation 
in empiricism, but the empiricism she offers may no longer concern the literary except 
as a social behavior. I suggest, then, that if Geertz’s account of “thick description” was 
misread by literary critics in the 1970s as an endorsement of their textualizing the 
world, Love’s “detextualizing” return to “thin description” may not carry us as far as 
we’d like toward the fundamental conundrum in literary studies about what counts as 
given (Love 430). In Marxist, psychoanalytic, and deconstructionist readings of 
literary texts, what’s given is an economic, psychic, or semiotic system, the study and 
application of which is necessary to decode texts. Produced by and inscribed within 
these systems, the claim goes, texts can never say what they mean. For formalists, 
similarly, texts are to a certain extent “mute,” as Fredric Bogel illustrates in New 
Formalist Criticism: Theory and Practice. Even when a poem is constructed 
specifically to disprove the idea that it cannot speak about itself – even when line 2 
comments on line 1 and line 3 comments on the relationship between lines 2 and 1 – 
line 3 “cannot comment on its own relation” to the other lines (28, Bogel’s italics). So 
we are forced to conclude, Bogel writes, that “while a poem may express something 
about something, we need literary criticism to express something about the poem” 
(29). 
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 For the surface readers narrowly, however, and for the wider array of critics 
today whose methods might count as postcritical, there remains something 
unsatisfying, and perhaps puzzling, about texts’ apparent lack of agency in the making 
of their own meaning, especially when readers may feel, palpably, that texts do things 
to them. As Emily Apter and Elaine Freedgood note in the afterword to “The Way We 
Read Now,” the particularities of texts and their readers and the contingencies of 
readers’ uneven attention to a text’s myriad features deserve a place in reading – even 
professional, critical reading (140). The various styles, methods, and strategies of 
reading that have arisen in the wake of critique’s having supposedly run out of steam 
largely share the goal of understanding meaning as co-constructed by texts, their 
readers, and their contexts. A detailed account of this co-construction’s mechanics 
would, of course, be exactly the work of semiotics and poetics as Culler has defined 
them. In the meantime, however, critics interested in elaborating the social and 
material contingencies of their own readings while also grounding those readings 
firmly in texts have adopted approaches to the making of knowledge that owe much to 
Bruno Latour. 
 Rita Felski explains some of the appeal of surface reading in Latourian terms, 
noting that “[w]ithin a Latourian framework, we do not probe below the surface of a 
text to retrieve disavowed or repressed meanings, nor do we stand back from a text to 
‘denaturalize’ it and expose its social constructedness” (“Latour and Lit.” 741). Rather, 
we might adopt something very like actor-network theory’s “leveling of phenomena 
through their incorporation into networks,” in which we accept that phenomena cannot 
be explained either reductively or holistically, but should be accounted for via the 
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networked relations of agents of very different kinds and scales (738). Latour’s 
account of a railroad, which he considers neither local nor global, makes a nice 
example. The railroad 
is local at all points, since you always find sleepers and railroad 
workers, and you have stations and automatic ticket machines scattered 
along the way. Yet it is global, since it takes you from Madrid to Berlin 
or from Brest to Vladivostok. However, it is not universal enough to be 
able to take you just anywhere. […] There are continuous paths that 
lead from the local to the global, from the circumstantial to the 
universal, from the contingent to the necessary, only so long as the 
branch lines are paid for. (Latour, WHNBM 117) 
 
To make sense of a railroad’s effects at the local scale, one cannot exclude its 
manifestations at the global scale, and vice versa. Networks thus violate our 
expectations (Latour would say our “modern” expectations) that things can be made 
sense of in static frames of reference, without changing scales. At the same time, 
Latour reminds us, the “paths that lead” from one scale to another must be “paid for” 
not only literally, in the case of the railroad, but in the sense that attention must be 
paid.  
 On Felski’s view, actor-network theory (ANT) shows that “prevailing styles of 
scholarly analysis often fail to capture the nature of our entanglement with texts” 
(739). She asks, in turn, whether the leveling of different phenomena and scales can be 
made to agree with the special modes of attention that critics bring to literature. 
Ultimately, Felski suggests that if “[i]nstead of engaging in a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, we conceive of interpretation as a form of mutual making or composing,” 
then Latourian thought may contribute to literary studies, and it is this notion of 
“mutual making” that I want, for the moment, to stress, because it paves the way for 
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my examination of metafiction as participating in the critical discourse about its own 
subject matter and form (741).  
 When Michelle Tea’s protagonist, Michelle, “wracked her brain for successful 
books with prominent crack smokers” and asks herself, “What made those crack 
stories work? What made them, um, universal?,” it seems clear that the protagonist 
and author are speaking through the same discourse to interrogate the “universality” 
and potential of Black Wave’s own dynamic plot structure (Tea 139). Of course it’s 
right that Black Wave, like any text, “needs to be mediated to readers by intensive 
critical performance if it is to show forth what it is, does, and means” (Bogel 25). But 
can’t a metafiction provide much of that mediation without falling short, somehow, of 
self-reflexivity? If formalism doesn’t have on hand the language to embed the 
mediating, “intensive critical performance” within a text, Latour may offer a language 
for talking about the constructedness of meaning that gives credence to texts’ agency 
in the process. 
 Latour’s accounts of meaning’s constructedness are valuable to literary critics 
because they enable and sustain empirical investigation.5 When Felski writes that 
Latour’s “Actor-network theory emphasizes both the necessity and the sheer difficulty 
of description, of attending to an empirical world that often resists or refutes our 
assumptions,” I take it as a provocation to examine how ideas from Latourian social 
science (and those branches of speculative realism that have drawn substantially on 
Latour) might impact the most descriptively-oriented field of literary studies: narrative 
                                                
5 Deconstruction, of course, also emphasizes and studies the constructedness of meaning, but without 
the language of empiricism that is so much desired in the humanities today. 
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poetics (740). I take as my premise that literary-fictional worlds are subspaces of the 
empirical world we inhabit. But before I turn my attention to the difficulties of 
describing such worlds in their particular depths and surfaces, their microcosms, 
mesocosms, and macrocosms, I return to the divide between interpretation and 
description, to consider by way of a Latourian analogy how that distinction is 
produced and sustained. 
 Narrative poetics is founded, I have said, on something like the distinction 
between interpretation and description. Poetics is taken not to promote the production 
or revelation of texts’ meanings, but rather, to quote Culler again, to investigate “the 
structures and conventions of literary discourse which enable them to have the 
meanings they do” (“Foreword” 8). In other words, poetics is about examining the 
conditions of possibility for textual meaning: the laws or rules – whether natural or 
conventional, necessary or contingent – that govern signification. In practice, 
however, the distinction between poetics and interpretation can be difficult to pin 
down, especially when the work of producing narratological distinctions becomes 
visible. 
 In “Story and Discourse in the Analysis of Narrative,” Culler deconstructs the 
narratological division between story and discourse by reading Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Rex and George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. The story/discourse divide is supposed to be 
easy to define. Ostensibly, story is what is told and discourse is the way it is told 
(Chatman 9). The story is supposed to have some kind of independent existence, such 
that it could be told in multiple ways, could be summarized, and could be subject to 
claims about what happened that are answerable in other terms than simply repeating 
 15 
the discourse. The discourse, however, comprises exactly the linguistic (or other) 
material in which the story is actually related. Because discourse is supposed to do the 
work of conveying the story material to the audience, the discourse is supposed to be a 
function of the story. Every element of the discourse must relate to or hang on the 
story’s “existents” or “events” (Chatman), and nothing can be extraneous, because 
then the discourse would not belong to this story. 
 However, Culler shows in his readings of Sophocles and Eliot how the story 
can also become a function of the discourse. This is the “logic by which event is a 
product of discursive forces rather than a given reported by discourse,” and it occurs 
when a structure of signification determines the event (Pursuit 195). In Culler’s 
words, “Oedipus becomes the murderer of his father not by a violent act that is 
brought to light but by bowing to the demands of narrative coherence and deeming the 
act to have taken place” (194). This appears to indicate a flaw in the narratological 
approach, however, which seems prepared to recognize discourse as a function of 
story, but not the other way around. Culler writes: “These two logics, one of which 
insists upon the causal efficacy of origins and the other of which denies their causal 
efficacy, are in contradiction but they are essential to the way in which the narrative 
functions” (198). Both of these logics are necessary to narrative, Culler contends, and 
“[t]heorists of narrative […] have perhaps been too ready to assume that they can be 
held together, synthesized in some way without contradiction” (198). 
 The narratological investment in producing the story as given and the discourse 
as contingent has a parallel in the investment of poetics in producing description as 
distinct from interpretation. But clearly it is an interpretation of Sophocles’ Oedipus 
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that enables a narratological insight about the production of meaning. In both cases, 
however foundational the distinction may be for the discipline that produces it, the 
question of how it was produced typically goes unexamined. And the Latourian 
analogy that I promised is just this: the work of producing such categories as 
description and interpretation, poetics and hermeneutics, and story and discourse 
resembles (has the form of, in Caroline Levine’s sense)6 the “purifying” work of 
modern, Western science, which belies the hybridity of the objects it describes and 
assigns them to distinct ontological categories (WHNBM 10). 
 Let me linger on this point and elaborate, since this analogy also gives its form 
to my readings in this project. Latour argues in We Have Never Been Modern that the 
idea of modernity depends on the clean separation of nature from culture and that the 
crisis of modernity (the beginning of its end) comes when networks of sciences and 
technologies have produced so many hybrids or “quasi-objects” that the purifying 
work of delimiting objects as either natural or cultural breaks down.7 The trick of 
Latour’s reading, however, is that modernity is characterized also by a second kind of 
work, translation, that it commits to hiding from itself. Translation “creates mixtures 
between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture,” even as 
purification “creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on 
the one hand; that of nonhumans on the other” (WHNBM 10-11). Latour explains that 
the set of practices he calls translation “corresponds to what I have called networks,” 
                                                
6 See Chapter 2. 
7 The purification itself is instrumentally important: it facilitates the formulation of “natural law” and 
hence the technical and epistemological achievements of scientific investigation. The material forms of 
modernity are thus built upon this “purifying” intellectual work. 
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while the second set of practices, purification, corresponds to “the modern critical 
stance” (11). The key, however, is that “as soon as we direct our attention 
simultaneously to the work of purification and the work of hybridization, we 
immediately stop being wholly modern, and our future begins to change” (ibid.). 
 Even without buying the whole of Latour’s argument that modernity’s clean 
critical distinctions always depended upon practices that it denied, and that hence, “we 
have never been modern,” we can see the power of his idea that even supposedly 
ontological distinctions can depend structurally on hidden labor that works with and 
sorts through nuance, complexity, and networks of disparate objects, ideas, and 
practices. To make this concrete on the front end of my analogy, Culler’s readings of 
Oedipus and Daniel Deronda are “translational” in Latour’s terms, since they combine 
narratological description with interpretation in order to produce a “pure” 
narratological (rather than interpretive) account of the relations between story and 
discourse in the two texts.8 Similarly, interpretive methodologies that aspire to direct 
contact with textual surface and invest in description may be doing a kind of work that 
interpretation itself cannot, or cannot yet, recognize. This is one way of accounting for 
how adamant critiques of critique can be, and also for how defenders of hermeneutics 
dig in. (In Chapter 2 I compare Ellen Rooney’s “Symptomatic Reading is a Problem of 
Form” with the formalism of Caroline Levine in an effort to show both critics’ 
investment in the form/content divide, another of these ontological distinctions that is 
                                                
8 Culler’s narratological summation is that “[s]ince the distinction between story and discourse can 
function only if there is a determination of one by the other, the analyst must always choose which will 
be treated as the given and which as the product. Yet either choice leads to a narratology that misses 
some of the curious complexity of narratives and fails to account for much of their impact” (Pursuit 
208). 
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produced by work that is difficult to account for.) 
 But what is the material, what are the hybrid forms, the quasi-objects of this 
analogy? What is being produced that fills the intermediary space between description 
and interpretation? In brief: contemporary critical writing, including metafiction. 
 To clarify, let me sum up and pull together the disparate threads and theoretical 
investigations that I have so far outlined: 
(1)  Today, in the real world, discourse is more difficult than ever to 
authenticate. This is not unrelated to new technologies that let us share words 
and images anonymously, network widely, and circulate views among the 
likeminded; but neither is it disconnected from the twin crises of critical 
suspicion (“Nothing means what it says.”) and critique’s implosion (“Every 
critical statement or position can be undermined by critical tools we all know 
well how to deploy.”). 
(2)  Many literary critics and theorists, to ameliorate these crises, have 
turned to science studies and speculative realist philosophy for an empiricism 
that also makes room for interpretation (unlike, perhaps, the STEM fields). 
They have not, in general, had recourse to literary studies’ own empirical and 
descriptive traditions (poetics), in part because poetics has advertised its 
difference from interpretation, but also because other disciplines have more 
fully developed language for talking about the co-construction of knowledge 
by persons, their tools, and their objects of inquiry. 
(3)  Contemporary methodological debates continue to rely on ontological 
distinctions whose validity they are already, in practice, undermining, most 
 19 
importantly those between description and interpretation, between form and 
content, and between discourse and story. This is analogous to the “purifying” 
work that Latour describes as producing the realms of culture (the human) and 
nature (the nonhuman) as ontologically distinct, but it is work that is already 
being overwhelmed by the proliferation of hybrid practices and hybrid objects 
whose ontologies will not permit their assignment to unmixed categories. 
My question, finally, is, What if the borrowing by so many cutting-edge literary 
theorists from Latourian social science and fields like speculative realist philosophy is 
less about empiricism than about the possibility of recognizing new forms of literary 
labor: descriptive-interpretive practices, readings, that in turn may offer new 
conceptions of literary form itself? 
 Possibly, the adoption of Latourian empiricism was supposed to enable 
practical distinctions between description and interpretation in the literary domain. 
But, a bit perversely, Latour’s actor-network theory and his analysis of modernity’s 
cultural and scientific functions provide an analogy that makes visible the critical 
energies that have been put into producing and sustaining the ontological divide 
between description and interpretation. Once one thinks to look for the hybrid objects 
that might persist despite the work of critical purification, one can read contemporary 
metafictions as assemblages of texts and worlds whose interpretation and description 
cannot be distinguished readily (or at all), since they are composed of the very same 
discourse. 
 Take for example the contemporary avant-garde novel S, by Doug Dorst, 
which comes in a slipcase containing the book (a bound codex) and an additional 
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twenty-two items including letters, postcards, telegrams, photographs, and a “decoder 
wheel” (Figure 1). This collection of items requires not only that any reader make 
decisions about when to break off reading the narrative text of the codex (itself already 
interrupted by facsimile handwritten marginal notes), but also that the items’ material 
form be considered as part of the story-world, stuff that the fictional characters 
supposedly make and handle. The physical form of the novel, which in so  
 
Figure 1 
 
much printed fiction is incidental to both the story and the discourse, in S becomes 
definitely part of both the story-telling mechanism and the story-world. Likewise, the 
novels on which I center this project challenge the already messy (but supposedly 
pure) division in narrative theory between story and discourse.  
 If the understanding I have offered of the division between description and 
interpretation as a kind of purification holds water, then it is presumably incumbent 
upon us to attend quite carefully to those hybrid objects that are contemporary 
metafictions. These are texts informed by the theory that critics bring to bear on them; 
built to thwart assumptions about what is narratively, discursively, and formally given; 
and, as I hope to show, less “mute” than other literary objects, because they speak 
simultaneously in various registers, including critical ones. Also – this is essential – it 
 21 
might be incumbent upon us to bring new forms of attention to bear on such objects, 
since the point, after all, is to raise questions outside the scheme of description and 
interpretation that has failed to resolve the field’s present crises.  
 What kinds of reading would new forms of attention produce? Can we decide 
at what scale to direct our attention, or must it traverse different scales and different 
ontologies, following the example of what Ian Bogost calls “Latour litanies,” networks 
of causation (or explanation) that concatenate such various objects and agents as “A 
storm, a rat, a rock, a lion, a child, a worker, a gene, a slave, the unconscious, a virus” 
(qtd. in Bogost 38). My readings of Cat’s Eye, John Henry Days, and The Body Artist 
are all, at base, narratological, because narrative poetics is the most developed 
descriptive discourse that is fully at home in literary investigations. They are geared, 
however, toward investigating the labor of producing and sustaining the ontological 
distinctions between description and interpretation, and between story and discourse, 
in the face of textual objects’ manifestly hybrid natures.  
 To distinguish this way of reading from traditional narrative poetics, I use “flat 
narratology” to name a descriptive-interpretive hybrid practice. While “flatness” 
appears already among the images of surface and depth in reading, and thinness and 
thickness in description,9 I borrow my notion of flatness from speculative realism and 
Latourian ontology.10 The point is to share descriptive-interpretive attention among 
small, contained units of discourse (like sentences and phrases); complex, composite 
                                                
9 See Love’s “Close but not Deep” for a “flat” reading of Toni Morrison’s Beloved, which Love also 
calls “reading the novel at the surface” (375). 
10 “Flat ontology” is a term borrowed by Ian Bogost from Levi Bryant and Manuel DeLanda: “An 
ontology is flat if it makes no distinction between the types of things that exist but treats all equally” 
(Bogost 17). 
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objects like the “existents” of the story-world (characters, settings, events); and also, 
equally, among textual constructs that are not given by the conventional vocabulary of 
narrative poetics, but are proposed and produced over the course of my readings. 
 The ambition of this project, then, is to participate in the descriptive-
interpretive hybridity of the novels that I analyze and to flatten the hierarchies that 
have been presumed or given by narrative poetics. I draw on descriptive 
methodologies from the social sciences that emphasize the mutuality of influence 
between objects of different natures and different scales, and I apply them to texts that 
themselves engage in narratologically descriptive work, in order to describe the 
relation of discourse to story outside of the logic of causality or priority. While flat 
ontology serves as one model of such reading, this is certainly not because speculative 
realist or object-oriented philosophy knows any more about textual objects, fictional 
worlds, and the operations of signification than literary theorists do. It is rather that 
flat ontologies and Latourian networks offer rubrics for considering the weird agencies 
of texts; the recirculation of discourse within metafictions; fictions’ circulation within 
our social and economic worlds; narrative discourse’s co-production of images, 
affects, ideas, and stories in our consciousness and culture; and the resilience or 
resistance of such products in the face of efforts to decode them, explode them, or 
even explain them away. 
 In “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?,” after polemically raising the 
dangers that I rehearsed above, Latour proposes that matters of fact are not the right 
focus for critical thinking and writing, because all facts, any facts, are easily 
debunked. Matters of concern, rather, should be taken as the hard and realist 
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grounding of a “renew[ed] empiricism” (231). Latour lays out the challenge this way: 
“Can we devise another powerful descriptive tool that deals this time with matters of 
concern and whose import then will no longer be to debunk but to protect and to care, 
as Donna Haraway would put it? Is it […] possible to transform the critical urge in the 
ethos of someone who adds reality to matters of fact and not subtract reality?” (“Why 
Has …?” 232 sic). Although I speculate that contemporary metafictions are up to 
something different with self-reflexivity than modernist and postmodernist 
metafictions, it is not my purpose in this project to define a new, contemporary genre. 
Rather, I want to explain why recent metafictions prove to be such rich ground for 
investigating the formal and conceptual questions of how to read – even fiction, even 
metafiction – in a way that adds reality to what is given in description and to what 
emerges contingently in interpretation. 
 Defined by its practices of self-commentary, metafiction makes use of self-
description and self-reference in the construction of its narrative. Although the 
language of contemporary metafiction operates at the edges of familiar critical 
practice, it is also always tinged with the work of making, since it cannot help but 
compose the fictional world or worlds on which it comments. It is my contention that 
close attention to the descriptive-interpretive practices and performances of 
metafictions can tell us a great deal about reading closely, about identifying a text’s 
surfaces and depths (if any), and about handling discourse that threatens to come 
unmoored from its context. 
 In the chapters that follow, I illustrate how contemporary metafictions can 
foreground such objects as frameworks, lists, taxonomies and phrases on a par with 
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character, setting, and event. I argue for the narrative significance of objects that have 
not been recognized by narrative poetics to date, and I theorize their narrative impetus 
via “flat narratology,” a method for making visible narrative operations that extend 
from world-building to story-telling to self-reflexive description-interpretation. 
 The methodological stakes, then, are as follows: I apply to literary texts and 
worlds Latour’s insight that understanding social and technical systems requires 
accounting for elements of different scales and different natures on equal terms. I also 
elaborate a method of description that attends to objects unaccounted for in Marcus, 
Best, and Love’s recent work. Finally, I show in a new light what speculative realism 
and object-oriented ontologies can contribute to narrative analysis: some kinds of 
literary object are peculiar in that, while clearly nonhuman (though human-made), 
they speak for themselves (especially when they speak about fictional worlds) and in 
voices that we might call their own. They are consequently good starting places for 
thinking about the nonhuman in terms that we can also apply to ourselves. They may 
also help us to navigate a culture in which the human sources and motives behind 
public discourse are willfully or contingently obscured. 
 In interpreting Cat’s Eye, John Henry Days, and The Body Artist, as well as 
describing them, I also briefly suggest that contemporary metafictions should be 
studied in concert, despite not cohering around any particular thematic content, 
because they do cohere in putting recursion, circularity, and self-referentiality to work 
in a new way: In contrast to modernist and postmodernist metafictions, contemporary 
metafictions acknowledge discourse’s real-world force and dramatize the power of 
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representation to alter what it represents. These are the new stakes of recursion, 
circularity, and self-referentiality in fictional, critical, and perhaps political discourse.  
 
 With a view to examining how contemporary narratives and narrative theory 
have reimagined the world-to-language relation over the last several decades, and how 
they might continue to do so amid the present crises in humanistic inquiry, I examine 
Margaret Atwood’s Cat’s Eye, Don DeLillo’s The Body Artist, and Colson Whitehead’s 
John Henry Days.  
 Chapter 1, “‘Nothing Goes Away’: Cat’s Eye’s Frameworks for Viewing as 
Narrative Poetics,” characterizes Atwood’s 1988 novel as both realist and 
experimental. Its peculiar first-person narration makes it easy to reconstruct a 
plausible biography for the protagonist, Elaine Risley. She is a painter who grows up 
on the outskirts of Toronto. As an elementary school student, Risley is both socially 
dependent upon and bullied by Cordelia, Grace, and Carol; and as Risley grows up, 
the memories of this bullying wax and wane in their salience to her life and art. She 
becomes close to Cordelia in high school, loses track of her when she moves away 
from Toronto, but returns to her childhood experiences as subjects for her paintings. 
The novel’s ostensible climax is the opening of Risley’s first retrospective show, in 
Toronto, for which she returns to the city and at which she imagines, again and again, 
that she might encounter Cordelia for the first time in decades. Cordelia doesn’t 
appear, however, and the novel closes with Risley on a plane back to British 
Columbia, where she lives. 
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 All along, however, Risley struggles with a problem that she cannot quite 
name, which is what version of herself corresponds to some external reality or whether 
any version does. From the unreliability of her memory to her encounter with a 
graffitied poster of herself (now wearing a mustache (Atwood 20)), the versioning in 
which she engages generates multiple and incompatible Elaine Risleys – some 
remembering, some forgetting, some narrating and thinking, others fixed as objects 
(rather than subjects) of spectacle and speculation. Indeed, the narration returns again 
and again to a particular framework or geometry for viewing, in which observed and 
observer are divided by a barrier. When Elaine Risley falls through ice, gazes down 
from a bridge (possibly at herself, below), looks “down through [time], like water” (3), 
or paints a painting that is also a memory, she actually relocates herself within this 
single, paradigmatic scenario. This framing (sometimes quite literal) invites one to set 
aside the novel’s self-contradictory plot and to develop a narrative analysis focused on 
the hybrid object that is the frame itself.    
 The narration of Cat’s Eye privileges the material and metaphorical play of 
surface and depth over those elements of the novel that have led scholars to consider it 
a Künstlerroman. While it enables the construction of a narrative around Risley’s 
biography, it actually flattens the discursive realm into the visual and vice versa and 
plays with hybridizing the ontological categories of life and death. Cat’s Eye is a 
metafiction bent on investigating its own rendering of surfaces, depths, and whole 
lives from linguistic material and geometries of spectacle, viewer, and frame. As a 
consequence, the theories of narrative that the novel offers up for examination 
sometimes seem less flat than perspectival; but the novel’s formal flouting of 
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biographical time allows its frameworks and spectacles to appear contemporaneously 
with one another, rather than being ordered or hierarchized by Elaine Risley’s personal 
or artistic development. 
 While Cat’s Eye flattens hierarchies of narrative perspective, Colson 
Whitehead’s John Henry Days (2001), which I analyze in Chapter 2, approximates 
“flat ontology” proper by indulging in indiscriminate, encyclopedic impulses, 
maximalist prose, digressive story lines, and list-making. The story that appears most 
often in John Henry Days is that of J. Sutter, a New York-based freelance journalist 
who attends the eponymous festival in Hinton, West Virginia, in his quest to break the 
record for “the longest bout of junketeering” (Whitehead 110). But the novel 
juxtaposes sections about J. and his cohort of publicity hacks with vignettes about 
other persons (some historical and some fictional) including John Henry himself, 
whom we see at work in the growing Big Bend Tunnel; and Guy Johnson, a 
sociologist who visits Hinton to sort through the “mountain” of evidence about John 
Henry’s (possible) real-life existence. These and other vignettes are thematically 
connected to the John Henry legend and ballad, but not narratively integrated with J.’s 
story or with each other.  
 The concern of Chapter 2, “Digressive and Taxonomic Narrative in Colson 
Whitehead’s John Henry Days,” is to mobilize the novel in a debate about form’s 
ontology, centered in Ellen Rooney’s “Symptomatic Reading is a Problem of Form” 
and Caroline Levine’s Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network. The novel itself 
poses a series of formal questions about myth, identity, and description and pursues 
their answers in a mode that repeatedly hinders the novel’s plot. I offer a flat 
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narratological reading of John Henry Days that accounts for these hindrances in terms 
of the novel’s competing logics of digression and taxonomy, and I identify those 
logics with the critical practices of Rooney and Levine, respectively. I read the novel’s 
accounts of excavation and taxonomy as metafictional reflections on critical treatment 
of literary texts. On their own, both forms of labor exhibit a totalizing impulse that 
inhibits narrative progress, and John Henry Days offers several examples of what I 
call “the describer’s nightmare”: characters or readers confront extreme ontologies in 
which (a) everything is given, (b) what’s given cannot be further described or 
differentiated, or (c) nothing is given at all. After examining each of these scenarios, I 
zoom out to consider how the novel’s open ending suggests a synthesis of its 
digressive and taxonomic impulses that I label “ontographic” in the spirit of Ian 
Bogost. 
 Chapter 3, “‘The Hidden Thinness of Everything’: Quotation, Performance, 
and the Tenuousness of Attribution in The Body Artist,” concerns the temporalities of 
repeated phrases. The Body Artist (2001) is narrated in seven chapters plus 
unnumbered units that appear between chapters 1 and 2 and between chapters 6 and 7. 
The chapters’ narration generally uses third-person pronouns to refer to the named 
characters: Lauren Hartke, the artist of the title; Rey Robles, her husband, who 
commits suicide; Hartke’s friend, Mariella Chapman; Robles’s first wife, Isabel; and 
the very strange Mr. Tuttle, who appears in Hartke’s house after Robles has killed 
himself, and whose speech and psychology are the subject of so much speculation by 
Hartke. The unnumbered units are fictional documents: first an anonymous obituary 
for Robles and later a review of one of Hartke’s performances, written by Chapman. 
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The narration also uses second-person pronouns in small sections at the starts of 
chapters 1, 2, 6, and 7.  
 Phrase, rather than character, setting, or plot, is responsible for The Body 
Artist’s metafictional challenge to the distinction between story and discourse. For 
example, when Mr. Tuttle or Lauren Hartke or the narrator (re-)introduces the 
expression, “Don’t touch it. I’ll clean it up later,” the novel conveys the impression 
that those words come untraceably from elsewhere. The phrases’ arrival or appearance 
becomes the crucial action – not Robles’s suicide or Hartke’s performance. Thus, the 
polyphony of this novel’s narration, which might only have generated plural 
perspectives on the narrated events, instead turns language into an agent at both the 
story level and the discourse level. At the peak of her performance, Hartke herself – 
already made of nothing but text to the novel’s reader – becomes a text within the 
storyworld, too, read and interpreted by her friend Chapman. The Body Artist is about 
the selection and dissection of discourse: not about character but about quotation. 
 DeLillo’s image of “the hidden thinness of everything,” combined with the 
novel’s parceling out of language into quotation, models flat narratology (95). Without 
pretending to eschew interpretation, it acknowledges the withdrawal of narrative 
elements beyond anyone’s capacity to know them exhaustively; at the same time it 
unmoors those elements from the restricted relations that narratology has 
conventionally assigned them. Flattened in The Body Artist’s self-commentary are the 
space from which we imagine discourse emerging and the space in which it appears. 
Hartke’s loss of Robles becomes a metaphor for the unmooring that enables and 
accompanies the arrival of certain phrases. 
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 While for the past century, nearly, there has been a strain of literary theory that 
hoped and aimed to develop a science of literature,11 there is a more recent but very 
powerful strain of thought that has worked to show the historical contingency and 
specificity of what we call science. Today, with the humanities under fire, literary 
criticism is caught somewhere between the pressures to reinvent itself as an empirical 
discipline and to double down on its claims for the value of humanistic inquiry itself. 
Attempts to repair the reputational damage done by the “hermeneutics of suspicion” 
are not obvious candidates for bringing literary analysis into debates about the 
nonhuman or the work of networks. If anything, turning to the nonhuman might be 
taken to enfranchise a new suspicion, that humans are less central than they have 
thought themselves, less powerful than they have imagined, and more fully subject to 
forces that are not, on the face of it, cultural. 
In this dissertation, however, I emphasize that we can productively distinguish 
Latour’s brands of skepticism and empiricism from the thread of suspicion that 
culminated in a “growing sense of fatigue with critique” (Anker 18).12 Although 
postmodernist metafictions are notorious for their attacks on the sanctity, surety, or 
security of knowledge, the insights and narratives of contemporary metafictions may 
be harnessed to bridge the extremes of empirical realist description and relativistic 
constructionism. Fictional discourse is not so fully bracketed off from the rest of the 
world as is sometimes imagined. To claim, as I do, that fictional, critical, and political 
                                                
11 See, e.g. Todorov 30-31 and also Chatman’s preface to Story and Discourse. 
12 If one is looking for structures of suspicion, however, one can probably find them without too much 
difficulty in Latour’s revealing of long-hidden aspects of the “constitution” of modernity in We Have 
Never Been Modern. 
 31 
discourse have the same stakes is not, in Latour’s words, “to get away from facts but 
closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism” 
(“Why Has…?” 231, Latour’s italics). Ultimately, my readings contribute to ongoing 
debates about where literary scholars locate the agency behind signification. 
Narratives, I contend, are neither only the utterances of their authors (real or implied) 
nor only arrays of words to which the reader or critic brings all the narrative and 
signifying force. They are, rather, a set of unusual real-world objects that, without 
being alive, nonetheless can speak about themselves.
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Chapter 1 – “Nothing Goes Away”: Cat’s Eye’s Frameworks for Viewing as 
Narrative Poetics 
 
1. A “Postmodern Gothic Künstlerroman”? 
 Cat’s Eye has often been studied as a Bildungsroman, and more specifically as 
a Künstlerroman – a narrative about the maturation of an artist. Susan Poznar, 
contrasting Cat’s Eye with Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto, calls the novel a 
“Postmodern Gothic Künstlerroman,” because it “demonstrates how a self-reflexive 
postmodern fiction might recycle seemingly trite devices into uncontainable images 
that menace the autonomy and integrity of those whom they ‘haunt’” (103, 67). In 
other words, the trite device of Walpole’s ghost-inhabited painting is liberated (from 
its frame, say) by Cat’s Eye’s self-reflexive form. While “Walpole rapidly defuses the 
threat of ontological and epistemological instability introduced by the dismembered 
apparition and the haunted portrait” (82), the hauntings of Cat’s Eye are not, in 
Poznar’s view, “literal” (her scare-quotes), and certain images, both painted and 
avoided, remembered and forgotten, hold sway over the novel’s characters (83). As 
Poznar has it, Cat’s Eye’s protagonist, Elaine Risley, “becomes at once tormented 
heroine, enigmatic specter, and, as artist herself, that very conjuring power which 
confers presence and absence within the aesthetic microcosms” (82-83).  
 Poznar’s emphasis on Risley’s “conjuring power” is, however, misplaced. 
Cat’s Eye represents Elaine Risley grappling with her past and present lives while 
visiting a city so packed with mnemonic cues that she feels like she has traveled back 
in time. The narrative’s temporal discontinuities combine with Risley’s forgetting and 
remembering of crucial episodes from her past to contrast different versions (usually 
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different ages) of Elaine Risley’s voice. And yet, as Risley tries to comprehend how 
she relates to Cordelia, her old friend and nemesis, the different versions of her voice 
become entangled: a past scene narrated in the present tense, from young Elaine’s 
point of view, will suddenly contain a retrospective observation that threatens to 
contaminate the whole “naive” narration.13 Even chronologically organized narratives 
may proceed by fits and starts, “jumping o’er times,” as Shakespeare puts it in the 
prologue to Henry V, and “turning the accomplishment of many years into an hour-
glass.” But while Henry V’s chorus begs the viewer’s indulgence, Cat’s Eye takes the 
opposite line by repeatedly highlighting the interpenetration of voices just described 
and Risley’s failure to narrate autobiographically. From her perspective, indeed, the 
whole telling is oriented toward (preparing for and speculating about) her potential 
future encounter with Cordelia. This conjectural narrative orientation prevents the 
Risley of Poznar’s description from becoming the heroine of her own story. Although 
Elaine Risley is a painter who grows up in Toronto, and although the novel conveys 
scenes from her childhood, adolescence, art training, and later adulthood, Risley is 
neither heroine nor specter. Cat’s Eye structures its narrative around a series of 
frameworks for viewing, each of which highlights an observer’s efforts to remove 
herself from a scene in which she is, however, inscribed. The maturity of Risley’s 
artistic production is stipulated from the novel’s early chapters, and the question the 
narration addresses is less How did Risley become an artist? than How do the 
configurations of a scene determine its relations to both observer and observation?  
                                                
13 I disagree with Dvorak, who claims that “on the whole [Atwood] adheres strictly to the stance of the 
naive narrator” (300). 
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 The novel’s conjectural or speculative answer to this question lies in its 
mapping of spatial and visual fields onto linguistic ones and vice versa; and it is 
possible to read both directions of this mapping as flattening the novel’s narrative. On 
the one hand, scenes in which Risley struggles to look through or beyond a surface 
and into the depths of a pool of water, a hole in the ground, or a ravine on the outskirts 
of Toronto are flattened by their rendition as narratorial discourse, in which the scenes 
cannot be seen in their supposed depth. On the other hand, Cat’s Eye’s narration maps 
substantial parts of its own story onto Risley’s paintings, as when her painting Unified 
Field Theory flattens the extended temporality of Risley’s falling through the ice into a 
temporally frozen image. However much these activities produce epistemological or 
ontological instability (the dominant concerns of modernist and postmodernist 
fictions, respectively (McHale)), Cat’s Eye concerns itself primarily with how 
narrative discourse generates, contains, and connects objects of different natures and 
scales: paintings and memories, stories and their tellings, frameworks for viewing and 
lost friends. 
 While Poznar draws illuminating contrasts between The Castle of Otranto’s 
paintings and Cat’s Eye’s images, perhaps she doesn’t sufficiently explore the 
contradictions within the latter: “The totemic image,” she writes, “opens up a matrix of 
relations between the female artist and her body, between the image and its creator, 
between the image and its beholder, and between the image and its predecessor 
images” (105, Poznar’s italics). Poznar’s phrase “Postmodern Gothic Künstlerroman” 
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begs the question whether the named genres are mutually compatible.14 In containing 
such a matrix of relations as Poznar describes, Cat’s Eye’s images distinguish 
themselves from Otranto’s not so much as updates to the Gothic tradition (relocating 
the stakes of haunting from social disruption to psychic disruption), but as the 
products of a genre concerned with the production, reproduction, perception, and 
description of its own contents. And it is this “matrix of relations” that calls for 
narratological investigation specifically, as Cat’s Eye’s narrative discourse strives 
repeatedly to abdicate the position whence it seems to emanate. Even as details of 
Elaine Risley’s life or lives accumulate from page to page, the narration returns again 
and again to a particular framework for viewing, in which observed and observer are 
rendered mutually inaccessible by an intervening image, surface, or screen. When 
Elaine Risley imagines looking “down through [time], like water,” when she falls 
through ice at the bottom of a ravine, or gazes down from a bridge into that same 
ravine years later, or when the discourse describes a painting that incorporates and 
transforms elements of that same setting, the novel experiments with where and how 
to place Risley (some version of whom is always narrating) within a single, 
paradigmatic scenario so that she is erased from the scenes that she narrates, both as 
observer and as participant. 
 My reading of Cat’s Eye’s frames, then, interprets the novel’s narrative 
experimentation as an attempt to delineate its own poetics by testing the conditions of 
possibility for narrating a life. Neither biographical or chronological in its 
                                                
14 Poznar, in particular, seems to accept that “Postmodern” just means “self-reflexive” (and possibly 
contradictory) and then works to illuminate those aspects of the novel that are explicable in terms of the 
other two genre labels. 
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organization, Cat’s Eye is remarkable for how it pushes and pulls its settings and 
characters through time and through the ontological modes of reality, possibility, and 
potential (what is, what might have been, and what might yet be). People, places, and 
things are lost and found in memory; the reappearance of Cordelia is anticipated, half-
realized, and then withdrawn; and at moments the narration even renders characters 
simultaneously living and dead.15 While giving the illusion of filling in Risley’s 
biography, the novel leaves important events suspended among multiple contradictory 
descriptions and different ontologies. Nor does it finish with any particular 
achievement – for example, with the triumphal execution of a particular painting, a 
“masterwork” such as often marks the climax of a Künstlerroman.16 Instead, the 
categories of presence and absence, and life and death, like those of present and past, 
remain perpetually reversible. But the framing and reframing (sometimes quite literal) 
of the novel’s central scenario invites one to set aside these ontological contradictions 
in favor a narrative analysis focused the hybrid object17 that is the frame itself. The 
novel’s framework for viewing plays at least three roles: it is a metaphor for the 
retrieval of past events; a (shifting) rubric for the narration of a life; and itself the 
object whose development gives Cat’s Eye a narrative progression.  
                                                
15 There’s some parallel here with The Body Artist. Marc Schuster reads DeLillo’s fictional artist, 
Lauren Hartke, as learning to encounter her husband’s death “in an ambivalent fashion” – where 
ambivalence is Baudrillardian resistance to consumer culture (177).  
16 Poznar also notes that, unlike a traditional Künstlerroman, Cat’s Eye does not bend toward the hero’s 
production of a “masterwork” (99). 
17 The term is Latour’s. See especially We Have Never Been Modern 30. While Latour’s hybrids are 
“mixtures of nature and culture,” the framework for viewing, in Cat’s Eye, is hybrid in its mixture of 
narrative form with narrative participation. It is thus a hybrid of discourse and story, those domains that 
narratology typically endeavors to separate. 
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 In what follows, then, I hope to recalibrate critical descriptions of this difficult 
novel. I begin Section (2) by illustrating how the questions Cat’s Eye raises over the 
ontological status of its paintings can be reframed as questions of narrative poetics. 
Then in sub-sections (2a) through (2c) I chart the novel’s multiple reconfigurations of 
its narrative perspective and frameworks for viewing, arguing along the way that the 
notion of narratorial “unreliability” is not up to the task of describing Cat’s Eye’s 
narration. In Section (3) I develop a flat-narratological account of the novel, which 
organizes it as a non-biographical (and non-character oriented) story. This account 
takes the novel’s framework for viewing as the narrative object whose story is told, 
and Section (4) considers the implications of this poetics for the ontologies of Elaine 
Risley and her paintings, especially Unified Field Theory, whose metafictional 
function I elaborate. Finally, Section (5) characterizes the novel as an extended 
speculation about language’s effects in the making and mapping of loss; and it locates 
the flatness of Cat’s Eye’s narrative discourse in its attention to the power of words 
over worlds and even life and death. 
 
2. From Cat’s Eye’s Ontologies to Poetics 
 Between the table of contents and the opening paragraph of Cat’s Eye, one 
encounters an untitled page of notes and acknowledgements that highlights the 
peculiar status of certain objects in the novel. “The paintings and other modern works 
of art in this book do not exist,” Atwood writes. “Nevertheless, they have been 
influenced by visual artists Joyce Wieland, Jack Chambers, Charles Pachter, Erica 
Heron, Gail Geltner, Dennis Burton, Louis de Niverville, Heather Cooper, Willian 
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Kurelek, Greg Curnoe, and pop-surreal potter Lenore M. Atwood, among others; and 
by the Isaacs Gallery, the old original.” And so, before the novel has even begun,18 the 
ontological status of the objects it represents comes into question via Atwood’s 
apparently gratuitous denial of their existence. On the one hand, Atwood admonishes 
her readers that there is no point in looking outside the text for the “paintings and 
modern works of art in this book”; but on the other hand, she draws a line of influence 
between real artists and fictional art that elides her authorship of the latter. She may 
mean simply that she, the author, has been influenced by the artists whom she names, 
and that she owes them a debt of gratitude for the fictive descriptions that she deploys. 
Nonetheless, the author’s writing about a character’s paintings as though they were 
real – in the same gesture that denies their existence – reflects the novel’s and the 
narrator’s uneasiness with the ontological status of what they describe.  
 Risley’s paintings, in particular, have struck critics as ontologically puzzling. 
Poznar reads Risley as so distanced, at times, from the products of her own efforts that 
she “is reluctant to ‘own’ the eyes which paint or view this work” (94, Poznar’s 
italics). Poznar implies that Risley feels “interrogated by the picture or compelled to 
query the ontological status” of her Pressure Cooker series (95). What Poznar doesn’t 
explicitly mention is that Risley made the six images of her mother “right after she 
died” because, in part, Risley “wanted to bring her back to life” (Atwood 167). Risley 
invests Pressure Cooker in advance with the desire to cross the boundary between life 
                                                
18 The note appears, in fact, before the two title pages. In a book that broke some number of the 
conventions of the contemporary novel in codex form, like S or Nox we might more readily question the 
sincerity of such a prefatory statement, especially if it were titled “Preface.” 
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and death, then finds the paintings detached from this desire when the series is 
interpreted by others.  
 Marta Dvorak addresses the ontological status of Risley’s paintings via a close 
reading of the ekphrasis associated with them. She remarks that when Risley describes 
her first paintings not made from present models, the ekphrastic discourse “takes on a 
paratactic form that erases discursive segments whose function is to indicate 
relationships between syntagms. The syntactic erasure in appearance suggests a 
corresponding absence of ontological or logical relationships” (304). In other words, 
the paragraphs beginning “I paint a silver toaster”; “I paint a wringer washing 
machine”; “I painted three sofas”; and “I paint a glass jar” (Atwood 366-367) engage 
in what Dvorak calls “mere juxtaposition” (304); they imply that these objects bear no 
meaningful relation to one another or to the fact that Risley has just discovered that 
she is pregnant. Nevertheless, Dvorak says, the canvases “tremble” with meaning, 
both biographically (with respect to Risley) and symbolically (with respect to the 
critic). Somewhat surprisingly, she sums up her reading of these early paintings in 
terms that bring Atwood unnecessarily into the account: 
Atwood’s objects indeed are “simply there,” or in ontological terms, 
simply are. They show nothing, point to nothing beyond themselves. 
Yet the narrator who “has no image of [her]self in relation to them” 
admits that they “are suffused with anxiety.” She insists that it is not 
her own anxiety, but that the anxiety “is in the things themselves.” 
Atwood has indeed charged her objects with anxiety, and they 
“tremble.” (304, Dvorak’s italics)19 
 
Dvorak’s point might have been made by underscoring the contradiction between the 
narration’s assertion that the objects Risley paints are “simply there” and the 
                                                
19 Dvorak’s quotations are from Cat’s Eye 367 in the edition I cite. 
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confession (in the same voice, Risley’s) that they are “suffused with anxiety.” But it is 
not so clear what moves Dvorak to endorse the “simple thereness” of the objects and 
to repeat it via her own claim that “Atwood’s objects[…] in ontological terms, simply 
are.” It’s not clear what makes the objects Atwood’s, given that Risley narrates the 
ekphrasis. Dvorak doesn’t elaborate, but we can infer from her ascription of some 
elements of the discourse to Atwood rather than Risley that in Dvorak’s view, Risley 
has somehow absented herself from her own narration.  
 Alternatively, I suggest that the narration pursues such self-absence without 
ever quite achieving it, and that this paradoxical pursuit motivates Cat’s Eye’s 
metafictional form and the order of its narrative, the series of movements within the 
novel’s central image of an observer divided from what she observes by a literal or a 
metaphorical surface: Elaine Risley as a child is buried underground; she falls through 
the ice and into a creek at the bottom of a ravine, then gazes up at the bridge above; 
and from the opening page she conceives of time as something you look “down 
through… like water” (3). An older Risley paints the image of the creek below the 
bridge and the Virgin of Lost Things hovering above it; and on her last day in Toronto, 
Risley visits the new bridge over the same ravine. The reconfigurations of this image 
or scene largely govern the novel’s structure, and the various surfaces through which 
Risley tries reach the inaccessible – the space or position that doesn’t contain her and 
which her presence does not contaminate – are analogous to one another, to the 
surfaces of her paintings, and to the surface of the text itself. Not that we or Risley 
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have the option of reading these surfaces instead of what lies beyond them20; rather, 
Cat’s Eye insists on a common form of separation between observer and observed, for 
which surface-as-barrier is a sign. It asks for, and tries to imagine, a poetics of this 
separation, a theoretical groundwork for reading the relations that operate across such 
a barrier. And we, like Risley, require a method of reading that handles the flattening 
of ontological differences to this plane.  
 The ontological differences between present and past, active memory and 
potential memory, real and unreal, occupied and empty are all represented in Cat’s Eye 
by the surfaces through which observers look; and those differences are 
simultaneously challenged by dictum that “Nothing goes away” (3). Both portraying 
and eliciting speculative approaches to the inaccessible – efforts to be where one is not 
– Cat’s Eye models the kind of reading that it requires. For all of the novel’s 
uneasiness with its objects’ ontological status, Cat’s Eye doesn’t come to shake up 
ontological distinctions per se, but to wrestle with how fictional discourse both 
enables and hinders access to what fictions contain. 
 
2a. Example: Down Through Time Like Water 
 Cat’s Eye’s opening lines are not properly narrative, but argumentative, 
descriptive, or speculative about the nature of time and what gets lost in it. “Time is 
not a line but a dimension, like the dimensions of space. If you can bend space you can 
bend time also, and if you knew enough and could move faster than light you could 
                                                
20 I am not advocating “surface reading” in the mode described by Marcus and Best in “Surface 
Reading: An Introduction” (2009). 
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travel backward in time and exist in two places at once” (3). Immediately we are faced 
with the question whether to take these statements as true of Cat’s Eye’s diegetic 
world: they look as though they might state a philosophical or science-fictional 
premise for the narrative that follows. Cat’s Eye will return to the trope of time’s 
nonlinearity, but as it happens, these sentences don’t signify a world-building premise. 
Far from definitive, the statement recedes in authority as it gathers context. The 
sentences exemplify the novel’s efforts to destabilize its own discourse and de-center 
its narration. The text proceeds,  
It was my brother Stephen who told me that, when he wore his raveling 
maroon sweater to study in and spent a lot of time standing on his head 
so that the blood would run down into his brain and nourish it. I didn’t 
understand what he meant, but maybe he didn’t explain it very well. He 
was already moving away from the imprecision of words. (3) 
 
The initial claim about time’s structure (“not a line but a dimension”) thus turns out 
not to originate with Risley or to receive her unqualified endorsement. Possibly 
childish, possibly misread or misunderstood, or perhaps irremediably imprecise, 
Stephen’s image of time as a dimension is immediately replaced by the narrator’s own 
vision, which is also the first iteration of the novel’s central framework for viewing: “I 
began then to think of time as having a shape, something you could see, like a series of 
liquid transparencies, one laid on top of another. You don’t look back along time but 
down through it, like water. Sometimes this comes to the surface, sometimes that, 
sometimes nothing. Nothing goes away” (3). Unable to control what “comes to the 
surface,” or whether anything does, the viewer in this scenario stands outside of time 
(a fantasy that this fiction can only almost make true). Time has a visible “shape,” but 
the location of the viewer goes undescribed. Later reconfigurations of this framework 
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might permit the viewer to examine the ground on which she stands; here, however, 
powerless with respect to the past, the time-independent viewer confronts from a 
distance whatever may rise to the level of perceptibility. Containing the unseen as 
permanently as the seen (since “nothing goes away”), the past becomes both intimate 
and alien, subject to the forms of speculation that the future normally invites. We 
might even take this symmetry between the future and the past as justifying the 
narration’s movement between the two.  
 Tension remains, however, between Stephen’s idea that one might move 
between two times and Risley’s metaphor of time as a pool that contains everything. 
Indeed, as the narration reconfigures its framework for viewing, it eventually suggests 
that Risley herself might “exist in two places at once.” Hence, we can see Cat’s Eye’s 
narrative wrestling to synthesize two ideas of time; and it is worth noting that one of 
them is explicitly discursive, while the other is imagistic. Risley treats Stephen’s 
formulation, “Time is not a line but a dimension,” as a sentence, something she repeats 
to Cordelia later and something whose insufficiency or opacity may be due to its 
linguist form.21 (Risley notes that Stephen “was already moving away from the 
imprecision of words.”) In contrast, she doesn’t translate her own vision into words for 
Cordelia, although narrating Risley perforce puts into language what (young) Elaine 
Risley began “to think.” Already Cat’s Eye’s narrative discourse begins to open a 
space between Elaine Risley the character and the perspective, quality, or nature of the 
narration: Risley the character follows Stephen’s movement away from words by 
becoming a painter; but Risley – as narrator – is constrained to the realm of discourse. 
                                                
21 “‘Stephen says time is not a line,’ I say. Cordelia rolls her eyes, as I knew she would” (4). 
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 This particular foregrounding of discourse would not suffice, by itself, to 
undermine accounts of Cat’s Eye as a Künstlerroman. Molly Hite, who reads the novel 
as the story of the making of an artist, writes that “[a]s a Künstlerroman, the novel 
seems to license a double substitution: for painter, read writer; for writer, read writer 
of this novel” (135). If, as Hite claims, “The question of how to read [Elaine Risley’s 
paintings] is in many ways analogous to the question of how to read Cat’s Eye as a 
whole,” then perhaps we could take this opening image as a key to reading the novel 
(138). Maybe the “series of liquid transparencies” could represent the layers of Elaine 
Risley’s past, through which she guides the reader. Maybe their liquidity and 
transparency could explain why different eras or events from Risley’s past sometimes 
overlap with one another in her telling. And yet what lies below the surface, in this 
framework for viewing, is not just the past, but all of time, and the situation of the 
viewer looking down into time from outside it is unstable. And so Hite, too, concludes 
that “Cat’s Eye finally authorizes not a transgressive glimpse into some pre-existing 
private realm of the ‘real,’ but a reminder that the ‘self’ of self-representation is 
always seer as well as seen, and that both seer and seen are implicated in the social 
construction of how one looks” (155). In other words, even if we could imagine a 
viewer narrating from outside time, the realm into which that viewer looked would not 
be “pre-existing” or “private” but co-constructed by the seer and the seen. Self-
representation is fraught to begin with, and Cat’s Eye does not slice personal history 
into distinct layers so much as it explores the possibility of occupying and abandoning 
different positions in that framework of viewing and attempts to describe the (blank or 
transparent) surface that holds those positions apart. It is deeply concerned with the 
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complexities of rendering visual and temporal dynamics in prose, and its progression 
through different arrangements of seer and seen flattens both image into discourse and 
narration into image. 
 
2b. Theory and Example: A Submersion 
 The central problem of Cat’s Eye, then, is one of relationality. Whatever 
position Elaine Risley’s narration takes up, the life it tries to recover and describe from 
the outside is routed through the position presently occupied, and so the opposite side 
of the surface has or holds the emptiness toward which Risley personally aspires. At 
different moments in Cat’s Eye, Risley aspires to empty spaces for two reasons or in 
two ways: First, the empty space represents the ideal place (outside time, say) from 
which her life could be narrated entire. Second, it represents a place of escape from 
her personal misery. But every time Risley goes through the surface, she fails to 
occupy that other space. In this novel’s poetics, passing through the barrier between 
seer and seen only achieves a reversal of the paradigm.  
 This problem of relationality is also the problem taken up – optimistically, one 
might say – by speculative realist philosophy in general and object-oriented ontology 
in particular. In Quentin Meillassoux’s telling, philosophical defenses of empirical 
description have been hampered since Kant by the view that in knowing the world, 
human minds only come to knowledge of their own structures of perception. All 
experience is mediated first by the perceiving body and second by the organizing 
mind, the argument goes, and so knowledge of the external world is impossible. 
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Meillassoux calls this “correlationist circle” (5),22 and one can see the appeal, in such 
a philosophy, of simply flipping the scenario: if one could become that other thing, one 
could know and describe from within, but then one would have given up the 
perspective from which one desired to know. Meillassoux argues that this 
correlationist philosophy is fallacious, however. Some forms of description, especially 
quantitative description, can’t fail, on his view, to talk about an external reality, “an 
absolute” (28). And on a somewhat different but equally relevant tack, Graham 
Harman argues that relations themselves are external things that we can know, co-
constructed as they are by all the parties (persons, ideas – indeed objects in general) 
involved in them. 
 Analogously, the changing relations among the narrating Risleys and between 
the narration and the narrated, the seeing and seen, are the story proper of Cat’s Eye. 
The paintings Elaine Risley makes remain invisible to a reader, but the narrative 
discourse is stuff that a reader encounters directly. As it alters the terms of the 
framework for viewing, it narrates the developing relationship between Risley’s 
narrating present and her biographical past, and scenes of burial represent an early 
stage of Risley’s desire to cross through the surface dividing the viewer and the 
viewed. 
 One of these scenes, echoing and modifying the metaphor of time as a pool, 
attempts to define (or portrays Elaine Risley attempting to define) the narratorial 
present as distinct from the past, on the one hand, and from her life, on the other. With 
                                                
22 Meillassoux defines correlation as “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” (5). 
(He also distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” correlationism (35).) 
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respect to the past, the present is defined by the language Risley uses to herself and by 
the change in the price of an ice cream cone: “I’m lying on the floor, on a futon, 
covered by a duvet. Futon, duvet: this is how far we’ve come.” In the past, “there were 
no futons and no duvets” and “the price of an ice cream cone was five cents. Now it’s 
a dollar if you’re lucky, and not as big either.” So “[t]hat’s the bottom-line difference 
between then and now: ninety-five cents” (13).  
 When Risley characterizes the present in terms of her life, however, her 
perspective shifts from an end-point (“this is how far we’ve come”) to a mid-point: 
“This is the middle of my life. I think of it as a place, like the middle of a river, the 
middle of a bridge, halfway across, halfway over. I’m supposed to have accumulated 
things by now: possessions, responsibilities, achievements, experience and wisdom. 
I’m supposed to be a person of substance” (13). The narration has now tried in two 
different ways to place Elaine Risley. First it tries placing her on the floor in her ex-
husband Jon’s studio in the time and place of futons, duvets, and dollar ice cream 
cones. But then it tries (less certainly) to place her “in the middle” of her river-like 
life. Whether this second placement supplants or supplements the first, it gives some 
direction to the perspective that was at first relatively static. No longer “lying on the 
floor,” Risley is “halfway over.” The narration also implies a preference for 
suspension over submersion by following “the middle of a river” (where one might be 
wet) with “the middle of a bridge.” It also replaces “halfway across,” suggesting 
lateral movement, with “halfway over,” indicating her position above the metaphorical 
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waters.23 This evolution of images separates the narrating Risley from the future and 
past on which she reflects, and her movement is orthogonal to the river’s, whatever the 
river represents. Separated from the flow of her life, Risley also denies feeling like “a 
person of substance.” She is transformed via this series of passages from someone 
simply lying in an apartment, reflecting on her life, into something rather more 
peculiar and subject to different kinds of motion: 
[S]ince coming back here I don’t feel weightier. I feel lighter, as if I’m 
shedding matter, losing molecules, calcium from my bones, cells from 
my blood; as if I’m shrinking, as if I’m filling with cold air, or gently 
falling snow. 
 
With all this lightness I do not rise, I descend. Or rather I am dragged 
downward, into the layers of this place as into liquefied mud. (13-14) 
 
Not only does Risley deny being a “person of substance,” she conceives of herself 
becoming immaterial; and when she is “dragged downward into the layers,” the 
narration makes a first revision to the framework for viewing that Elaine Risley 
imagined as a child. It’s not that she adopts Stephen’s suggestion of time travel and 
time as a dimension: rather than winding up in two places at once as a result of much 
knowledge and speed, Risley gets bogged down in one place, involuntarily, where 
multiple times overlap. The image of overlapping times is her own (“a series of liquid 
transparencies”), but now she is not only looking down into it, but moving through it; 
and the layers have changed from “liquid transparencies” into “liquefied mud.” 
  Analogous to Risley’s account of her own experience, Cat’s Eye’s narrative 
and chronological structures sustain a tension between the relations of suspension and 
                                                
23 “Halfway over” might also be taken to return from a spatial organization to a temporal one, where 
“over” means “done” or “complete.” 
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submersion. The same waters can appear either clear or muddied, and the narration 
can either descend into their midst or look down upon them from above, unable (by its 
own account) to call up a particular event from their depths. “Nothing goes away,” in 
the first version Risley offers up of her ontology of time (3). Nonetheless her narration 
trades in scenes and objects whose status hangs contingently on questions that the 
story won’t answer or that Risley cannot resolve. “Apart from all this, I do of course 
have a real life,” Risley tells us, shortly after denying her substance, but “[a]longside 
my real life I have a career, which may not qualify as exactly real” (15). With such 
gestures the narration self-indulgently promises to ground a real Elaine Risley in the 
kind of everyday life a reader might recognize, then almost immediately takes the 
promise back. If Elaine Risley’s career “may not qualify as exactly real” (my 
emphasis), this narration provides neither access to Elaine Risley’s stipulated “real 
life” nor any indication what that reality would consist of. 
 
2c. Reliably Reversible Burial 
 It may be objected that, by itself, the narratorial offering and retraction of a 
promise does not suggest either a poetics of its own or the need for methodological 
innovation in narrative studies. Wayne Booth coined the term “unreliable narrator” in 
The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961), and his approach to categorizing narrators remains 
influential. James Phelan largely follows it in his analysis of unreliable narration in 
Living to Tell About It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration (2005). Phelan 
begins by pointing out that that a character narrator performs multiple functions that 
can sometimes interfere with each other. Its “telling” functions are discursive and 
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include narrating to the narratee (“narrator functions”) and revealing information to 
the authorial audience (“disclosure functions”). Its “character” functions are “the ways 
in which characters work as representations of possible people ([…] their mimetic 
functions), as representatives of larger groups or ideas (their thematic functions), and 
as artificial constructs within the larger construct of the work (their synthetic 
functions)” (5-6). Like Booth, but with greater precision, Phelan defines unreliability 
as a gap between what a character narrator says to its narratee and what an implied 
author says to its authorial audience.24 
 Since the implied author and the authorial audience are central to Phelan’s 
account of what a text means and its ethical import, his approach can run into trouble 
when, as in Cat’s Eye, the critic’s access to some of these positions is blocked. Phelan 
imagines a feedback loop among authorial agency, reader response, and textual 
phenomena (10). When the reader’s access to authorial agency is blocked, then the 
ethical responsibility for judging characters gets thrown onto the reader.25 The 
blockage itself becomes a rhetorical effect, one that calls on the reader to position him- 
                                                
24 The implied author is not, itself, an unproblematic category, and before Phelan can advance his own 
ethical account of unreliable character narration, he has to wade through the messy debate occasioned 
by Booth’s invention and reification of the implied author. 
25 This is what happens, according to Phelan, at the climax of Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the 
Day: 
Because Ishiguro’s particular use of character narration here blocks our access to conclusive 
signals [from the implied author] about how to respond, the effect of his technique is to 
transfer the responsibility for disambiguating the scene to the flesh-and-blood reader, and the 
deciding factor in how we each carry out that responsibility is our individual ethical beliefs as 
they interact with our understanding of Stevens as a particular character in a particular 
situation. In other words, the consequence of Ishiguro’s technique at this crucial point is that 
he invites our own ethics to play a crucial role in shaping our response to the scene. (60, 
Phelan’s italics) 
The implication of Phelan’s commitments is that, if narrative is rhetoric, then its source is a person, an 
author or an implied author, and what and how it signifies (the most important thing, from the point of 
view of structuralist poetics) is less important than the effects of the feedback loop on the readers of a 
text. 
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or herself authoritatively with respect to the story. As a consequence, there is little 
room in Phelan’s model for discursive instability to infect the source of narration: 
Either the implied author is legible, constructible in a fairly definite way, or else the 
reader is in a position to judge the characters and events of the narrative without 
authorial guidance. His criticism is “realist” in the sense that story-world events are 
the objects of evaluation for all the persons that witness them or participate in them: 
characters, implied authors, and readers. In Cat’s Eye, however, as we have already 
seen, the nature of the “real” is in play, and in order to naturalize the narrative, to 
make it cohere biographically (as Phelan would insist on doing), one must make not 
ethical judgments, but ontological ones.  
 As the extant criticism on Cat’s Eye demonstrates, this task is achievable. With 
concepts like self-division (Hite 139), braided discourses (Banerjee 514), and 
interwoven double narrative (Dvorak 299), it might seem that critics are well equipped 
to describe Cat’s Eye’s peculiar discourse. Yet as these critics explicate Cat’s Eye’s 
themes – optical or concealing, “denying the past” (Banerjee) or “telescoping past and 
present” (Dvorak) – they simplify the set of perspectives that Cat’s Eye has on offer. 
To reach their conclusions regarding what the novel is about (gendered and 
disciplining gazes, “hiding,” or the polysemy of linguistic and visual signs, 
respectively) they synthesize voices and discourses of different qualities and from 
different times in Risley’s supposed biography. Naturalizing Cat’s Eye’s discourse so 
that it narrates an artist’s life, they look past narratological questions that are just as 
present in the autobiographical story Risley tries to tell as they are in un-simplified 
narration: Which elements of narrative discourse belong above the surface, and which 
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can be submerged? How should a narrator work (with) the reversibility of these 
categories? 
 The two events that mark reversals in the power dynamics between (young) 
Elaine Risley and Cordelia both prioritize the difficulty of bridging gaps between 
mutually inaccessible conditions or positions: knowledge and ignorance; memory and 
forgetting; dominance and subjugation. Both events also deal expressly with the 
border between life and death, rendered as a surface below which the dead are 
submerged and above which life carries on. First there is the live burial, possibly 
datable to Remembrance Day, November 11, in which Cordelia, Grace and Carol bury 
the eight-year-old Elaine in Cordelia’s backyard. They cover the hole with wooden 
boards and cover the boards with dirt (115). Second is Elaine Risley’s near-death 
experience, when she falls through the icy surface of the creek in the bottom of the 
ravine where Cordelia has thrown her hat. In both scenes, Risley’s “reliability” as 
narrator is beside the point, since the first problem is to understand how the narration 
juxtaposes – or navigates among – mutually inaccessible narratorial positions. (Young) 
Elaine’s present-tense narration has no access to the older Risley’s self-evaluation, 
while the narrating Risley asserts her loss of memory with respect to the events 
described. Yet the narration proceeds anyhow, proposing and evaluating relations of 
different kinds between these positions. 
 Both biographically and discursively prior to the ravine scene, the live burial 
revises the framework for viewing established in the opening chapter, producing a new 
interior tension. No longer (only) standing above the surface and outside time, the 
narration descends with Elaine underground, into the hole; for all that, it doesn’t 
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entirely abandon the perspective of the observer looking down. Instead, a shift in 
narratorial perspective dramatizes the difficulty bringing these two positions into clear 
causal, temporal, or psychological relations. In the brief chapter (Chapter 20) that 
contains this scene, the hole in Cordelia’s backyard is figured first as a place of 
anticipated social connection, then as a place of utter isolation, and finally as a cue to 
Risley’s rich, yet misplaced, perceptual memories. This hole is the most “promising” 
of several that Cordelia has begun digging (114). Looking forward, Elaine narrates 
how Cordelia “says we can use it for a clubhouse, we can put chairs down in the hole 
and sit on them. When it’s deep enough she wants to cover it over with boards, for a 
roof” (115). At this stage there is little hint that Elaine will badly abused by her 
friends, although her social distance from them has been marked, for example, by her 
unfamiliarity with Cordelia’s table settings and by the Risley parents’ anxiety over 
Mrs. Smeath’s plan to bring Elaine to church (78, 103). Before the live burial is 
related, the narration turns to a school commemoration of Remembrance Day and the 
children’s memorization of John McCrae’s “In Flanders Fields.” The poem’s opening 
clause appears as evidence of the memorization, but the sentence “We are the dead” 
interrupts a paragraph narrating the eleven o’clock minutes of silence. “We are the 
dead,” italicized, thus appears as Elaine’s interior monologue, at once giving voice to 
the dead (as the poem itself does) and prefiguring Risley’s occupancy of both sides of 
the life-death divide.  
 The inclusive plurality of “We are the dead” contrasts ironically with the 
isolation into which Elaine is about to descend: 
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Cordelia and Grace and Carol take me to the deep hole in Cordelia’s 
backyard. I’m wearing a black dress and a cloak, from the dress-up 
cupboard. I’m supposed to be Mary, Queen of Scots, headless already. 
They pick me up by the underarms and the feet and lower me into the 
hole. Then they arrange the boards over the top. The daylight air 
disappears, and there’s the sound of dirt hitting the boards, shovelful 
after shovelful. Inside the hole it’s dim and cold and damp and smells 
like toad burrows. 
 
Up above, outside, I can hear their voices, and then I can’t hear them. I 
lie there wondering when it will be time to come out. Nothing happens. 
When I was put into the hole I knew it was a game; now I know it is 
not one. I feel sadness, a sense of betrayal. Then I feel the darkness 
pressing down on me; then terror. (115-116) 
 
These two paragraphs narrate Elaine’s isolation from her friends in terms that also 
suspend the burial scene between event and non-event. “Cordelia and Grace and 
Carol,” evenly connected to one another by the paratactic “and,” have put Elaine in the 
position of a dead person “already,” and so, in the world of their play, the burial isn’t 
what kills Elaine. Nor, in narratological terms, is the burial what isolates her, since the 
“ands” linking the three other girls plainly exclude her already. But in the register of 
Elaine’s experience, the burial divides her from her friends: it deprives her of daylight, 
their voices, their loyalty, and her sense of time’s passage. Once down in the hole, 
“Nothing happens.”  
 For the moment, then, the hole is a place of non-relation. In it, Elaine loses 
access to her friends, and in “wondering when it will be time to come out,” Elaine 
herself is in the position of “this” or “that” or “nothing” which may come to the 
surface of time’s pool in the novel’s earlier image (3). She’s been translated from the 
exterior viewer to the contents of the depths, and the perspectival shift that 
immediately follows the paragraphs quoted above reinforces the inaccessibility of 
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those contents. Elaine is, in effect, divided from Risley when the narration abandons 
(young) Elaine’s narration and picks up with Risley’s retrospective account26: “When I 
remember back to this time in the hole, I can’t really remember what happened to me 
while I was in it” (116). In this self-confounding language, Risley both “remembers 
back to this time” (apparently making some kind of journey) and “can’t really 
remember what happened.” At this stage in the novel’s configuration of its framework 
for viewing, the figure for Risley’s lack of memory is an empty visual field. She 
narrates having “no image of [her]self in the hole; only a black square filled with 
nothing, a square like a door. Perhaps the square is empty; perhaps it’s only a marker, 
a time marker that separates the time before it from the time after. The point at which I 
lost power” (116).  
 Risley’s apparent effort to recall this episode contrasts with later passages in 
which she confesses an active will toward forgetting. “I don’t want to remember,” she 
tells us. “The past has become discontinuous, like stones skipped across water, like 
postcards: I catch an image of myself, a dark blank, an image, a blank” (329). Risley 
thus punctuates her past in visual terms, with blanks separating images from one 
another. The burial scene exemplifies how Risley’s narration stitches together 
                                                
26 Actually, a grammatical ambiguity anticipates the change in perspective. In the clause “Up above, 
outside, I can hear their voices,” the spatial markers technically modify the pronoun “I,” although the 
rest of the sentence suggests that they modify “their voices.” It is appropriate, though, that we get this 
hint of Elaine Risley outside the hole, even in the passage that narrates her burial, because Elaine 
elsewhere creates and describes such dislocations. For example, she learns how to faint “almost 
whenever [she] want[s] to” (191). “There’s a way out of places you want to leave, but can’t,” she 
narrates. “Fainting is like stepping sideways, out of your own body, out of time or into another time. 
When you wake up it’s later. Time has gone on without you” (189). As in Risley’s account of her life, 
location, and profession (13), the contrast appears between moving into and out of depths, on the one 
hand, which requires crossing a surface barrier, and movingly laterally (“stepping sideways”), on the 
other. My thanks to Fredric Bogel for pointing this out. 
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forgetting and remembering. Even as it insists on the irretrievability of what goes on 
under the surface, it brings that space into relation, showing how the inaccessible 
remains active. The older Risley “need[s] to fill in the black square of time, go back to 
see what’s in it” (116). “If I could even see the undersides of the boards above my 
head it might help,” she tells us, although we have no way of determining from what 
biographical moment Risley might be narrating. “I close my eyes, wait for pictures” 
(116). 
 What happens next nicely illustrates Cat’s Eye’s complex temporalities. While 
Elaine’s time in the hole is a blank, there is a “wait” with some duration while Risley 
recollects what turns out to be “the wrong memory” (117): 
At first there’s nothing; just a receding darkness, like a tunnel. But after 
a while something begins to form: a thicket of dark-green leaves with 
purple blossoms, dark purple, a sad rich color, and clusters of red 
berries, translucent as water. […] Nightshade, I think. It’s a dark word. 
There is no nightshade in November. (116-117, Atwood’s italics) 
 
The live burial scene culminates, then, in the replacement of visual and spatial 
reckonings with a single word. The darkness gets filled in temporarily by the image of 
nightshade, and the “translucent” berries let light into the scene; but instead of 
resolving into a clear image, the memory crystallizes around the italicized word, 
which remains “dark.” Then the memory is shunted from the narrative timeline, since 
“there is no nightshade in November.” The live burial makes a permanent impression 
on the narrator, but an impression she can only belatedly access by negation. It is a 
“marker” of the before and after that itself lacks discernible features. The only image 
Risley can retrieve from the experience is the wrong one, and it is flattened almost 
immediately into a word. 
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 “Nightshade” recurs in a passage that anticipates the central scene where 
Elaine goes through the ice below a bridge. Elaine, in Grade Five, defers an encounter 
with Cordelia, Grace, and Carol in order to imagine her suicide in terms of erasure and 
disassembly: “I think about becoming invisible. I think about eating the deadly 
nightshade berries from the bushes beside the path. I think […] about jumping off the 
bridge, smashing down there like a pumpkin, half of an eye, half of a grin. I would 
come apart like that, I would be dead, like the dead people” (172-173). Nightshade is 
connected to death not just by the live burial scene, but also by its offer of suicide.27 
Crucially, however, the crossing over into death is about barring Elaine’s tormentors 
from reaching her, and not about terminating Elaine’s existence. Here, and elsewhere, 
the narration promises that there’s something to be like when one is dead.28 This 
persistence of the inaccessible sustains the novel, which depends on the unfulfilled 
promise that Risley will encounter Cordelia once again. 
 The live burial isolates Elaine negatively, separating her from the social circle 
on which she depends as a child and severing her childhood experience from her adult 
memory. Emphasizing both Elaine’s and Risley’s lack of images, it connects the 
positions of the two narratorial perspectives with a word, “nightshade,” that resonates 
for both and seems to dissolve the surface that separates them: “The nightshade is a 
                                                
27 The smashed pumpkins of this suicidal ideation also appear in Chapter 20, which opens with 
Halloween before moving into Remembrance Day. 
28 The novel offers a profusion of suspended deaths that show, taken together, how becoming invisible, 
dying, and going away are no guarantee against being. For example, Risley figures her parents as “dead 
but also alive [….] lying side by side, in their summer clothes, and sinking down through the earth, 
which is hard but transparent like ice” (185). Whether this is Elaine’s dream or Risley’s much later 
account – whether, in other words, Elaine Risley’s parents are chronologically dead or alive – goes 
unspecified. In either case, the narrator stays above the surface: “They look up at me sorrowfully as 
they recede” (185). 
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common weed. You pull it out of the garden and throw it away” (117). In other words, 
it comes out of the surface of the ground beneath which Elaine has been buried, and 
yet “the flowers, the smell, the movement of the leaves persist” in memory, “rich, 
mesmerizing, desolating, infused with grief” (ibid.). Nightshade’s sensorial persistence 
instantiates the power of discourse to link positions separated by a surface, and 
participates in the novel’s figuration of burial as reversible. 
 In contrast, the creek experience to which we next turn stages a positive 
isolation. Elaine is again separated from Cordelia, Grace, and Carol, but she is also 
rescued (reintegrated into a social space) by the appearance of a vision that Elaine 
provisionally identifies as the Virgin Mary. Here it is not discourse that crosses a gap, 
but a kind of hallucination. The live burial and the ravine scene thus come into tension 
over the nature of what divides and bridges the positions of seer and seen, living and 
dead, et cetera. The development of this configuration becomes Cat’s Eye’s story. 
 
3. Cat’s Eye’s Framework for Viewing: a Narrative Object 
 Appearing near the center of the novel, Elaine’s descent into the ravine 
introduces a scenario that has staying power and through which the narration will 
continue to experiment with different frameworks for viewing. In the first pass, the 
narration performs multiple balancing acts to suspend the scene outside the reader’s 
(or Risley’s) apprehension. When Elaine goes down to get her hat, which Cordelia has 
thrown over the side of the bridge, maybe Elaine goes through the thin ice 
intentionally. Maybe the narrating Risley knows one way or the other. Maybe Elaine’s 
vision of the Virgin Mary, hovering above the bridge, is real. These possibilities 
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persist, in part, because the position of the observer, up on the bridge, goes both filled 
and unfilled; and because this version of the scene reverses the earlier trope of an 
observer looking into water. Later, however, Risley will return to this geographical 
setting as a teen and as an adult; and she will paint a canvas, Unified Field Theory, 
based on the vision Elaine has down in the ravine. Each narrative return to this 
scenario entails a new configuration of the framework for viewing, and I will diagram 
these frameworks below. 
 In its most general form, the framework is just a division between observer and 
observed. A barrier of some kind – an image, a surface, a screen – keeps the two apart: 
 
Figure 2 
Risley’s childhood account of time renders the framework hierarchical, with the 
observer looking down into the past. 
 
Figure 3 
The live burial shows how the past remains alive, but although it positions (young) 
Elaine underneath the ground, nothing can be seen from there; seeing remains the 
(limited) power of the older Risley looking back.  
 60 
 The ravine scene appears at first to map easily onto the framework already 
established. When Elaine goes through the ice, the narration reminds us that this water 
is the place of the past: “The water of the creek […] comes straight from the cemetery, 
from the graves and their bones. It’s water made from the dead people, dissolved and 
clear, and I am standing in it” (208). This immersion in the past differs from the live 
burial in several ways, however. In the burial scene, the hole was prepared and the 
boards were put in place and covered with dirt after Elaine was already below the 
surface. But in the ravine there’s no sense that Elaine is “already” dead. She has to 
break the ice, crossing the barrier between present and past more actively than before. 
This raises the question of whether Elaine is abdicating the position of the observer for 
the position of the observed, or whether by falling into the water she somehow 
collapses the distance between observer and past time that the narration has earlier 
established.  
 When Risley looks up from the stream at first, “Nobody is there” (207), but this 
emptying of the position of the spectator is unstable and temporary. When Risley looks 
again, “There’s someone on the bridge, I can see the dark outline. At first I think it’s 
Cordelia, come back for me. Then I see that it’s not a child, it’s too tall for a child. I 
can’t see the face, there’s just a shape. One of the yellowish-green lights is behind it, 
coming out in rays from around the head” (208). The vagueness of this vision is 
striking, as is Risley’s attempt to identify with the figure when it begins to move: “She 
isn’t falling, she’s coming down toward me as if walking, but there’s nothing for her to 
walk on.” Risley thinks, “I would like to be able to walk on air like that” (209).  
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 It is evident that when the ice breaks, the barrier between past and present, 
between observed and observer, does not vanish. Instead, the scenario becomes 
dynamic: the bridge, rather than the broken ice, somehow substitutes for the surface of 
time’s pool (or the surface of the ground in the burial scene). Elaine is positioned 
beneath, and the bridge begins empty, then holds “someone” with a “dark outline” 
who in turn begins to descend through the air. 
 
Figure 4 
That Risley “would like to be able to walk on air like that” suggests both her desire to 
leave the bridge and her wish to navigate between the categories that surfaces in this 
novel hold apart. There is no way, however, to make narrative sense of Elaine Risley’s 
movements through this scenario. The fact, for example, that late in Elaine’s middle 
school years, “[t]he wooden footbridge over the ravine is torn down” does not prevent 
her from revisiting this scenario: “I go one day and stand at the top of the hill on our 
side of the ravine, watching the bridge come down. […] I have an uneasy feeling, as if 
something’s buried down there, a nameless, crucial thing, or as if there’s someone still 
on the bridge, left by mistake, up in the air, unable to get to the land. But it’s obvious 
there’s no one” (222). Even when there is no bridge, Risley’s sense of the bridge 
remains, as does her feeling that something remains down below. The framework for 
viewing persists even when the structures that supported it earlier are torn down. 
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Later, a new concrete bridge spans the same gap, and when Risley visits it on her 
return to Toronto, it becomes possible to map her features onto what young Elaine 
observed so many years before, from below. The “yellowish-green lights” may be the 
new lampposts; and the “glimpse of red,” which young Elaine takes for the heart of 
the Virgin Mary, is explicable as a hint of middle-aged Risley’s cerise jogging suit, 
visible where her coat parts in front. Finally, even the words that Elaine’s vision 
speaks, “You can go home now,” are among the words that Risley directs to her vision 
of a past Cordelia (209, 459).  
 In biographical terms, what’s on the bridge while Elaine freezes in the creek 
below could be Cordelia (but isn’t) and could be the Virgin Mary, although Elaine only 
says to her mother, “A lady helped me” (210, 211).29 Or, more convincingly from a 
certain perspective, what’s on the bridge is just Risley looking down into the creek and 
backward in time; and if that’s the case, then Risley willy-nilly occupies the position 
of the spectator that Elaine abandons when she descends into the ravine. In any case, 
the position of the observer, high above, empties and fills and empties again in this 
first iteration of the scenario.  
 Later, however, the adult Risley returns to the spot, and the events we have just 
analyzed are narrated and re-narrated again.30 “From here it looks neutral,” Risley 
relates, looking at the transformed place where years ago she suffered, but this 
                                                
29 Actually, Elaine moves over a period of two days from total certainty (“It’s the Virgin Mary, there 
can be no doubt”) to the feeling that a “hazy space” has filled the time between falling into the creek 
and seeing her mother, a space in which she is “not sure now, that it really was the Virgin Mary” (212). 
30 For extended discussions of this operation see both McHale’s chapter “Worlds Under Erasure” (in 
Postmodernist Fiction) and Richardson, Brian. “Denarration in Fiction: Erasing the Story in Beckett 
and Others.” Narrative, vol. 9, no. 2, 2001, pp. 168–175. 
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appearance of neutrality evidently doesn’t satisfy her, and the narration carries us, with 
Risley, back into the scene: “I stand at the top of the hill, take a breath. Then I start 
down” (457). In this passage, which closely follows Cordelia’s failure to appear at 
Risley’s gallery opening (both discursively and chronologically), the novel returns to 
its original framework for viewing: an observer looks down towards a surface which 
she may or may not get through. Atypically, Risley’s narration here remains for some 
time in the past tense – sort of: 
That was where I fell into the water, there is the bank where I 
scrambled up. That’s where I stood, with the snow falling on me, 
unable to summon the will to move. That’s where I heard the voice. 
 
There was no voice. No one came walking on air down from the 
bridge, there was no lady in a dark cloak bending over me. Although 
she has come back to me now in absolute clarity, acute in every detail, 
the outline of her hooded shape against the lights from the bridge, the 
red of her heart from within the cloak, I know this didn’t happen. There 
was only darkness and silence. Nobody and nothing. (458-459) 
 
Although this passage describes Elaine’s childhood experience in the past tense, it also 
points actively, presently, to the places Risley identifies; and the “lady in a dark cloak” 
returns to Risley “now.” The narrative thus balances the vision’s coming back to 
Risley “in absolute clarity” against the definite statement that when Elaine was down 
in the ravine “[n]obody and nothing” were there. Presence, it turns out, keeps on 
trumping absence, even after Risley recognizes – when Cordelia finally fails to show 
up at her opening – “I’ve been prepared for almost anything; except absence, except 
silence” (452). 
 The contrast between different versions of the ravine scene make the 
configuration of Cat’s Eye’s narration extremely difficult to parse in terms of character 
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or biography. Most directly, we may be unsure what to conclude about Elaine’s vision 
from the bottom of the ravine. Did she see anything, or did she only imagine that she 
did? Further, if the novel has a single narrator, then that narrator, Risley, sometimes 
appears to occupy Elaine’s perspective so completely – telling Elaine’s story in present 
tense, using Elaine’s words – that it becomes too difficult to say in what way Risley, 
rather than Elaine, is narrating. But taking Elaine to be a separate, second narrator 
would further fragment an already disjointed life-story. Given Risley’s self-
consciousness about memory, her confessions of forgetfulness, and the scientific 
discourse through which the narration sometimes explicitly approaches time’s 
nonlinearity, it seems a bit cynical to conclude that Risley reports Elaine’s memories, 
in Elaine’s voice, so unreliably that she interposes images of her adult self between the 
soaked, freezing Elaine and the unthinkable emptiness atop the bridge. On the one 
hand, such a reading of the narration would carelessly diminish the power of its 
persistent present tense to render the fluctuations of Elaine Risley’s self-knowledge 
over time. On the other hand, there seems to be something equally wrong and equally 
cynical with the alternative view, that Elaine and Risley literally become visible to one 
another across the decades. Such a transaction would render the diegetic world 
comprehensible as a science fiction at the cost of vitiating the text’s deep engagement 
with how memory and history come into view.31 
                                                
31 Brian Richardson notes that “narrative self-erasure” can have a variety of functions, and that it need 
not produce ontological instability when there is “a stabilizing frame available” (101). My claim is that 
framework for viewing, although it takes different forms in different scenes of Cat’s Eye, provides such 
a stabilizing frame. 
 65 
 We require, therefore, a reading that makes sense of Cat’s Eye’s complex 
narrative modes by describing and sustaining (rather than biographically resolving) the 
aesthetic and philosophical conundrums posed by Elaine Risley’s burial, submersion, 
and suspension, and by the tenacious concurrence of the forgotten and the remembered 
in Risley’s first-personal narration. When the novel offers up a narrating voice that 
describes a blankness at the very point (on or above the bridge, for example) from 
which it supposedly emanates, this is not – or not only – a way of rendering a 
biographical narrative of trauma into prose. It is rather the grounds for taking Elaine 
Risley to have a liminal ontology, a “transitional” way of being observer and observed, 
through whose shifting frameworks Cat’s Eye narrates a story (6). 
 
4. “Whatever it is by itself” / “Or so you think” 
 The ravine scene, as first narrated by Elaine, tells in several ways how the 
position of the observer on the bridge gets emptied out. Elaine herself descends from 
the bridge into the ravine; Cordelia, Grace, and Carol leave, too; and the “dark 
outline” of a woman who appears afterward also begins a descent from the bridge, 
through the air. The adult Risley, however, visits this location from above, and when 
she tries to reaffirm the vacancy of this position (“There was no voice. No one came 
walking on air down from the bridge,” etc.), she reinscribes herself in the scene (458, 
459). It seems, then, that Risley’s opening premise, that “nothing goes away,” 
maintains some force of truth, even in the face of Risley’s never actually meeting 
Cordelia again. This oscillation between insistent presence and definite absence is 
rendered in different ways by each iteration of the framework for viewing. The 
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oscillation is an action central to the novel’s narrative – both how it is told and what 
happens in it. 
 The liminal ontology of Cat’s Eye’s protagonist, then, is best understood by 
treating the versions of Elaine Risley as metafictional hybrids of story and discourse 
whose narrative roles are shaped by this oscillation in and out of visibility. These 
versions are not representations of a single character whose life-story they tell in 
different ways, but are themselves participants in a story about how seer and seen 
interact. And Cat’s Eye offers Risley’s paintings as a metafictional model for how to 
read its suspended narrative poetics – its denials and repetitions that allow 
incompatible and mutually inaccessible versions of Elaine Risley to coexist in the 
discourse. The position of the observer in the novel’s framework for viewing is not 
finally contained in Elaine Risley’s biographical time or space, but the framework for 
viewing is itself a narrative object, and one that traditional narrative poetics centered 
on characters, plots, and settings may not identify as such. Taking the framework for 
viewing (rather than Elaine Risley) as the entity around which Cat’s Eye’s major 
action revolves enables special attention to the resolution offered by Risley’s painting, 
Unified Field Theory, which in turn permits us to locate the position of the observer in 
the metafictional space where words flatten into images and vice versa. 
 Unlike the ravine scene, Unified Field Theory removes the observed figure 
from below the surface or barrier, not from above it, although the scene it depicts 
resembles the ravine scene closely. While there is “a woman dressed in black, with a 
black hood or veil covering her hair” floating above, “[u]nderneath the bridge is the 
night sky, as seen through a telescope. Star upon star, red, blue, yellow, and white, 
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swirling nebulae, galaxy upon galaxy; the universe, in its incandescence and darkness. 
Or so you think. But there are also stones down there, beetles and small roots, because 
this is the underside of the ground” (446, 447). Without a human figure in the lower 
third of the canvas, the underside of the bridge becomes a version of the scene as a 
whole, rendered on a smaller scale and self-similar, like a fractal: It is a “night sky,” 
with stars hung in it, but also subterranean, evoking both the burial in Cordelia’s 
backyard and the cemetery whose water feeds the creek. 
 Unified Field Theory, then, in its composition and in the narrative description 
of it, is a metafictional device. By rendering the above and the below (the positions, 
respectively, of observer and observed) not as adjacent and divided, but as recursively 
containing each other, the scene establishes a perspective outside itself, a view that 
belongs to neither the young Elaine nor the older Risley and that is underlined by the 
phrase “or so you think.” Within the narrative world (i.e. diegetically), Risley refers 
with this phrase to her imagined viewer, someone standing in the gallery and looking 
at the painting. Beyond the story world, however, it apostrophizes the reader, who, 
unlike Risley’s imagined viewer, has no independent access to what Risley describes 
and no way to perceive it visually. 
 Borrowing its title from a lecture Risley’s brother Stephen has given (and that 
Risley attended), Unified Field Theory makes a pun that depends on the novel’s 
discourse – that would not, in other words, be accessible to any of the characters. In 
physics, unified field theories are those that describe all of the fundamental forces 
together, but no such theory is accepted, and possibly none exists. Similarly, Cat’s 
Eye’s fourteenth (and penultimate) part is called “Unified Field Theory,” and holds out 
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the promise or illusion of gathering the novel’s competing narrative voices under a 
single rubric. To do so, however, one must perform the impossible action of removing 
oneself from the framework for viewing, becoming neither observer nor observed. As 
it happens, Stephen’s lecture ends on a speculative note. It asks, “what of the moment 
beyond the first moment? […] Or does it even make sense to use the word before, 
since time cannot exist without space and space-time without events and events 
without matter-energy?” (361, Atwood’s italics). In the novel, then, the phrase “unified 
field theory” evokes a question about the inaccessible (the prior-to-time) even as it 
names a theory that unifies and explains. The painting, meanwhile, pictures the 
eponymous cat’s eye marble, presumably like the one that Elaine tucked away for 
years and then rediscovered in the trunk in her mother’s basement. The cat’s eye has 
been much discussed as a symbol or metaphor for the novel’s conception of vision. 
But in the present argument, what matters is not vision, but observation. While Risley 
can “look into [the marble], and see [her] life entire,” in Unified Field Theory the cat’s 
eye would be opaque to a diegetic visitor – and to a reader of the novel, the marble is 
perceptible only in words (434, my italics). 
 Cat’s Eye’s narration says little enough about writing. “[T]he imprecision of 
words” impresses Risley a great deal, as does her brother Stephen’s apparent 
preference for numbers, but painting generally underpins Cat’s Eye’s structure – 
without, however, managing to appear. The novel thus comments formally on its own 
telling, at the remove created by translating one medium into another. Although the 
novel’s parts are named for Elaine Risley’s paintings; although the plot is geared 
towards producing its anti-climax at the opening of Risley’s retrospective show; and 
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although Risley describes certain of her paintings in significant detail, the paintings 
themselves, rendered linear by their translation into words, cannot be perceived whole 
by the reader, nor can they be taken in all at one moment.32 With their visual qualities 
trapped below or beyond the surface of the text, they occupy a position analogous to 
whatever lies below the surface of time in the novel’s guiding image, and so it seems 
that they should situate the reader in the position of the observer up on the bridge. But 
we have seen how unstable the positions of Cat’s Eye’s observers always are, and we 
have also encountered commentary coming from below, both in the burial scene and in 
Elaine’s experience in the ravine. The paintings do not quite fit into the framework for 
viewing that the novel elsewhere establishes, but rather comment on it. 
 Risley’s aspiration to empty certain landscapes, certain passages, of her own 
presence reinforces this treatment of her paintings as exceptions to (or from?) the 
narrated world. When Risley visits the bridge and becomes, in some way, the object of 
Elaine’s vision from below, she imagines, symmetrically to Elaine, that Cordelia has 
come into view: “I know that if I turn, right now, and look ahead of me along the path, 
someone will be standing there. At first I think it will be myself, in my old jacket, my 
blue knitted hat. But then I see that it’s Cordelia” (459). This “seeing” is especially 
strange. The narration blatantly omits any transition between the imagined and the 
real, but goes from thinking to being in an instant. And so it begins a fully rendered 
scene in which Risley reaches out to try to comfort Cordelia with the powerful words, 
“It’s all right. You can go home now,” words that echo what Elaine heard years before 
                                                
32 See Kittler (esp. pp. 103-104) on the relation between linguistic discourse, artistic and mechanical 
media, and the stoppage and storage of time. 
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(459, Atwood’s italics). Yet moments later, when Risley “turn[s], finally, Cordelia is 
no longer there” (460). So wherever Elaine Risley is positioned, she imagines she sees 
Cordelia, not herself; and as this section closes, Risley purports to be done with seeing 
altogether: “There’s nothing more for me to see. The bridge is only a bridge, the river 
a river, the sky is a sky. This landscape is empty now, a place for Sunday runners. Or 
not empty: filled with whatever it is by itself, when I’m not looking” (460). Risley 
strives here to narrate an empty landscape, the thing that continues when she stops 
observing; but paradoxically her language fills the space. This filling in, however, 
unlike the empty landscape, is something the novel can and does describe, repeatedly 
and well. Far from telling the story of Elaine Risley’s survival and maturation, it tells 
of the persistent, ever-changing relations between observer and observed that go on 
even beyond the narrator’s capacity to access a scene.  
 Ultimately, by burying Elaine, by almost drowning her, by suspending her in 
the air and in the future above the scene of her own near-death, by twinning her with 
her friend and nemesis Cordelia, and by painting the ravine scene from a position that 
the scene excludes, the novel urges the reader to discover the narrative material that its 
narrator cannot touch, namely the phrases and frames that drive the story. 
 
5. Conclusion: “You can stop playing that” 
 At the end of 2c. above, I suggested that some of Cat’s Eye’s scenes rely on the 
power of discourse to bridge ontological gaps, while others rely on vision –
 particularly hallucination. Overall, however, Cat’s Eye’s narrative organization 
flattens the discursive realm into the visual and vice versa. Elaine’s visual 
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hallucination in the ravine hinges on the appearance of comforting words that are not 
heard “out loud” (209); similar words close Risley’s peculiar vision of Cordelia in the 
novel’s penultimate chapter33; and Unified Field Theory, the painting whose 
composition makes it the keystone of Cat’s Eye’s reflexive commentary, depends for 
its effect on the words of its title and the discourse that provides exclusive access to its 
supposedly visual contents. Perhaps the most potent words in Cat’s Eye are those that 
flatten life into death, though not into non-existence. First they belong to Stephen, 
Elaine’s older brother, who makes Elaine “play war” with him: 
I am the infantry, which means I have to do what he says. He waves me 
forward, motions me back, tells me to keep my head down so the 
enemy won’t blow it off. 
 “You’re dead,” he says. 
 “No I’m not.” 
 “Yes you are. They got you. Lie down.” (26) 
 
Stephen’s authority over Elaine is rooted in vision (“There is no arguing with him, 
since he can see the enemy and I can’t” (ibid.)), but his authority is exercised in 
language. When, as Cat’s Eye approaches its end, Risley co-opts Stephen’s life-taking 
and life-making authority, she relies on his language to banish Cordelia, in spite of not 
having seen her at the gallery on the evening her retrospective opens. That night, after 
acknowledging to herself that “Cordelia has a tendency to exist” (453, Atwood’s 
italics), Risley addresses her old friend, and apparently Cordelia responds: 
You’re dead, Cordelia. 
No I’m not. 
Yes you are. You’re dead. 
                                                
33 The vision is peculiar because it wavers between Gerald Prince’s “disnarration” (in which an event 
that is imagined or hypothetical with respect to the story world is narrated) and Brian Richardson’s 
“denarration” (in which an event is narrated as though it occurs in the story world and then denied in 
subsequent narration). 
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Lie down. (454, Atwood’s italics) 
 
It appears then that the novel has translated the domain in which these words operate 
from a childhood game into a serious imperative, and from play on “swampy ground” 
to play across the textual surface of the narrative (26). Risley’s late imperative to 
Cordelia to “Lie down” acknowledges the absent Cordelia’s existential intrusion into 
Risley’s world, but commands it to flatten itself; and we can infer the success of that 
late command by the absence of any further reply from Cordelia. 
 Cordelia’s non-appearance at the gallery isn’t the final word. Nor is the silence 
(marked by white space and a chapter break) that follows Risley’s imperative, “Lie 
down.” Actually, Risley has already conceived of herself “headed for a future in which 
[….] Cordelia vanishes and vanishes,” and her final vision of the young Cordelia, on 
the bridge above the ravine, is still to come (451-452, 459-460).  
 The point is that Risley’s desires and efforts to banish Cordelia redound on her, 
as well. Cordelia and Risley have “changed places,” or they are “like […] twins” (249, 
450). If either were fully dead or completely vanished, the novel’s flattening of 
different ontological domains would fail; and this mutual dependency is explicitly 
thematized. Elaine, for example, deploys the image of her own death to rattle Cordelia. 
“I’m just telling you the truth […],” says Elaine in eleventh grade. “I’m really dead. 
I’ve been dead for years” (256). Cordelia’s answer, “You can stop playing that,” gives 
Elaine pleasure (ibid.); it also calls up the question of whether game and non-game can 
be properly distinguished in this novel. 
 Cat’s Eye concludes, as it opens, with a narrational gambit, a voice that seems 
to escape its character narrator, Risley. By rendering the absent and the inaccessible as 
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a locus (however unstable) from which discourse issues nonetheless, Cat’s Eye’s 
narration creates a space into which it can banish Risley without having to delete her, 
and the novel can strive at last (as Risley herself does) to depict the world in her 
absence, even though she cannot quite cease to exist.  
 In the final removal of Elaine Risley from the ravine landscape, Risley may 
either affirm the possibility of knowing a space beyond its human resonances or may 
remind us that human knowledge and human perception are cut off from a landscape, 
“whatever it is by itself, when I’m not looking” (460). The narrative remains 
ambivalent about whether the unpeopled world is properly empty or full, since the 
landscape is “empty now, a place for Sunday runners. Or not empty: filled with 
whatever it is by itself […]” (460). Even this idea of being filled with something 
unlooked at is not quite the final word in this novel, which instead turns to meditate on 
the inaccessible stars:  
Now it’s full night, clear, moonless and filled with stars, which are not 
eternal as was once thought, which are not where we think they are. If 
they were sounds, they would be echoes, of something that happened 
millions of years ago: a word made of numbers. Echoes of light, 
shining out of the midst of nothing. 
 
It’s old light, and there’s not much of it. But it’s enough to see by. 
(462) 
 
This closing image appears to endorse the possibility of human examination of what 
lies far outside the scope of individual human experience; and it is as though Risley 
has adopted the perspective of her dead brother, the physicist, in the novel-time where 
she must relinquish her particular past. Even the inhuman stars define and echo an 
event, “something that happened millions of years ago: a word made of numbers.” 
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Stephen’s old doubts about words’ imprecision are obviated, it seems, by the 
possibility of a numerical word “shining out of the midst of nothing.” If we can 
translate the word made of numbers into an image made of words, we may find 
ourselves with a scant image, but one that’s sufficiently present to speculate by. 
 Cat’s Eye is both a realist novel and an experiment. In the course of its peculiar 
narration, Elaine Risley struggles with a problem that she cannot quite name, which is 
how to locate herself in a framework for viewing that is, itself, always changing, 
always subject to a new configuration. These multiple configurations generate 
multiple and contradictory Elaine Risleys – some remembering, some forgetting, some 
narrating and thinking, others fixed as objects (rather than subjects) of observation and 
speculation. One might go so far as to argue that, on its own terms, Cat’s Eye is the 
narrative of a dead Elaine or an absent Cordelia who are somehow, improbably, the 
same person – the machinery of the novel kept in motion by the suspension of their 
qualities of being in the realm of speculation. But this reading pushes the bounds of 
plausibility, given the interplay between Risley’s honesty, openness, or candor and her 
ongoing pattern of self-undermining speculation. Rather than relegating Cat’s Eye to 
the domain of horror-fantasy or science-fiction, which would diminish the force of its 
psychological and ontological queries, it is preferable to consider the novel a species 
of metafiction, bent on investigating its own capacity to render surfaces, depths, and 
whole lives from linguistic material that literally cannot be living.  
 Cat’s Eye plays up and plays on the different temporalities that govern a 
reader’s assimilation of textual narrative and a viewer’s assimilation of a painting. The 
novel interjects material and visual components that, like the eponymous marble, 
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appear and disappear both for characters and for the reader. More importantly still, it 
repeatedly revises its own scheme for the spatiotemporal relationship between 
observer and observed. The novel thereby invites readers to explore the textual 
dimensions of fictional objects and lives as part of the story. If “nothing goes away” in 
Cat’s Eye, it is also the case that everything pops into and out of presence, into and out 
of immediate accessibility, and most crucially for the workings of this metafiction, 
into and out of language. Cat’s Eye’s self-reflexive narrative poetics and the 
ontological speculation that its narration models are mutually illuminating and are 
very much Cat’s Eye’s point. 
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Chapter 2 – Digressive Labor and Taxonomic Narrative in Colson Whitehead’s 
John Henry Days 
 
1. Finding Form 
 In contemporary debates over critical and post-critical reading practices, those 
wishing to move beyond or outside the genre of critique have often advocated 
deference to the forms and contents of the text itself. Counterproductively, a fantasy of 
textual form’s independence or isolation from those who perceive it undergirds certain 
positions, as though form were not a relation, but a simple given. Stephen Best and 
Sharon Marcus highlight this givenness in at least two of their half-dozen accounts of 
what “surface” might mean in “Surface Reading: An Introduction.” Under the 
heading, “Attention to surface as a practice of critical description,” they explain that 
“what we think theory brings to texts (form, structure, meaning) is already present in 
them. […] The purpose of criticism is thus a relatively modest one: to indicate what 
the text says about itself” (11). Later, under the heading “Surface as the location of 
patterns that exist within and across texts,” they note that “In this type of surface 
reading, the critic becomes an anatomist breaking down texts or discourses into their 
components, or a taxonomist arranging and categorizing texts into larger groups. The 
anatomist and taxonomist rearrange texts into new forms but nonetheless attend to 
what is present rather than privilege what is absent” (ibid.). Since these accounts do 
fall under different headings, Best and Marcus are presumably alert to the tension 
between the views that (1) “form, structure, meaning” are “already present” in texts 
and that (2) “the anatomist and taxonomist rearrange texts into new forms.” Surely 
such arranging could be done in numerous ways for any particular text, and this 
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suggests that theory really does bring form and meaning to texts – and possibly 
imposes them.  
 While this tension reflects the diversity of practices that Best and Marcus 
gather and explore under the rubric of “Surface Reading,” it also points to a thorny 
question about the nature of form itself. Limiting the scope of that question to the 
domain of literary texts, on might be tempted to ask:  
—Is form objective, a definite characteristic of the literary text, where it may 
found, observed, and described by a critic? 
 
—Or is form relative, a contingent product of some interaction between texts 
and readers? 
 
In the course this chapter, I will reject this formulation of the question, but the 
positions implied here are not straw men, either. Caroline Levine’s Forms: Whole, 
Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network defines forms intentionally broadly as “all shapes and 
configurations, all ordering principles, all patterns of repetition and difference” (3). 
This definition underpins Levine’s important distinction between form and “genre,” 
which depends on “the different ways in which [form and genre] traverse time and 
space” (13). On the one hand, “any attempt to recognize a work’s genre is a 
historically specific and interpretive act” because “one might not be able to tell the 
difference between a traditional folktale and a story recently composed for children or 
to recognize a satire from a distant historical moment” (ibid.). In other words, genre 
recognition is contextual. It depends on the position and condition of the observer, and 
so the nominal genre of a text may change over time, especially if the historical 
conditions of its production and dissemination are up for debate. On the other hand, 
however,  
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Forms, defined as patternings, shapes, and arrangements, have a 
different relation to context: they can organize both social and literary 
objects, and they can remain stable over time. One has to agree to read 
for shapes and patterns, of course, and this is itself a conventional 
approach. But […] once we recognize the organizing principles of 
different literary forms – such as syntax, free indirect speech, and the 
sonnet – they are themselves no longer matters of interpretive activity 
or debate. (13, italics added) 
 
For Levine, linguistic and literary forms require conventional definition, but once the 
forms are so defined, there can be no question whether they are found in particular 
texts. “Patternings, shapes, and arrangements” can be articulated and then discovered. 
Forms are in and of the material they shape, and their stability allows them to “travel 
across time and space in and through situated material objects” (10). The objectivity of 
forms, on this account, is what makes them so useful for analysis, and the richness of 
analysis comes from the interactions of multiple, overlapping, and often competing 
forms, each of which “affords” different actions, experiences, observations, potentials, 
limits, and so on (6).  
 In contrast to Levine, Ellen Rooney’s sharp defense of symptomatic reading, 
“Symptomatic Reading is a Problem of Form,” argues that “the work of form entails 
the play on words, the rendering of form as reading’s effect. […] Form can never be 
discovered, but must be actively produced” (135). In defending symptomatic reading 
against Best and Marcus’s rejection of it, Rooney is not defending a hermeneutics of 
suspicion but advocating for the recognition of any reading’s positional “guilt,” its 
“debt to the reading it resists, without which it would have neither significance nor 
consequence nor a field of play” (137). Like Best and Marcus, then, Rooney advocates 
a mode of reading that avoids critique’s pitfall of knowingness. However, for Rooney 
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surprise does not come from a new and avowedly naive openness to textual surfaces 
and whatever is perceptible there. It comes rather from the “symptomatic rupture” of 
which she writes, “its contingency cannot be eluded: a necessary surprise” (142). 
Because textual form is not given in advance, in Rooney’s account, no discovery is 
available. Instead, the nature of reading practice necessitates contingency, including 
the contingency of form.3435 
 The positions of Levine and Rooney are not perfectly symmetrical; 
nonetheless, they clearly offer different strategies for preserving the liveliness and the 
ethical relevance of literary analysis in a time of methodological foment in the field. 
Levine argues for embracing forms’ mobility and examining as broadly as possible 
how different literary forms interact with the social and material forms among which 
they travel and with which they interact. In contrast, Rooney argues for a 
“provisional” reading practice that is always encountering its own alternatives, rather 
than forms of other scales and other materials: “Symptomatic reading is a productive 
practice that anticipates its undoing, undoing itself, again an again; its transformations 
of form work its surprising openings to the future” (147). The ethical component of 
symptomatic reading, then, is this encounter with its other that it is always bringing 
                                                
34 Rooney’s phrasing strangely echoes Meillassoux’s proof in After Finitude of the “necessity of 
contingency.” Rooney’s account of symptomatic reading, grounded in Althusser’s reading and 
rereading of Marx, explicitly embraces Althusser’s “anti-humanist unraveling of the subject as 
consciousness and presence” (142). It thus becomes possible to see, in Rooney’s emphasis on the 
relational aspects of reading, a surprising similarity with speculative realism’s attempts to decenter 
humans from their philosophical accounts of the world. 
35 Carolyn Lesjak describes the contrast I’ve been outlining in terms of materiality, rather than form: 
“Surface readers claim, in essence, that Marxist reading practices ‘dematerialize’ the text—recall 
Marcus’s claim that Jameson ‘dismisses the inert given and materials of a given text’—whereas 
Marxists argue that surface readers falsely materialize texts, thereby enhancing their inertness and 
forgetting about the real things and real people behind them” (249). 
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about, rather than Levine’s promise to put literary forms into productive dialogue with 
social ones. 
 The concern of the present chapter is twofold: (1) to examine how this debate 
about form’s ontology might inform a narratological reading of Colson Whitehead’s 
John Henry Days; and (2) to see what such a reading might return to the debate that 
motivated it. John Henry Days suits the position I’ve assigned it in this critical call 
and return because it poses a series of formal questions itself – about myth, identity, 
and description – and it pursues its answers in a mode that repeatedly hinders the 
novel’s plot. My flat narratological reading of John Henry Days accounts for these 
hindrances by examining the novel’s competing logics of digression and taxonomy, 
and I identify those logics with the critical practices of Rooney and Levine, 
respectively. I begin by examining briefly the critical reception of John Henry Days to 
date, most of which still considers the novel “postmodern.” I then read the novel’s 
accounts of excavation and taxonomy as metafictional reflections on critical treatment 
of texts. In John Henry Days, excavation always reaches a dead end, forcing the 
narrative digressively onto other tracks. And both forms of labor, taken individually, 
exhibit a totalizing impulse that inhibits narrative progress. Both also produce 
examples of what I call “the describer’s nightmare”: characters or readers confront 
extreme ontologies in which (a) everything is given, (b) what’s given cannot be further 
described or differentiated, or (c) nothing is given at all. After examining each of these 
scenarios, I zoom out to consider how the novel’s open ending suggests a synthesis of 
its digressive and taxonomic impulses that I label “ontographic” in the spirit of Ian 
Bogost. Bogost describes ontography as a “general inscriptive strategy […] that 
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uncovers the repleteness of units and their interobjectivity” (38). In advocating 
“inscription” rather than “description” and “uncovering” rather than “discovering,” 
Bogost sketches a critical-philosophical practice that works with and works on what it 
examines, without either taking the surface for the essence or trying to excavate an 
object’s depths. I conclude that John Henry Days has cannily (and uncannily) 
anticipated the crisis over where and how literary form should be located, and has 
already moved forward with the labor of self-examination. It enacts that labor by 
underscoring the narrative potential of taxonomy; hence John Henry Days flattens 
hierarchies of character, setting, and plot in favor of a flat organization of its material 
that nevertheless makes a story. 
 
2. Critical Reception of John Henry Days  
 John Henry Days may seem like an unlikely fiction through which to explore 
the ontology of literary form. James Wood sees the novel’s concerns as “social, 
historical and linguistic (rather than characterological, aesthetic, and metaphysical)” 
(32). Derek Maus, borrowing a term from Linda Hutcheon, reads John Henry Days as 
“historiographic metafiction,” its self-commentary bent on revealing the constructed 
nature of both history and fiction (7-8). Williams Ramsey (like Maus) situates John 
Henry Days in the “post-soul aesthetic” and argues forcefully that the novel is part of a 
“postmodern shift” where the South, “[o]nce a contested monolith, […] has morphed 
into multiple narratives of a South that function with increased freedom from the past” 
(770). Ramsey sees the stakes of John Henry Days as ontological, but in the mode of 
postmodernism’s supposed work to undermine our distinctions between real and 
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unreal.36 Claiming that “Whitehead offers simulacra of originals that no longer exist, 
just as the prologue's accounts of John Henry fail to embody the original man,” 
Ramsey concludes bluntly, “What is most at stake in John Henry Days, therefore, is 
the constitutive nature of reality. Wryly, and in the manner of Jean Baudrillard, 
Whitehead notes, ‘the real is so hard to come by these days’” (782).  
 In contrast to these readings, however, Ramón Saldívar situates Whitehead 
squarely in the contemporary, in a “a post-postmodern, post-Civil Rights era in 
American fiction” (1). He describes Whitehead’s “postracial aesthetic” as “invested in 
speculative realism,” which he defines as “a hybrid crossing of the fictional modes of 
the speculative genres, naturalism, social realism, surrealism, magical realism, ‘dirty’ 
realism, and metaphysical realism” (5). On Saldívar’s view, John Henry Days “refuses 
the hegemony of postmodern metaphysics” (5):  
Folklore and historiography are not just the themes of the novel but 
structure its formal narrative. Whitehead there takes the myths, legends, 
dreams, histories, and illusions of vernacular knowledge to their 
wildest ends precisely to question and revalue their validity by asking, 
what kind of knowledge is available through each of these forms? How 
do these forms of narrative shape our understanding of “race”? (12) 
 
Saldívar’s reading of John Henry Days is quite brief, but the takeaway is that in asking 
about the knowledge “available through each of these forms,” the novel embraces a 
real to which these various narrative forms provide different kinds of access. The real 
may be hard to come by, but instead of a postmodern satire of the quest for the real, 
John Henry Days “return[s] to the real in its heterogeneous forms” (14). This novel, 
                                                
36 See Brian McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction on the “dominants” of modernist and postmodernist 
fiction, the former epistemological, the latter ontological. 
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along with the works of numerous other writers whom Saldívar cites,37 suggests an 
alternative to the literary-historical “timeline that takes us from naïve realism to 
plodding social realism, to triumphant modernism and demystified parodic 
postmodernism” (14). Instead, “something else results: When placed within a horizon 
that includes naturalism and realism, social realism, surrealism, magical realism, and 
perhaps speculative realism, Realism emerges as the substratum of narrative that has 
never been superseded entirely within the history of narrative forms” (ibid.). While it 
is not perfectly clear what Saldívar means by placing capital-R Realism within this 
“horizon,” he clearly reads the genre-mixing novels and hybrid narrative forms of 
Whitehead and others as embracing “heterogeneous forms” of the real, much as 
speculative realist philosophers do (14).38  
 Although, like Saldívar, I read John Henry Days as adumbrating a speculative 
realist practice, my path to that conclusion is, in Levine’s terms, formal, rather than 
generic. Rather than situating Whitehead in a “cohort of authors” that “insists on the 
urgency of the matter of race in the twenty-first century” (Saldívar 3), I focus on the 
structures of self-reference in John Henry Days. Wood, Maus, Ramsey and others 
have productively read John Henry Days as a meditation on the social and cultural 
values of the John Henry legend or as a “secret history” of Reconstruction (Walonen 
69). But there is a payoff, too, in describing the novel via the forms of our 
                                                
37 He writes: “In addition to Whitehead and Touré, a host of other writers are also exploring a post-
postmodern, post-Civil Rights moment in American racial formations. I refer to writers such as African 
Americans Percival Everett, Dexter Palmer and Darieck Scott; Asian Americans Karen Tei Yamashita, 
Sesshu Foster, Charles Yu, and Larissa Lai; Native American Sherman Alexie; Latinos Salvador 
Plascencia, Junot Díaz, Michelle Serros, Yxta Maya Murray, and Marta Acosta. A case can be made for 
including Michael Chabon, Gary Shteyngart, and Jonathan Safran Foer’s recalibrations of Jewish and 
Yiddish ethnicity.” (3) 
38 Saldívar cites Alain Badiou, Ray Brassier, Quentin Meillassoux, and Graham Harman (5). 
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contemporary debates over how to read. Such a description attends primarily to the 
novel’s self-reflective engagement with storytelling, which navigates between the 
givenness of mythic and historical forms, on the one hand, and the apparent 
malleability of narrative material, on the other. In its “fractured but connected pieces” 
(Wood 32), it takes up a speculative subject, the story of a possibly historical John 
Henry, and, in order to avoid transforming its retelling into an overwriting, delivers 
what it can by addition and multiplication, “adding verses” of its own.39  
 
3. Excavation in John Henry Days 
 The difficulty of John Henry Days for narrative theory is its breadth of 
thematically bound, but narratively disconnected, vignettes. The legend of John Henry, 
“the steel-driving man,” forms the ever-present but un-recoverable backdrop to the 
main plot line of J. Sutter, the freeloading freelance writer or “junketeer”; and Godfrey 
Frank’s polymorphous (and unread) novel, A Chiropodist in Pangea, anchors John 
Henry Days’s lyrical and formal climax. J.’s narrative is thus bracketed by two other 
stories at opposite ends of the spectrum of specificity. In the John Henry legend, none 
of the narrative material (the place, the time, the identity of the hero, and so on) is 
given, whereas Chiropodist teems with narrative givens, even as it lacks form. J., then, 
is held for the duration of the novel between the possibilities of being overblown into 
legend or reduced to a joke by the ridiculous luck of being shot by accident while on a 
foolish quest. J. himself struggles to decide between these options, and the form of 
John Henry Days, too, wavers between the mining of real and mythic histories and the 
                                                
39 “Adding Verses” is the title of the novel’s fifth and final part. 
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cataloging of disconnected narratives. The critical question, then, might be whether to 
excavate J. Sutter’s (or John Henry’s) central narrative (discarding the surrounding 
dross) or to compile and taxonomize the novel’s multiple vignettes about characters 
who have investigated or been touched by the John Henry legend and song. However, 
John Henry Days thematizes the futility of both of these impulses and offers, as I have 
already suggested, a different mode or model: a critical labor that sets itself alongside 
the mechanics of a text, modeling its procedures on the text’s own critical maneuvers. 
 The key image of excavation in John Henry Days, of course, is John Henry’s 
hammering inside the mountain, where he drives a bit into rock. Dynamite is placed in 
the holes he makes and detonated, after which the rubble is cleared and John Henry 
goes back to the end of the tunnel again to “advance[] the heading” (239, though the 
phrase occurs elsewhere, too). However repetitive, this labor promises progress, 
movement deeper into the rock, until John Henry’s tunnel meets the one being blasted 
at the same time from the mountain’s other side. But the novel reneges on this 
promise, figuring the material into which John Henry drills as so recalcitrant that it 
turns excavation (and narrative) away.  
 When John Henry dreams of breaking through the last remaining barrier of 
rock, the result is a nightmare transformation of the mountain’s content from stone 
into flesh. Here is the dream: 
It is odd because it is just him and L’il Bob working the tunnel. John 
Henry and his partner always work with a second team. It keeps the 
productivity up. Two pairs of men boring twin holes into the mountain 
and singing to their work. The sound of the hammer is percussion, each 
blow a footfall into the mountain on the other side. But today he does 
not know why they are alone in the darkness and why they do not sing. 
He cannot see L’il Bob’s face and cannot move his mouth to talk to 
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him. To find out what is happening. It is as if neither can stop. Their 
labor pulls them like a stream and it is all they can do to stay afloat. It 
seems they have been at this hole forever. He cannot seem to get the bit 
deeper. The mountain has grown harder. They have hit the mountain’s 
heart and the mountain is using all of its ancient will to prevent their 
violence against its self. It works against them. Then with one blow 
John Henry feels something give and with the next blow the bit sinks in 
deep, deeper than he has ever driven before. John Henry thinks, we’ve 
hit the western cut. The two ends of the tunnel have met. He is about to 
cheer. They have won Captain Johnson’s bonus. Then the blood comes. 
(238) 
 
Although the passage opens by naming the conditions that “keep[] productivity up” 
and enable the “footfalls” that carry the workers deeper into the mountain, the dream 
isolates John Henry and L’il Bob at the end of their labors, a climactic confrontation 
with the mountain’s center where a second team is unnecessary. Their labor “pulls 
them like a stream” and threatens to drown them, but it doesn’t take them anywhere 
while the mountain “works against them.” The work takes place “at this hole forever”; 
“[t]he mountain has grown harder.” It is clear, then, that the motion of John Henry’s 
hammering can be divorced from the question of his progress. In this dream, progress 
into stone is at an end, and progress only resumes when the narration transforms the 
unwilling rock into flesh that yields to the steel-driver’s blows.  
 Breaking through thus entails a transformation of the material John Henry was 
excavating into the same stuff he is made of himself, and this is how the dream ends: 
“the rock around him is now flesh. The red shale glistens like animal meat. Ridges 
formed by the blasting are now tracings of sinew. Veins and arteries. It is a living 
breathing mountain and he is in its angry guts. The heart of the mountain pours itself 
over him. The blood is up to his neck. Then the blood spray blinds him again and he is 
awake” (238-239). This reclassification of the dream-mountain’s rock as flesh makes a 
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horror of John Henry’s efforts to drive deeper, since to drive into the depths of the 
mountain is now to let out its lifeblood. More than this, John Henry’s vision of 
connecting the eastern cut to the western one is revealed as an end he cannot 
accomplish. To go into the depths of something is not the kind of work (in this novel) 
that brings one out the other side or achieves its own completion, but the kind of work 
that transforms material into an antagonist that resembles oneself.40  
 The novel diverts the idea of completed excavation into a dream where, instead 
of facilitating commercial activity (by extending a rail network), finishing the tunnel is 
only a step in the direction of returning the sick John Henry to himself: “He had 
traveled through a series of fever dreams all night. They were coupled together like 
train cars. He knew that the caboose contained morning and each time he fell asleep he 
hoped that this time he would step into it. But he opened the door to the next car and 
stepped again into nightmare” (239). Travel by rail shifts from the abstract motive of 
John Henry’s physical labor (what his labor would eventually enable) to a recursive 
image of failing to pass through all the way to the end. To sustain this image, it is 
essential that this version of the John Henry legend ends, like all the others explicitly 
recounted in the novel, before the tunnel is complete. The stories cannot bring him to 
the mountain’s heart, lest the metaphor turn literal and the blood run out; nor can they 
                                                
40 Formally, this digging or excavation that returns one to oneself resembles the “correlationist circle,” 
Meillassoux’s account of metaphysical reasoning in the Kantian mode. Ancient rock is even one of the 
materials that Meillassoux considers a special challenge to correlationism, since it would be absurd to 
consider our statements about them true “for us,” when the statements reach back to the time before 
humans existed – even before life itself. John Henry Days, like Meillassoux, will offer alternative ways 
of handling the reality that confronts one in one’s labor. 
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bring him all the way through the mountain, where the narrative would lose its motive 
and its terminus at once.  
 This inability to complete an excavation faces other characters in the novel, 
including, for example, Guy Benton Johnson, the historical black sociologist (1901-
1991) who makes a plausible stand-in for readers and critics. The narration depicts 
him struggling with his John Henry material in a voice that is partially his own: “One 
man against the mountain of contradictory evidence! He has been here three days. 
Three days, and Guy thinks he can see a little into John Henry’s dilemma: the farther 
he drives, the deeper the darkness he creates around himself” (155). With the verb 
“drives,” Johnson identifies his labor with John Henry’s, and his formula for the work 
(“the farther he drives, the deeper the darkness”) is stated with pronouns that could 
equally well refer to the sociologist or the steel-driver. Although the Guy Johnson 
vignette is set late in the lifetimes of any who might have witnessed John Henry at 
work (if John Henry were a historical person), the syntax renders both characters 
performing the same labor on resistant material.  
 Neither the mountain of rock nor the mountain of evidence yield to driving, but 
the Guy Johnson vignette emphasizes a slightly different account of what’s wrong 
with excavation, namely that it fails to get past a surface. Johnson has arrived in 
Talcott because, although “‘The Ballad of John Henry’ has picked up freight from 
every work camp, wharf and saloon in this land,” he has “sorted” through all that 
material and settled on Talcott as the legend’s likely point of origin (155). Johnson 
seems to be getting to heart of the matter, the heart of the mountain, except that what 
he has extracted from the song’s many iterations turns out to contain the song again. 
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Once in Talcott, “he cannot get two stories to coincide,” and some of his informants 
“have heard the ballad so many times that they manufacture their own spectatorship, 
stealing lines from the song and offering these in their eyewitness accounts” (155). 
Ubiquitous but multiple, the song about John Henry reinfects Johnson’s research into 
the song’s origins. A glimpse of this logic is legible in John Henry’s own vignettes, 
too. John Henry’s preoccupation with the “crag” under which he passes each time he 
goes down the tunnel exemplifies the reproduction within the mountain of the 
mountain’s foreboding face, so that his excavation also fails to get past the surface 
(85). In several ways, then, John Henry Days becomes a story of material that instead 
of yielding as one goes deeper into it, returns one recursively to an earlier encounter 
with the same.  
 John Henry Days refuses to resolve the legend of John Henry. Elements of his 
story are specified again and again, but in inconsistent or contradictory terms. Besides 
going out of its way to relate the details ascribed to him by various characters, the 
novel also foregrounds contradictory versions of the legend in its prologue, a 
concatenation of anonymous testimonials about John Henry that place him in different 
work sites and affirm or deny the possibility of his ever have raced against a steam 
drill. Making him an object of historical and sociological investigation by characters 
could have turned the novel into something of an essay on John Henry’s cultural 
weight, but the novel also tells its own version of the legend, a narrative cut short 
before the race that makes John Henry a hero. 
 The narration of John Henry Days digresses habitually from the central, late 
twentieth-century plot line, and much of the narration attends to labor that doesn’t 
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carry work forward. Guy Johnson reminds himself that “we make our own machines 
and devise our own contests in which to engage them” (163, Whitehead’s italics). 
Meanwhile, both John Henry’s contest with the steam drill and J.’s pursuit of the 
record (to which I will return below) are beside the point of the two characters’ usual 
employment. John Henry’s job consists of drilling into rock at the furthest reaches of 
the slowly growing Big Bend tunnel, “advancing the heading,” but his race, although 
it also consists of drilling, will happen outside. It is a simulacrum of his real work,41 
and a digression that is quite necessary in light (or shadow) of the impossibility of 
completing excavations. It is, very exactly, a plot device that distinguishes John 
Henry’s hammer swinging from that of other workers in the tunnel and that brings him 
to a personal, rather than collective, confrontation. As for J., he is supposed to produce 
content to fill the lanes of the internet, the “Information Superhighway” (185), but his 
quest to match Bobby Figgis’s record of consecutive days junketeering (having his 
room, board, and travel paid for by a magazine or internet content provider) sets him 
apart from his content-producing peers. What’s more, pursuing the record only 
involves attending consecutive publicity events, not actually writing about them. 
Toward the novel’s end, too, J. finds himself thinking about another story, Pamela 
Street’s or his own, which has nothing to do with the web content he is assigned to 
write. Thus J. and John Henry, along with Guy Johnson, are differentiated from their 
peers by their digressions; and they are mobilized into narrative when recalcitrant 
                                                
41 In this it resembles the “GENUINE STEEL-DRIVING EXHIBITION” at the 1996 John Henry Days 
festival (318). 
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material turns their work away and they find themselves in dramatic, but not 
productive, confrontations.  
 So essential is the steam drill to the structure of John Henry’s legend, that 
Whitehead even invites the machine to speak, describing it at the start of the novel’s 
final part as an actor about to go on stage: “Standing patiently in the wings, resisting 
the temptation for one last smoke before the big scene, the steam drill, the heavy in 
this particular drama, waits for the cue. What’s a hero without a villain?” (341). And 
yet, John Henry Days, doesn’t reach a climax through its characters’ confrontations 
but always seem to be recounting how things are before they are worked out. When J. 
and John Henry approach their material as a matter of surface and depth, they are 
stymied. They would end up (if the narrative carried them far enough) only returning 
to themselves. And in the contests to which their narrative lines are diverted, where 
they pit themselves against the products of artifice, and they also do not make 
narrative progress, exactly. True, the invitation to the steam drill to speak (“Steam 
drill, can we get a soundbite” (342)) puts it briefly on a par with John Henry.42 For the 
space of a section, it becomes not just his antagonist but potentially the hero of its own 
narrative. This potential however, serves to undermine the steam drill’s position as 
chief antagonist, and indeed “[t]he Burleigh steam drill is the terminus of a series of 
inevitabilities, but only terminus until the line is extended, the rails laid farther into 
frontier, until the next model replaces and advances the heading” (341). In so far as the 
drill becomes a protagonist (rather than an antagonist), the structure of its story 
                                                
42 The narration even imagines “The Ballad of Jo Jo the Steam Drill” – “no chart-topper, virtually 
unhummable by human mouths, and you can’t dance to it besides” (341). 
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becomes interminably repeatable. The promise of the Burleigh drill’s obsolescence 
confirms the pattern of digression that I have been laying out.  
 Thus, the work of excavation in John Henry Days produces a pair of 
unexpected effects: the laborer discovers only himself in the dark depths to which he 
has driven; and with this lack of progress through the expected material, a digressive 
logic kicks in. The story shifts sideways to relate another task, feat, or contest. But this 
shunting of the narrative away from labor’s completion turns out not to resolve the 
question I posed earlier, whether literary form, or forms more generally, are 
objectively present in material or relative to the work one puts into it. Images of 
excavation as violence suggests that it is a work of imposing; if so John Henry’s 
nightmare might be an effort to warn off the excavating interpreter of John Henry 
Days. But the mountains of material that John Henry and Guy Johnson confront also 
seem to recoil against them, perhaps maintaining their forms in the face of violence. 
Johnson perhaps recognizes this when he finds the motivation to continue his work in 
the maxim he has written down and carries in his billfold, “we make our own 
machines and devise our own contests.” The declaration affirms that his work returns 
him to something he has himself produced; but it sidesteps the problem of the 
mountain-as-material, the mountain’s own form, by putting Johnson in contention with 
a machine, instead. When this novel’s digressions prevent narratives of excavation 
from reaching their conclusions, they still allow narrative material to pile into 
visibility. In order to grasp the novel’s narrative logic, one must deal with this 
profusion of material. It asks the novel’s characters, and its readers, for a different kind 
of work. 
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4. Describers’ Nightmares and Extreme Ontologies 
 As critics have pointed out repeatedly, John Henry Days is a novel of diverse 
materials and modes. For example, Wood and Jonathan Franzen in their reviews and 
Ramsey and Saldívar in their articles all stress, in different ways, the challenge John 
Henry Days poses to a basic description of what happens in it. Franzen notes that 
“[t]here is very little story to speak of beyond the pageant, the scripted performance, 
of the eponymous event,” and refers to “the book’s essentially static structure”; but 
somewhat contradictorily, he also calls it “an aleatory fugue,” without expanding on 
that phrase (n.p.). Wood analogizes John Henry Days to “a fictional mural of 
contemporary and historical American life” (30). “Its mode,” he writes, “is generally 
filmic – the rapidity of cutting seems more important than the depth of scenes, as if 
Whitehead were continually saying to himself, ‘Keep it moving, keep it moving!’” 
(31).43 Ramsey suggests that “history itself is disassembled into absence” by John 
Henry Days. “Through [Whitehead’s] slippery play of social constructions, in which 
all discourses are constituted more by presuppositions than empirical fact, no core 
sense of southern essence is left standing […]” (771). Saldívar, finally, reads the 
mixing of generic forms in Whitehead as part of a “weird kind of realism,” a project to 
“imagine the conditions under which the thing in itself and its phenomenal form might 
coincide” (14). Together these comments sustain the question whether John Henry 
Days is a repetitive novel, static in virtue of its refusal to move beyond the “mighty 
                                                
43 He also writes, “It cannot be said that Whitehead’s characters have much depth of life. They are 
lively [….] But they are awarded little more than the characteristics essential to their roles in the 
allegory” (31). 
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monad of its theme” and the stricture of allegory (Wood 31), or whether it is scattered, 
governed by chance, always moving (too rapidly!) from one scene to the next. The 
form or formlessness of John Henry Days’s own narrative material is up for debate. 
 Thus far, we have encountered directly only the mountains of stone and 
“evidence” that John Henry and Guy Johnson drive through. In their resistance to 
labors of excavation, the mountains exemplify an ontology of extreme withdrawal: 
nothing of these mountains is given to those who approach them, and the only 
description we get of the heart of the mountain takes the form of a nightmare. At the 
other extreme, however, are Godfrey Frank’s compendious novel, A Chiropodist in 
Pangea, and the party, pegged by the narration as the “main event,” that celebrates 
Chiropodist’s release (323). Here, rather than turn away from the material it might 
describe, the discourse provides an exhaustive account instead. “They were all there,” 
the narration dares, “from the eminently fuckable to the differently attractive, the not 
conventionally handsome and the walking airbrushed in complimentary pairs, the 
critics’ darling and the promising newcomer milled about. Miracles abounded in that 
room” (323). The chief miracle is not so much the unlikely pairing of categorical 
opposites as the narrative’s stipulation that really everyone is crammed into the party. 
It is a miracle of total givenness, and the narration moves back and forth between the 
generic and the particular in a dizzying who’s-who, punctuated by anecdotal dialogue 
in which these faceless characters themselves vie to describe Godfrey Frank’s 
unimaginable novel: “It’s about the environment” (324); “It’s a philosophical treatise 
in the form of a prose poem” (324); “It’s a postmodern retelling of the Midas story – 
you know, capitalism” (325); “No, it’s a memoir” (325); “It’s a nonfiction novel” 
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(326); “In a weird way it’s a reinterpretation of Hamlet” (327); “It’s a masterpiece” 
(327); and so on. All the speakers of these assessments are clichés rendered as 
individuals, including a “prodigal son,” “a hooker with a heart of gold” and a 
“substituting big black guy when really meaning to say nigger” (326, 326, 327, 
Whitehead’s italics). As C. Namwali Serpell argues, we should not think that cliché 
impedes our access to a scene like this. She suggests, rather, “that the material and 
affective affordances of [a] heap of clichés enable it to index the unspeakable” (175). 
These clichés help John Henry Days’s narration to give, exactly, its all. 
 “They were all there,” even the dead, it turns out, since J. “had read about a 
death in the newspaper just that very afternoon” (323). The dream of all-inclusiveness 
extends from the list of partygoers to J.’s memories of the recently deceased Toure 
Nkumreh, a former Black Panther who guest-lectures for a semester at J.’s college and 
who finishes his course with the promise, “In five years you will have forgotten 
everything I’ve said” (333). This is a memorable promise that its own content will be 
forgotten, hence an ironic, self-defeating claim. Yet the narration cites it with a 
seriousness that both jars and jibes with its narrative context, a party celebrating a 
“breakout” novel by a famous academic who “shambled through the media like a 
creature from a science fiction film, a monster whose mutant gigantism he could 
doubtless locate in nuclear-age anxiety, cold war terror” (327). This is narration half in 
awe of the authority-by-personality-and-position that it mocks. Godfrey Frank is an 
apotheosis of academia and of pop at once, a kind of opposite to Nkumreh’s self-
deprecation: “‘I’m the last member of the Black Power Traveling All-Stars,’ 
[Nkumreh] joked, and the lecture hall filled with laughter. The students believed they 
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had been embraced as intimates” (325). The party scene thus laces the anonymous and 
the cliché with the intimate and personal. It blends cultural with psychological 
narrative and quotes from Godfrey Frank’s song, “Awestruck Post-Struct Superstar”: 
Roland Barthes got hit by a truck 
That’s a signifier you can’t duck 
Life’s an open text 
From cradle to death 
 
The satirical mention of Barthes lands with a thud. Obviously it signals a metafictional 
engagement with structuralist and poststructuralist theory, but is Whitehead taking 
revenge for “The Death of the Author” by narrating Barthes’s death in this text-within-
a-text? Or is the truck you can’t duck a reminder that even when a machine signifies, it 
also has another kind of weight? It’s the second couplet of this quatrain, however, that 
sets Godfrey Frank’s novel, party, and song at the opposite ontological extreme from 
the mountains discussed above. If “Life’s an open text / From cradle to death,” then 
everything is given, available for access, and also well delimited. Unlike the mountain 
whose heart one cannot reach or break through, life is an easy given, and death its 
closure (according to Frank). 
 Surprisingly, the narrative climax of John Henry Days is neither John Henry’s 
race with the steam drill (not narrated) nor J.’s impossible decision whether to get into 
the cab with Pamela, bound for the airport and New York, or to return to the festival 
for the unveiling of the stamp (where the reader knows a shooting is about to happen). 
It is rather this book-release party, narrated at the end of the novel’s penultimate part – 
and not just because it achieves the kind of totalizing description that the narrative 
elsewhere eschews, but because it takes on the closure of death, from which the 
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narrative otherwise turns away. If, however, John Henry’s mountain represents the 
extreme of withdrawn form while A Chiropodist in Pangea offers the extreme of its 
givenness, John Henry Days as a whole and the nature of its protagonist, J., both 
remain problematic – their own, mixed versions of the describer’s nightmare. 
 Titled “Adding Verses,” the final part of John Henry Days makes an ending 
less by closing down the novel’s major narrative lines than by reaffirming the 
desirability of digressing – of continuing to accumulate narrative. The novel itself 
ceases to speak, as any finite narrative must do, but rather than capitulating to the 
narrative logic of character or plot, it exploits the recursive movement of J. and John 
Henry’s labor to hold the termini of their narratives at bay. As I argued above, the John 
Henry legends and songs don’t depict the end of his labor as the completion of the 
tunnel but divert their energy toward his relatively aimless competition with the steam 
drill. John Henry Days truncates the plot line even sooner, introducing the steam drill 
and establishing that the contest will take place, but only narrating as far as the end of 
John Henry’s preparation. The novel leaves him in motion toward what we imagine to 
be his final, fatal labor: “There was no one to hear him but himself. He walked down 
the road with his hammer in his hand” (386). But for the accretive and digressive logic 
of John Henry Days to hold true, he can never arrive at the contest that is his end. 
 Similarly, the novel doesn’t deliver the end of J.’s work, whether it’s writing 
the story he finds in Talcott or matching and exceeding Bobby Figgis’s record. Instead, 
he becomes an ancillary figure in Pamela Street’s narrative, accompanying her on her 
walk up the mountain to bury her father’s ashes and even helping to dig the hole for 
them. J.’s excavating labor is restrained and temporary: he needn’t get to the 
 98 
mountain’s heart, but only deep enough to cover a funerary urn, and afterward he fills 
the hole back in. Still, the narration makes the comparison with John Henry’s type of 
work explicit: 
It was strange to sit there in the dirt. Their hands moved and moved. He 
was tired out from this one simple task, and in the same dirt he was 
feebly scratching into lay dead men who did more back-breaking work 
in a day than he had done in his whole life. And the legendary John 
Henry, nearby or not nearby in the ground. He tried to think of what the 
modern equivalent would be for his story, his martyrdom. But he lived 
in different times and he could not think of it. He dug some more. (377-
378) 
 
As is typical of John Henry Days, the narration refuses certain decisions: John Henry’s 
proximity remains a speculation, not a fact, and the narrative thus preserves the 
necessary distance between J. and him. At the same time, however, the narration 
exploits the ambiguity of reference that comes from too many pronouns packed 
together, so that the “he” who “lived in different times” could plausibly be either of 
the figures under consideration. It is thematically significant that this version of J.’s 
work happens in tandem with Pamela. As we will see, the novel’s most optimistic 
moments tell of labors pursued side-by-side.  
 When the narration returns to J. alone, in the final section, it positions him on 
the verge of a decision that the narration indicates is false: “He stands there with the 
sun on his face deciding, as if choices are possible” (389). What kind of choice is it, 
though, that the narrative precludes J. from making? We might imagine the sentence 
doing no more than mentioning the illusory nature of fictional characters’ agency. The 
point might be simply that J., like any character, cannot decide, because characters are 
not agents, however convincingly they are realized as products of text and reading. On 
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my reading, however, J. cannot decide because a decision would tip him into one of 
the two categories between which the narration has suspended him all along: on the 
one hand, a fully individuated narrative object with a discoverable form of his own; on 
the other hand, a kind of paraphrase, a mere index whose form is contingent on 
whatever John Henry turns out to be. In other words, the provisionality of J.’s labor 
and of the novel’s own are both at stake, and the narration cannot continue through J.’s 
decision without collapsing the suspension of his categories. After all, the novel 
concludes in only three more sentences: “She asked one last thing when they came 
down the mountain. When they came down the mountain [Pamela] asked, what’s the J. 
stand for? He told her” (389). Although this revelation of J.’s name doesn’t reach the 
reader, it threatens to transform his standing, to violate the scheme that has held J.’s 
narrative somewhere between John Henry’s and Godfrey Frank’s. 
 
5. J.’s Material, J.’s Labor 
 “Who is J.” or “What is J.”? John Henry Days is not structured to answer these 
questions separately but to raise them in tandem, linking what can be learned of his 
identity with his narratological form. To delve into the question of his identity will 
result in labor shunted aside by resistant narrative material such as the initial that 
won’t expand into a name. To answer the formal question, however, requires situating 
J. in relation to the novel’s other materials. In Caroline Levine’s terms, we might say 
that the provisional ontology of J. in John Henry Days – his form suspended between 
a legend (John Henry) and a joke (Godfrey Frank) – affords our encounter with the 
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novel’s other, minor characters, to whom I will turn below for an account of 
excavation’s alternative, taxonomy.  
 First, however, to give a sense of this suspension, it helps to look at how the 
narration depicts J.’s own labor and to consider how that labor is held apart from his 
identity. His identity seems to participate in the extreme ontologies of the impenetrable 
material of the legend or the mountain, in some ways; and in other ways it resembles 
the repleteness of A Chiropodist in Pangea. As distinct from his material, however, J.’s 
work makes him accessible to criticism. To interpret J., one must work through the 
descriptions of his labor, even if they seem like digressions. 
 For J. to complete his labor would be as threatening to the novel’s digressive 
structure as John Henry completing his, so the reader of John Henry Days never sees a 
full story, article, or unit of “content” written by J. Instead, the products of his labor 
appear in fragments that are also provisional, in a selection of voicemail messages 
from editors and fact checkers who have not yet finalized his text (232-237). Even so, 
J., like John Henry (about whom the one consistent detail is that he is a “steel driving 
man”), is defined more completely by his labor than by anything else, and his 
unfinished labor invades even his leisure. Walking into Talcott proper from the Talcott 
Motor Lodge, the morning after nearly choking to death on a piece of prime rib, J. 
leaves the road (a digression) to make his way down to the river bank: 
Except for the railroad tracks across the river he can’t see any sign of 
civilization. And the silver loop of an old can’s pull-top in the sand, but 
nothing else. Out of the sunlight and in the shade of the trees crouched 
around the bank, J. feels his body cool and he slips into an even deeper 
silence, even though the brown river is louder than the empty road. 
Time out of the world. A little downstream the water blows over a sill 
of rocks that sends white curtains twisting and twirling. For an instant 
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J. sees himself clinging to one of those rocks, but he can’t figure out if 
that momentary image is a scene of final hard-won safety or just a 
reprieve before the battle for the shore. He has half a mind to sit but 
decides instead to make an oath, some stentorian declaration of himself 
and purposes. Isn’t that what you do in places like this, among nature, 
out of the hurly-burly, no one to hear but those who won’t tattle: make 
an oath. Hurl one. Same thing as laying a road or nailing railroad tracks 
into frigid dirt, that’s making an oath too, saying I am. And if it was 
good enough for his hosts this weekend, it is good enough for him, he 
figures. He is an American, fuck it, he has his Social Security card in 
his pocket at that very moment. (151-152, Whitehead’s italics) 
 
It is strange and wonderful to walk through this would-be bucolic passage, from the 
supposed absence of “any sign of civilization” on J.’s side of the river to the piece of 
paper that authorizes J. as a worker and inscribes him in a specifically American 
system of toil and reward. Along the way, J. seems to be escaping the heat of the road 
and any notion of urgency with respect to his arrival in Talcott. “Time out of the 
world” cannot be a time for work. However one parses it (“time-out – of the world” or 
“time – out-of-the-world”) the phrase marks a temporal break in the narration, and it 
seems possible that in such a digression, the narration will set J.’s labor aside and 
bring his identity to the fore. Instead, however, “Time out of the world” provides the 
narrative gap during which J.’s imagination reintroduces the question of work: 
“[C]linging to one of those rocks,” J. has either reached “hard-won” safety or merely 
rests “before the battle for the shore.” Hence, J.’s imagination moves him from a 
position of unworldly stasis back into a dynamic situation defined by the work that got 
him there or will get him away. So impossible is leisure that J. can only gather “half a 
mind to sit” and opts instead to make the oath he equates with manual labor. Either his 
very presence “among nature, out of the hurly-burly,” has been spoiled by this act of 
imagination, or else the rhetorical question, “Isn’t that what you do in places like this,” 
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leads automatically to the answer (without even a mark of interrogatory punctuation) 
that what “you” do in the uncivilized American landscape is work: “laying a road or 
nailing railroad tracks into frigid dirt.”44  
 Significantly, this “you” is generic. It extends beyond the question of J.’s 
identity, and it keeps the passage focused on J.’s labor. The question remains, though, 
how to read J.’s failure to produce the oath. If one thinks of narrative as appropriately 
analogized by the laying of tracks, the setting out of plot, the generation of 
momentum, and so on, then J.’s inability to generate the oath that would do such work 
becomes an ironic and anti-narrative response to what the situation calls for: 
He can’t think of anything. He gives it a full five minutes and he 
decides to take a piss instead. 
 
He takes one last look and clambers up the dirt. He approaches town 
and whistles without recognition the tune he heard at dinner the night 
before. (152) 
 
The narrator might be mocking J., whose quest to overtake Bobby Figgis’s record of 
consecutive days junketeering amounts to little more than being the king of moochers. 
Or possibly the narration implicitly laments the failure of this writer to come up with 
the right words at a moment when he wants to define his ambition in personal, rather 
than commercial, terms. If instead, however, one accepts the digressive narrative logic 
of John Henry Days, then one can see how the narrative’s refusal of the definitive oath 
is necessary to the plot’s continuation. For if J. were to succeed in producing his 
“declaration of himself and purposes,” the suspension of his ontological status 
between recalcitrant material and open form might collapse. 
                                                
44 The “white curtains twisting and twirling” also suggest a heavy symbolic reading of this passage, in 
which J.’s (racially) white surroundings are responsible for depriving him of the possibility of leisure. 
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 The passage under examination here passes from J.’s vision of a landscape 
without signs of civilization into his impulse to reenact American expansionism by 
(metaphorically) building a road or laying track, and this movement hinges on J.’s 
sudden vision of himself clinging to a rock sill in the middle of the river. Here again is 
a nexus of story and stone: the rock sill, a stable object amid the river’s flow, inspires 
J. to attempt a “declaration of himself and purposes,” a statement that would inscribe 
and expose his aims. Yet the equivalencies that J. constructs here return us to the 
construction of his identity through labor and labor’s systems rather than through his 
own material being: “make an oath. Hurl one. Same thing as laying a road or nailing 
railroad tracks into frigid dirt, that’s making an oath too, saying I am.” Hurling the 
oath that J. imagines is the “same thing” as extending an infrastructural network; 
presumably the equivalence lies in the road’s or track’s determination of destination 
across formerly undirected (and resistant, “frigid”) ground. J.’s failure to produce the 
oath thus holds him right at the edge of involvement in such a project. It distinguishes 
him from John Henry’s total definition via labor (“steel driving man” is his epithet), 
and yet the Social Security card shows that J. is at least provisionally inscribed in 
labor’s networks.  
 “I am” is also the statement that “was good enough for his hosts this weekend.” 
J.’s inability to come up with an oath might be read as a brief exemption from his 
definition by economic contribution to the American project. But it is also and more 
powerfully a failure to assert that he is anything, even at the moment in which he 
imagines a commonality with his hosts. Hence, there is the potential for something 
tragic in J.’s blankness here, which the narration averts by truncating the moment of 
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reflection with a literal evacuation. With empty bladder and empty mind (failing even 
to recognize the tune he whistles), J. climbs back to the road. The point is not only that 
the narrative resumes by digression as J. returns to his unfinished work, but that J. 
remains the character whose material the narrative won’t define. The condition of his 
ongoing labor is something like an annihilation of individual context. Who or what is 
J. Sutter, then? The kind of character who sets out to produce mere web content, but 
along the way starts “kidding about [a] story” and eventually finds that he “has a story 
but it is not the one he planned” (387). J. is shunted from scene to scene no less than a 
reader of John Henry Days, and when at last he winds up with a story on his hands, 
the novel finds itself at a close. 
 
6. Narrative Minority and the Taxonomic Impulse 
 At this stage of the analysis, it is possible finally to introduce taxonomy as the 
model of labor John Henry Days proposes as an alternative to excavation. John Henry 
and Guy Johnson, as we have seen, make no progress so long as they drive themselves 
against mountainous content. J., meanwhile, is so shaped by the novel’s digressive 
logic that despite his inability to experience leisure, he also can never really begin to 
work. Like John Henry, J. appears most clearly in motion when his energy is diverted 
into a competition that only simulates work: J. competes for Bobby Figgis’s record; 
John Henry challenges the steam drill to a race. Johnson reminds us meanwhile that 
“we make our own machines and devise our own contests.” This logic of digression 
partially accounts for why John Henry Days keeps switching among its various 
narratives: it cannot afford to run aground on the fact of John Henry’s existence or 
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non-existence, and it must find a way both to incorporate and to move beyond some of 
the verses and versions in which the John Henry legend has been told since the late 
1800s.45 But while the logic of digression explains the multiplicity of narrative 
threads, another logic is needed to keep their multiplication in check, and that is the 
logic of taxonomy, the effort to classify and systematize the narrative material that 
keeps accumulating. The novel that contains everything is a fantasy or illusion. Like A 
Chiropodist in Pangea, it can be named and described in some abstraction, but it 
cannot actually be written. So while John Henry Days displays its own impulses 
toward encyclopedism – consequently drawing comparisons to DeLillo’s Underworld 
and David Foster Wallace’s maximalism46 – it also enlists various minor characters’ 
narratives to counterbalance the logics of digression and accretion with the work of 
classification. Joan Acorn, an intern for the Charleston Daily Mail, is one such 
taxonomizing figure, and I will also discuss Pamela Street’s temp work for a “content-
driven interactive information provider,” before turning to the narrative, digressive, 
and taxonomic functions of “the List” and the junketeers’ “anatomy of puff” (287, 70). 
 In its simplest form, taxonomy in John Henry Days enables narrative discourse 
in the face the otherwise unsayable. This is what happens when Acorn invokes the 
basics of journalistic taxonomy to structure her thoughts after a gunman opens fire at 
                                                
45 One might separately make the argument that John Henry Days’s digressive logic can be attributed to 
its tackling a myth, per se. In Mythologies, Barthes claims that myths constitutes a “second-order 
semiological system” that flattens pre-existing signs into mere signifiers that it arranges in a new 
signifying “chain.” As a result “Everything happens as if myth shifted the formal system of the first 
significations sideways” (113). Myths have a digressive logic of their own in so far as they shunt 
preexisting signifying operations (themselves narrative in form, as a signifier points to or connects with 
a signified in order to become a sign) perpetually to the side. 
46 See, for example, Walonen (77) and Wood. This is indeed Wood’s opening position: “So it has 
happened. Underworld, the most diffusely influential American novel of recent years, has begun to 
deliver nameable kin” (30). 
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the John Henry Days stamp ceremony. “She thinks, where, what, who, these are the 
essential questions a journalist must ask herself” and proceeds to deliver her report to 
the editor on the other end of the phone line (26). Naming herself as a journalist has 
allowed the intern to approach and interview witnesses before she makes the call, 
although she is also a witness herself. Separately, the “essential” journalistic questions 
help her to reclassify the scene as an object of reportage. Taxonomy thus gives Joan 
Acorn two levels of descriptive access, but it is important that we not confuse 
description with objectivity. As Ramsey points out, Acorn’s “perception of events is 
[...] ‘nutty’” and her descriptions are factually in error (782). But I take issue with 
Ramsey’s characterization that Acorn’s journalism is no good and that “she reports on 
the stylish seduction of surfaces” (ibid.). As the narration reminds us, “The witnesses 
share what they have seen and fit their perspectives into one narrative through a 
system of sobbing barter. In these first few minutes a thousand different stories 
collide; this making of truth is violence too, out of which facts are formed” (24). Like 
John Henry’s steel driving, Acorn’s taxonomic work “is violence,” and she herself 
does not entirely escape tears. Nor does her reportage escape the described system of 
barter: her individual work is designed for publication, and the discourse she produces 
comes out “in someone else’s voice,” evidence that the process of classification has 
affected the classifier, too (26). Joan is both agent and object, actively involved with 
her content and consequently changing as she performs her taxonomic work. 
 Pamela Street’s temp work at an unnamed internet company similarly 
enmeshes her in layers of taxonomic flux. The “new media” company is stuck in the 
old media age because Technology Services is late delivering the “Tool” (there are still 
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“glitches” to be worked out) (287). As a “bigwig” at the company puts it to Street and 
her co-workers,  
Your job […] is ontology. With millions of websites out there, a newbie 
will need a reliable source to tip them on where to go. Where they can 
find things that might interest them, discount diaper retailers or 
aluminum pliers. The ontologists classify websites into root categories 
such as Entertainment, News, and Health, categories recognizable to 
many from the real world, and write descriptions of no more than 
thirty-five words. (287) 
 
Here, “newbies” are distinguished from experienced internet users in a speech to brand 
new hires. This paradoxically positions Street, who “had never been on the internet 
before coming to work there” as both beginner and expert (289). The bigwig also 
hypes a coming transformation in the ontological work itself: “The present database 
was fine for the average business but not for a new media company such as theirs. It 
was cumbersome. It was obsolete, dodo bird in this new world. Awkward fields, 
counterintuitive commands” (287-88). When the new database is rolled out, the 
awkward fields will be replaced by ones “specifically designed for the needs of 
ontology,” and the Tool “will publish their ontology directly on the web” (288). “But 
until Technology delivered the new Tool, he continue[s],” in a passage that balances 
the novel’s taxonomic logic with its habit of tending towards an event that hasn’t 
happened yet, “they would need all the bodies they could get. Have fun with it, he 
added, and left the room” (288). Thus, for all that taxonomy enables discourse, the 
bigwig poises his company, and the ontologists’ labor, in a liminal zone between 
categories. A transformative event is on the way or in the works; in a certain sense it is 
totally known (the bigwig can say what the Tool will do when it comes); and yet the 
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fact that it isn’t yet manifest somehow reduces the workers to “bodies” who must 
perform a lot of necessary, if boring, ontological labor in the meantime.  
 To add one more ingredient to the taxonomic mix, the narration offers a 
glimpse of how these workers’ personal lists contrast with their work for the company. 
Together, the ontological scheme that should organize the internet (“Entertainment, 
News, and Health,” etc.) and the one that governs the labor (“bodies” vs. “the Tool”) 
represent a stricture from which, peculiarly, the appearance of wipeboards in the open-
plan office space (“the Box”) seems to release the human workers. At first Pamela 
doesn’t understand everyone’s excitement,  
but once she saw how the rest of the team hurried to write in red or 
green or blue their to-do lists, she realized that a void had been filled. 
The wipeboards were like a little bubble of hope inside each person that 
they had been unaware of. They made charts on the wipeboards, some 
people just lists, and when an item had been achieved, it was crossed 
out or wiped away. In some ways these to-do lists were the only 
outward markers of the progress made each day. Everything else was 
held tight by the database in cells, rows, columns. (289-90) 
 
The tight grip of the database speaks to how a fixed or completed taxonomy threatens 
to cut the human workers off from narrative possibility (“progress”), even as the 
personal, changeable charts and lists that people put on their wipeboards speak to a 
more flexible aspect of taxonomizing labor. Certainly it is ironic that these workers 
reproduce the form of their wage labor within their “little bubble[s] of hope” and that 
only a gift from their employer makes that hope perceptible to them. Furthermore, 
Street’s initial indifference to the wipeboards thickens the irony, as does her 
admiration for the company’s tireless bots, the “lines of code that prowled the internet 
[…] searching for keywords of interest to each team’s area of ontology” (289). Finally, 
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the resemblance between John Henry’s eventual replacement by the steam drill and 
Street’s replacement by the Tool is inescapable. I want to emphasize, however, that 
John Henry’s legend comes from the steel driving he performs just opposite the 
machine, as Pamela herself works alongside and admires the “tireless bots.” The 
novel’s pairing of human and machine labor situates excavation and taxonomy in 
proximity to one another and in a state of awaiting improvement or perfection to 
come. In the meantime, driving into material unexpectedly generates digressions, 
while taxonomic juxtaposition surprisingly facilitates narrative progress. This is the 
balance that the narration of John Henry Days repeatedly strikes. 
 The cleanest and also the messiest example of taxonomy and digression at 
work together in John Henry Days is “the List,” an object sometimes so inflated by 
narratorial description that it resembles a spiritual power, but at other times so 
circumscribed that it denotes no more than a computer file and its backup copy. “The 
List possessed a will and function” (55); “The List pondered the faces of itself and 
reached out” (55); “The List was just” (55); “The List had been pushed from the earth 
by tectonic forces” (56); “The List was aware of those in its charge” (56); “And the 
List rewarded the world” (56). These six sentences, which begin six consecutive 
paragraphs, make the List seem autonomous, self-aware, moral, natural, omniscient, 
and benign, but for all this, in other terms, “The intent of the List is to have a reliable 
group of people on call who don’t give a fuck, who want things for free” (136). These 
are the junketeers, people who show up at publicity events on someone else’s dime, 
receive meals, drinks, and various products for free, and actually write up stories often 
enough that they remain in good standing with the List’s proprietor, Lucien. How one 
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sees the List depends on what one uses it for and on the possibility of altering its 
contents, and John Henry Days puts the List at the center of a subplot concerning 
editorial access, as One Eye conspires to get off the List and J. aspires, in a certain 
way, to transcend it. Hence, like the mountain, the List is an obstacle and an enabler, 
its content resistant to alteration, even if it is not perfectly fixed. For J., then, the List 
resembles a mountain, while One Eye considers it a “machine to beat,” metaphorically 
equating it with the Burleigh steam drill and with the record that J. is pursuing (236). 
The List, a dynamic object of veneration and revilement, thus unites John Henry, One 
Eye, and J. thematically and contributes uniquely to the novel’s balance between 
taxonomic and digressive logics, the former productive of its own enabling forms, the 
latter a result of thwarted excavation. 
 One Eye explains his desire to delete himself from the List as a question of 
symbolism: “It’s not about willpower. It’s beyond willpower. Deleting my name has a 
symbolic power that will sustain my decision,” he says, when J. first suggests that if 
One Eye wants to change his life, he “could always not go” to the publicity events 
(126). One Eye’s point is that, as the narration has already articulated, the List 
represents the functioning of the whole pop culture: 
The great ebb and flow of need, chronicled, subscribed to. A comeback. 
A meteoric rise. A next big thing, jostling for position in a year-end 
double issue. The reclusive author breaks her silence and grants 
interviews to justify her grandiose advance. The precocious upstart 
seen at the right parties. Behind the scenes at the award ceremony. The 
triumphant return. The inner life of. The secret world. The stories were 
told. There was a need. The List facilitated. (55) 
 
In passages like this, John Henry Days simultaneously classifies and concatenates, 
names and describes. The “need” mentioned at the passage’s beginning and end is 
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perhaps specified (detailed) by the list of events beginning with “A comeback.” Yet 
there is no syntactic cue to read this way, and the end-punctuated phrases that form a 
series never refer to one another. Nothing but “need” recurs, and no pronoun finds an 
earlier antecedent. No place and no time unify the successive syntactic units. 
Phenomena like “A comeback,” “a meteoric rise,” and “A next big thing” have parallel 
structure, and they seem to issue demands for attention (especially the last one, 
“jostling for position”). But the narration lists them right along with an event 
described in quite different terms: “The reclusive author breaks her silence and grants 
interviews.” In the shift from the indefinite to the definite article (“a” to “the”), which 
coincides with the shift from a fragmentary noun-phrase to a narrative sentence, the 
passage performs taxonomic work at one level while creating a need for it at another. 
Assuring us that “[t]he stories were told” and asserting that “[t]he List facilitated,” the 
narration challenges the critic to find the unstated connection between these 
statements. But it also names the List as the facilitating key. 
 The figure of the List blends the story-telling mechanisms of pop culture and 
publicity with a mechanism of categorization. The people on List are mustered to get 
the story out, but they also actively debate the “Anatomy of Puff.” They consider the 
virtues of the original three-way breakdown of genres, “Bob’s Debut, Bob Returns, 
and Bob’s Comeback,” versus the value of the fourth mode of puff, “Bob is Hip,” and 
the possibility of adopting a fifth mode, “Bob’s Alive” (70). However broad or narrow 
the taxonomic scheme, “[e]ach manifestation [of Bob] commanded its own distinct 
stock phrases and hyperbolic rhetoric” (70). In other words, the kind of Bob (a generic 
pop figure) under consideration by the writer determines the rhetorical elements that 
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the writer will deploy. For writers of puff, this just means that the task of meeting a 
required word count is streamlined, but it is not difficult to see in literary theory and 
interpretation a comparably dynamic, self-critical discipline. 
 Earlier I promised to modify my formulation of the question whether form is 
objective or relative. In the context of John Henry Days’s digressive and taxonomic 
impulses and its depictions of both extraction and categorization, then, I suggest that 
both formulations err in imagining a text’s simple givenness. The first half of this is 
easy to see. If we imagine that form is objective, then we imagine that it is just there in 
the text. It is harder to see, but equally the case, that imagining form as relative to the 
critic or reader indulges in a fantasy of givenness. For if form were provided by the 
critic, then the text itself must be thought of as an undifferentiated, that is formless, 
content: tohu va’vohu (“formless and void”), like the mere stuff, not yet even material, 
that precedes creation (Genesis 1:1). While these reciprocal fantasies of givenness 
color some of Best and Marcus’s 2009 accounts of “Surface Reading,”47 the present 
empiricist turn in the humanities actually emphasizes relation: Latour’s actor-network 
theory conceives of objects always in relation to their makers, users, and social and 
material contexts. Similarly in a certain way, Graham Harman’s metaphysically realist 
object-oriented philosophy “is a method of exploring gaps between objects and their 
components, objects and their appearances, objects and their relations, or objects and 
their qualities” (“Outline” 193, Harman’s italics). Here, I have modeled my emphasis 
on labor in John Henry Days to coincide in the end with this assessment that the 
                                                
47 “Surface reading’s advocacy of neutrality, of ‘minimal critical agency,’ of ‘objectivity, validity, [and] 
truth,’[70] involves a fantasy of stepping outside the subject altogether,” in the worlds of Carolyn 
Lesjak (247). 
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critical and interpretive labor best suited to Whitehead’s novel is that which 
acknowledges and replays book’s own efforts to taxonomize provisionally what it 
lacks the scope entirely to contain. 
 The novel itself contains plenitudes as well as multitudes. In John Henry Days, 
the whole unwieldy organization of pop is on the table; and, as the novel dramatizes, 
the structures of pop can consume those who give themselves over to it entirely, like 
Bobby Figgis. It’s a struggle, too, to keep pop at an ironic distance, as the remaining 
junketeers try to do. New categories of puff might have presented a welcome 
opportunity to the junketeering class, but as Tiny points out, particularizing a 
taxonomy has diminishing returns, and too many new categories will destabilize the 
entire taxonomic edifice: 
“See what I’m talking about?” Tiny thunders, spraying droplets of a 
substance from his beard like a dog shaking off rain. “You could make 
a case for Talcott as Debut, Comeback or Return or Hip. It’s all 
jumbled up now. I’m accustomed to four varieties of puff and I like it 
like that. Four elements, four humors, four seasons, four varieties of 
puff. Otherwise why have categories at all? Why not make everything a 
category. A puff for every little thing.” (74) 
 
Tiny implies here that the point of taxonomy is a degree of abstraction, and he is right 
to observe that the highest level of taxonomic inclusivity would be a complete 
catalogue that no longer served any organizing purpose. A Chiropodist in Pangea, 
discussed earlier, seems to exemplify such an all-encompassing tome, and in 
Whitehead’s description of the book release party, Godfrey Frank’s hugeness is a 
horror: “It Came from Academia: Frank shambled through the media like a creature 
from a science fiction film, a monster whose mutant gigantism he could doubtless 
locate in nuclear-age anxiety, cold war terror” (327). At the other extreme, however, is 
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the total failure to specify, which the narration invokes with the insipid phrase, 
“droplets of a substance,” but which is also exemplified in the novel by whatever 
appears (however temporarily) impenetrable – the mountain, the “contents” of 
Pamela’s box that go so long unnamed, and even John Henry and J. 
 It is illustrative that what draws Tiny to four varieties of puff, rather than the 
original three, has nothing to do with efficiency or logical structure. It is, rather, the 
rhythmic and aesthetic form of four-ness: “Four elements, four humors, four seasons, 
four varieties of puff.” The sentence itself is a list and a sort of meta-taxonomy of the 
conditions of Tiny’s comfort. Perhaps a taxonomic scheme, however wrought and 
however justified, ought to be recognizable by its similarity to other known schemes. 
Although Tiny doesn’t exactly win the argument, his appeal to a taxonomic scheme’s 
aesthetic foundation resonates with One Eye, who, as this debate among the junketeers 
winds down, first confides in J. about his plan to take himself off the List. By such 
juxtapositions, John Henry Days bridges the distance between the minutiae of its 
dialogue and the shape of its plot. The List makes (digressive) story space for J., One 
Eye, and the other junketeers in the same gesture that it makes a discursive space for 
(taxonomic) theory. 
 
7. Provisional Conclusions and Ontography 
 The List’s capacity to hold the sprawling John Henry Days together makes the 
most sense when understood as a dynamic object produced simultaneously by Lucien 
and by the junketeers themselves, whose relations to one another and their own 
writing practices give meaning to the form (the mere table of names) that Lucien has 
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the power to edit. The List is a discursive object that is also produced through the 
actions of characters in John Henry Days’s story. As such it is the kind of object 
toward which flat narratology is designed to draw attention; flat narratology might 
synthesize the descriptive bent of longstanding narratological projects with the 
“ontographic” practice that Ian Bogost distills from object-oriented philosophy. Kate 
Marshall characterizes ontography as an “an alternative inscriptive strategy to 
narrative,” but if novels are putting ontography to use, then narrative theory also needs 
to make a place for its operations. Moreover, as my reading of John Henry Days 
suggests, a novel can mobilize taxonomy as a narrative operation that draws together 
characters, settings, and plots that in traditional narratological terms are only 
juxtaposed. 
 Distinct views of the ontology of literary form undergird different positions in 
the ongoing debates over critique, specifically, and the role of humanistic inquiry more 
broadly. I suggest that speculative realist philosophy and Latourian network analysis 
provide generative models for how to navigate narratives whose internal connections 
work at heterogeneous and widely divergent scales. If we want narratological readings 
that not only advance narrative theory, but also offer compelling accounts of the 
particular texts with which they engage, then it is helpful to note the directions those 
texts indicate and, in a way, to test texts’ narrative devices by doing them over.48 My 
goal in narrativizing the taxonomies of John Henry Days is not to do over what the 
novel already does, but to extrapolate a more general narratological approach from its 
delicate handling of J. and J.’s deferred work. Like Tiny, whose preferred anatomy of 
                                                
48 My language here has a precedent in Saldívar’s analysis of John Henry Days’s “doing” race (2). 
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puff rings true to him on aesthetic grounds, I have tried to define a scale or scope of 
contact that is descriptive, interpretive, and particular – that touches, works, and 
moves (on).49 
 Conclusions about J. are just what the novel heads off by refusing to give his 
full name, even when he gives it to Pamela Street. Although his trip to Talcott creates a 
central plot line, J. is mostly excluded from the novel’s digressive and taxonomic 
logics, left hanging between the over-read John Henry and the un-read (but much 
described) content of A Chiropodist in Pangea. We can say, however, that J.’s labor is 
transformed when he puts his hands in the dirt beside Street and helps to bury her 
father’s ashes in the same graveyard where John Henry’s remains might lie. No longer 
only striving to produce content, J. moves the following morning to an open space and 
a more reflective work: “The yellow paint that had divided the asphalt into parking 
places has been scratched away. There are no dividers anymore. Just open space out on 
the black tar. J. Sutter stands in the open lot trying to decide” (388). The narration later 
denies J. this choice, but the effort itself still signifies. The narration leaves J. trying to 
chart the kind of middle ground that he has occupied (without knowing it) all along, 
and this effort to decide models the impossibility of assimilating everything one could 
want into a critical or interpretive model. It is essential to my reading of John Henry 
                                                
49 Is there a surprise at the end of JHD? In keeping with Rooney’s account of surprise in reading, the 
surprise may have the form of the pleasure of recounting in new terms how the novel unfolds itself. But 
perhaps this surprise belongs to criticism, rather than to the novel. The novel itself, instead, may offer 
something like an open secret (on Anne Lise Francois’s model), a knowledge of J. Sutter that doesn’t 
even need to be spoken out loud. Isn’t it obvious that J. stands for “John,” the name both of the famous 
Sutter by whose mill gold was discovered in 1848 and – of course – of John Henry. 
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Days that its narrative logics are provisional, dynamic, even dialectical.50 Still more 
importantly, they flatly reject the hierarchy of character, setting, and plot by which 
narrative content is usually organized. John Henry Days ends with a valiant effort to 
insulate its protagonist from the violence of having said too much. The novel sprawls, 
but only until the moment of decision arrives, when it falls silent. The remaining 
interpretive challenge, then, is to handle this withdrawal of J. from before our eyes – 
and the novel is teaching us how. 
                                                
50 See Carolyn Lesjak’s “Reading Dialectically,” a scathing rebuttal of “surface reading,” for a fuller 
account of how ontological extremes might be held in tension. 
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Chapter 3 – “The Hidden Thinness of Everything”: Quotation, Performance, and 
the Tenuousness of Attribution in The Body Artist 
 
1. Introduction 
 At the very beginning of Don DeLillo’s The Body Artist, “Time seems to pass. 
The world happens, unrolling into moments […]” (9). The narration thus promises 
from its opening sentences that time moves (or doesn’t move) deceptively; the novel 
also very succinctly introduces a concern it shares with Atwood’s Cat’s Eye over the 
spatialization (here “unrolling”) of time. As we saw in Chapter 1, Cat’s Eye’s promise 
that “Time is not a line but a dimension, like the dimensions of space” belongs to a 
voice that the narration abandons almost immediately (Atwood 3). For all its apparent 
authority, then, the statement fails to lay out Cat’s Eye’s physical or metaphysical 
premises, and Cat’s Eye’s various accounts of how time works lead instead to 
reflections on the novel’s frameworks for viewing. In The Body Artist, as in Cat’s Eye, 
the narration very soon abandons the voice in which it opens, but in this novel the 
voice returns farther on, though briefly, at the starts of chapters 2, 6, and 7. Also the 
opening statements of The Body Artist are not, like Cat’s Eye’s, limited in their scope 
by attribution explicitly to a character. Consequently, The Body Artist’s opening 
gambit of time’s seeming is not explicitly refuted by the narration. If “Time seems to 
pass” were to establish this novel’s metaphysical groundwork, the question would not 
be, as in Cat’s Eye, “What framework can sustain examinations of a life or lives?,” but 
rather “What kind of seeming does time perform, and which features of this fictional 
world sustain it?” 
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 In this chapter I proceed as though The Body Artist were indeed speaking for 
and about itself in the opening paragraph (which I will shortly discuss in detail). This 
premise leads me to examine the poetics and temporality of quotation as it appears 
within the narrative discourse and disrupts it. I define quotation quite broadly here: 
Any language in the discourse of The Body Artist whose origin supposedly lies within 
the story-world counts.51 Quotation thus includes character speech (monologue, 
including interior monologue, and dialogue), story-world documents (an obituary and 
a review of a work of performance art), and the self-citational language that The Body 
Artist uses to warp the world it constructs, transporting the narration from one time 
and place to another and even allowing characters to inhabit multiple scenes at once. 
Taking up the poetics of quotation in advance of considering the poetics of character 
or plot in The Body Artist draws attention to the narration’s own minimally descriptive 
approach to its narrative objects; and it contrasts that minimal description (“thin” 
description, in terms Heather Love adapts from Clifford Geertz) with the relatively 
“thick,” interpretive speculations offered by The Body Artist’s protagonist, Lauren 
Hartke. This, in turn, highlights those aspects of the novel that inhibit – or, conversely, 
facilitate – naturalization, the process by which readers and critics “explain 
[something’s] meaning by treating it as the natural effect of an unexceptionable cause” 
(Culler, Pursuit 152).52  
                                                
51 The breadth of this definition relies on Derrida’s idea that “[e]very sign […], in a small or large unit, 
can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, 
engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable” (Limited Inc. 12, 
qtd. in Lee 43).  
52 See also the back and forth between Monika Fludernik (Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology) and 
“unnatural narratologists” such as Brian Richardson and Jan Alber. These debates over how to handle 
“the non- or anti-memetic in narrative” are now a decade old but the stakes of the debate remain high 
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 As in previous chapters, my approach here involves selecting and organizing 
narrative discourse in unconventional ways; but as in Chapters 1 and 2, I ground these 
selections in close readings of the text’s metafictional self-commentary. Beside 
asserting a spatialized temporality for The Body Artist, the opening passage also 
indicates the novel’s concerns with performance, identity, and (perversely, given the 
title) disembodiment – all in advance of introducing its characters. Here is the opening 
paragraph in full:  
Time seems to pass. The world happens, unrolling into moments, and 
you stop to glance at a spider pressed to its web. There is a quickness of 
light and a sense of things outlined precisely and streaks of running 
luster on the bay. You know more surely who you are on a strong bright 
day after a storm when the smallest falling leaf is stabbed with self-
awareness. The wind makes a sound in the pines and the world comes 
into being, irreversibly, and the spider rides the wind-swayed web. (9). 
 
In contrast with the enigmatic first sentence and the strangeness, the difficulty, of 
“your” stopping to glance at a spider in the second, the third sentence’s abrupt turn to 
impersonal, even objective, description stands out. The “quickness of light” and the 
“sense of things outlined precisely” are external and disembodied, grammatically 
unattached to any real or fictive subjectivity. Perhaps because of this, the statement of 
your knowing “more surely who you are on a strong bright day after a storm when the 
smallest falling leaf is stabbed with self-awareness” has the ring of a cosmic principle 
(rather than a personal one) linking your self-knowledge to the leaf’s self-awareness. 
Read narrowly, in isolation from the narrative contexts that may eventually enclose 
                                                                                                                                       
(Fludernik, “How Unnatural” (358)). The question is whether narrative analysis has to be (or can be) in 
the business of interpreting “unnatural” narrative discourse by mapping it onto “natural” forms, or 
whether, instead, narrative “oddity” can be preserved and embraced by narratology (361). My own 
analysis is largely sympathetic with the unnatural narratologists, but if Fludernik is right to imply that 
they tried, but failed, to “resist interpretation,” I part ways with them there (ibid.). 
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them, these pairings of light’s quickness with “a sense of things” and your own self-
knowledge with a leaf’s may disclose the ontology of the story-world. It would be a 
world in which perception and knowledge are implicitly, immediately connected, 
maybe causing each other. And yet, time’s “seeming” undermines the links that the 
narration would otherwise establish: If time only seems to pass, then the strong bright 
day may be somewhere one never arrives, except by passing one’s eyes over that very 
sentence. So the discourse here both describes the world whose objects, images, and 
relations it names and calls attention to how that world, made just so by just this 
language, is illusory. There is “a quickness of light” because the discourse says so; and 
having been alerted that I know more surely who I am “on a strong bright day after a 
storm,” I may even be inclined to feel this way if such a strong bright day arrives; but 
time only seems to pass in the world described, because it is fixed by this narration. 
Thus The Body Artist very economically initiates its self-commentary. Even the falling 
leaf is “stabbed”: arrested, transfixed, and subject to examination. 
 Still, there is no doubt that The Body Artist can be read quite straightforwardly 
with human characters, their language, and their psychology at the center of the story, 
instead of quotation’s disruptiveness to the world-making function of discourse. The 
novel’s main action occurs in the days and weeks after the suicide of Lauren Hartke’s 
husband, Rey Robles, and it follows Hartke, the body artist of the title, as she develops 
a new performance. It is easy enough, then, to make headway into the novel by 
psychologizing its experimental narration and recuperating its occasionally bent 
diegesis into a realist mode. One need only read the weirdest or most unwieldy 
elements of the fictional world as metaphors for loss or grief, and the opening 
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paragraph would simply articulate Hartke’s point of view in advance. Its apparently 
cosmic utterances would constitute Hartke’s early morning insights on the morning 
before her husband shoots himself. The unusual conjunctions (“the world happens […] 
and you stop”; “there is a quickness […] and a sense”; “The wind makes a sound […] 
and the world comes into being”) wouldn’t explore the ontology of this or any world. 
Rather, they would share the contours of Hartke’s affective landscape. 
 Such a reading, however, is deflationary. It undersells the novel’s self-
commentary and might demote the two story-world documents that The Body Artist 
imports from their formal positions as chapter equivalents. Their easy resemblance to 
real-world documents also doesn’t help a reading oriented toward Hartke’s interiority. 
More importantly, two of The Body Artist’s characters, Hartke and Mr. Tuttle, possess 
such uncanny imitative abilities that they transform before the reader’s eyes into other 
people and thereby sever their utterances from the temporal and spatial contexts in 
which they are produced. So, in lay terms, the critical problem of The Body Artist is to 
figure out just how weird one should take the novel to be. Do its spare prose and its 
non-attribution of certain phrases make it only difficult to read – requiring some care 
and imagination in order to make sense of the novel’s events in a naturalistic way? Or 
is the novel itself a performance of a different kind, not one whose plot one has to 
work harder than usual to reconstruct, but one that isn’t plotted in customary terms at 
all? 
 Consider Mr. Tuttle, who first appears after Robles’s death but whose voice 
and language recall Robles and other characters to the present. His strange speech 
violates the bounds of time and of identity, disrupting Hartke’s efforts to make sense 
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of him, his past, her past, her husband’s death, and her grief. Laura Di Prete, in “Don 
DeLillo’s ‘The Body Artist’: Performing the Body, Narrating Trauma,” acknowledges 
that “the reader is doomed to fail in an effort to decode or fully explain such a figure” 
(484). However, by reading Mr. Tuttle as an intrusive “phantom,” borrowing the term 
from Nicolas Abraham, she emphasizes his production in Hartke of a “heterogeneous” 
subjectivity (485). Mark Osteen and Joseph Dewey, like Di Prete, focus on Tuttle’s 
impacts on Hartke, exploring her artistic production and her grieving, respectively; 
and when David Cowart takes up the topic of “DeLillo and the Power Language,” he 
reads Tuttle as “a vehicle for a number of enigmatic revelations about language as 
environment” (157, italics added).  
 It is also possible, however, to read this novel the other way around: not as the 
story of a performance artist who wrestles with the intrusive or uncanny language of 
her environment, but as the story of a story realizing itself in words – of language that 
calls into being, however temporarily, such characters as Mr. Tuttle, Robles, and 
Hartke herself with their complex temporal and personal relations. In pursuit of such a 
reading, I begin by investigating the distortions caused by quoted discourse in 
narratological terms. Section (2) defines these terms and argues for quotation’s 
consistent generation of a present tense in narrative discourse. Section (3) takes up the 
implications of that analysis for The Body Artist’s experimental deployment of certain 
repeated phrases, and Section (4) offers an account, via Heather Love, of how such a 
flat (or maybe “thin”) reading of the novel might be “hidden.” Section (5) extrapolates 
further from Love’s advocacy of thin description in the humanities to explain the 
appearance of The Body Artist’s two interpolated documents, which I take as 
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quotations of story-world discourse that also do characterological work; and I 
conclude in Section (6) by returning from the topic of “documentary metafiction” to 
the topic of time with which the novel and my reading both begin. Quotation’s special 
status motivates both The Body Artist’s fragmented narration and the peculiarity of its 
anti-mimetic or “unnatural” characters. Even though the narrative contains loss and 
grief, the novel’s critical and philosophical work concern the mechanics of 
representation. With this in mind, it might be appropriate to say that Hartke’s loss of 
Robles is a metaphor for the unmooring that enables and accompanies quotation, 
rather than the other way around.  
 
2. On Quotation’s Temporality 
 Quotation has a special temporal status and a special ontological status in 
fiction generally, as I will illustrate in a moment. When The Body Artist violates the 
conventions of quotation, though, it makes the timing and ontology of quoted 
language (and gesture) into the subject of a specifically narratological concern about 
how characters are composed. When Hartke begs Mr. Tuttle, “Do Rey,” she is asking 
for quotation: “[s]ay whatever comes into your head, just so it is him” (73). And 
Hartke’s own transformations rely on quotation, too – of gesture as well as language. 
The Body Artist’s self-reflexive narration not only uses, but is also about, the 
distortions quotation can cause.  
 My theoretical framing of quotation as a discrete narrative object relies on the 
observation – indeed the insistence – of Gérard Genette that narrative discourse is not 
in the business of mimesis (representing) but of “informing.” This insistence 
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appropriately permits separate analyses of the temporality of a narrated story’s events 
and the temporality of the narrative discourse. Accounts of story time can specify how 
long events take in the story-world, how often they recur, and whether they belong in 
the past or the present relative to the central, ongoing action of the main narrative line 
(if there is one). Analyzing the temporality of the discourse is either much simpler or 
much more complex. On the one hand, “discourse time” itself is typically measured by 
the number and length of words, although one might also count syllables or consider 
the discourse’s metrical aspects. On the other hand, to make the temporality of the 
discourse signify, one must consider discourse time and story time together: Genette 
calls the relation between them “duration.” When the discourse covers a long time in a 
few words, we can call it “summary”; when the timing of the telling and the timing of 
the told event are (by some measure) similar, Genette (and Seymour Chatman, 
following him) calls this “scene.” Discourse can also linger longer than the event that 
it relates (“stretch”) or even bring the flow of time in a narrative text completely to a 
halt, as in pure description.53 
 Genette wants to do away with the idea of mimesis when it comes to “verbal 
acts.” In his words, “Narrative does not ‘represent’ a (real or fictive) story, it recounts 
it – that is, it signifies it by means of language – except for the already verbal 
elements of the story (dialogues, monologues). And these, too, it does not imitate – 
not, certainly, because here it cannot, but simply because it need not, since it can 
directly reproduce them, or more precisely, transcribe them” (42-43, Genette’s 
                                                
53 For examples of cutting-edge work on description, see Freedgood and Schmitt’s “Denotatively, 
Technically, Literally”; Schmitt’s “Tidal Conrad (Literally)”; and Love’s “Close but not deep: literary 
ethics and the descriptive turn.” 
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italics).54 Genette thus marks out dialogue as a special case. It differs from other 
narrative elements in virtue of being a transcription of language that has its basis, 
Genette might like to say, in the language of the characters, but is made to appear just 
so at the surface of the narrative. As I indicated in my Introduction, and as I argue in 
my analysis of John Henry Days, this imagined priority of story elements or story 
materials over the discourse in which they appear (whether by transcription, mimesis, 
or reference), cannot be sustained with respect to contemporary metafictions, if it can 
be sustained anywhere. Culler’s deconstruction of the story/discourse divide already 
casts doubt on the possibility of treating story stuff as prior. I hesitate to follow 
Culler’s conclusion, however, that despite the reversibility of the story/discourse 
hierarchy, which narrative’s self-deconstruction entails, “one must be willing to shift 
from one perspective to the other, from story to discourse and back again,” in order to 
“account for the force of narrative” (Pursuit 208). Rather, I want to test the idea that 
metafictions like The Body Artist benefit from readings that avoid asserting a 
necessary gap between story and discourse, since so much of their stories are made of 
the discourse itself. The potential for such discourse-heavy stories is implicit in 
Genette’s account of dialogue as transcription, which I extend to quotation more 
broadly. The transcription model of quotation suggests the power of a certain class 
                                                
54 Despite Genette’s formulation, narrative discourse does sometimes imitate a character’s verbal acts. 
This, anyhow, is one way of accounting for the relationship between narratorial discourse and free 
indirect discourse. There is also a more general problem that aesthetically realist narratives routinely 
quote character speech in such a polished form that it does not resemble real (i.e., flesh-and-blood, real-
world) speech. If we assume that the characters in such fiction are supposed to be as much like real 
people as possible, then there is an argument to be made that such quotation is actually a form of 
paraphrase rather than a direct reproduction. My own view tends in a rather different direction: I take 
narratorial statements about what characters say to be stipulative, to constitute the facts about the story-
world. 
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story elements (linguistic ones) to appear directly in the discourse. Significantly for 
my reading of The Body Artist, when narratorial discourse quotes, its power to 
compress or dilate time or otherwise to mediate a reader’s encounter with story 
material is restrained. It is not that this story stuff is prior, nor that it actually comes 
from anywhere different than the narratorial discourse, but that the form in which it 
appears in the discourse is the same form it has in the story. 
 Thus, if we think of certain verbal information as “transcribed” from the 
language of a character, then quotation becomes a unit or an object that belongs so 
completely to the story that its appearance has the potential to rupture the discourse.55 
Through the break it makes in the narrative discourse, a quotation erupts into the 
reader’s real life: a linguist artifact that remains self-identical no matter how often it is 
reproduced and no matter how one modifies its context.56 Of course, calling a 
sequence of words “self-identical” raises a host of difficulties involving, for example, 
the material medium in which the words in question are (re)produced and also the 
fundamental questions of semiotics about signs’ ontology and their divisibility into 
signifiers and signifieds. Let me emphasize, then, the narratological aspect of my 
analysis here. Where the narratives I study repeat phrases explicitly or stipulate, for 
example, “people saying the same thing,” I will give them a great deal of prima facie 
credit (DeLillo 101). This is not to say that the same words mean the same thing 
                                                
55 In technical terms, quotation is, strictly speaking, extra-narrative even as it is perfectly intra-diegetic. 
56 In Foucault’s terms, the linguistic artifact I describe here is a formulation, but not a statement. It may 
become as many statements as the occasions of its utterance in different narrations, different scenes, and 
so on. See “The Enunciative Function,” section C (96-100). 
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wherever they recur. Of course they do not. But their form remains intact; and so do 
their tense and timing in so far as quotation is sundered from narratorial discourse.  
Quotation happens now, unfolding in the present tense. It brings its words 
directly to the reader, with narratorial discourse only (perhaps) offering a preface, an 
afterword, or some other mode of commentary. Conceived of as a communicative 
agent (as in the narrative-as-rhetoric tradition of Booth and Phelan),57 a narrator 
neither speaks through nor is heard over quotation. Otherwise conceived, however, it’s 
not clear what a narrator would be, which is why I refer as consistently as possible to 
the effects of “narration” instead.58 
 Here is an example, from an early passage in The Body Artist, in which we can 
see how the narratorial discourse reasserts itself after quotation interrupts. DeLillo’s 
wilder experimentation with quotation is foreshadowed here, but the first-time reader 
of The Body Artist will encounter this exchange between Robles and Hartke before 
having observed how weird the novel becomes. It will do, then, for a preliminary foray 
into the poetics of quotation. To aid the analysis that follows, I break a continuous 
selection (from the very end of Chapter 1) into three parts: 
[1] She saw him standing in the doorway. 
 “Have you seen my keys?” 
 She said, “What?” 
 He waited for the question to register. 
 “Which keys?” she said. 
 He looked at her. (27) 
                                                
57 See also Richard Walsh’s argument that a narrator is always either the author or a character, in “Who 
is the Narrator?” 
58 The complete bibliography relevant to this decision would be extensive. But see especially Foucault’s 
articulation both of the gap between statements’ authors and their subjects (93) and of the extent of the 
“enunciative field,” the wide network of formulations (some only possible, rather than made) that 
constitutes a statement’s context. 
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 Although this passage is quite ordinary so far (one can imagine it appearing in 
a relatively conventional novel, despite its choppiness), it is formally and temporally 
complex. Shifts in both mood and tense occur between the first and second 
paragraphs: “She saw him standing in the doorway” is in the simple past tense and the 
indicative mood, while “Have you seen my keys?” is interrogative, in the past-perfect. 
These shifts would constitute a weird break in the narrative, were it not, exactly, for 
the quotation marks, which naturalize the shifts. The passage also dispenses with 
attribution, at times. One must infer, for example, that the speaker of the question 
“Have you seen my keys?” is one of the two persons mentioned in the immediately 
preceding sentence. “She saw him standing in the doorway” paves the way for us to 
assume that it is Robles, not Hartke, looking for his keys as he prepares to leave; and 
the attribution of the reply confirms this. 
 Indeed, that reply, “What?” stands somewhat differently with respect to the 
narration, since a simple-past sentence contains it. Here the quotation marks go 
beyond what would be needed to mark the word as quotation, since “She said” 
indicates character speech already. Elsewhere DeLillo introduces his characters’ 
language in constructions that look just like this, but without the helpful and 
conventional punctuation. Nonetheless, the effect of the quoted speech here, which 
piles up on itself even in these few lines of prose fiction, is to place the reader 
imaginatively within the unfolding moment that is being narrated. In presenting story 
material that is coextensive with its discourse, quotation can situate a reader in story 
time, generating a feeling of expectation – indeed, a present tense. While Robles waits 
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for Hartke’s answer, we wait there with him in the sense that we must pass through 
this discourse in order to arrive at Hartke’s reply (not yet guaranteed). This is despite 
the fact that Robles “waited” in the past tense. I don’t mean that discourse time and 
story time coincide perfectly when one reads quoted speech. Obviously one can read 
quotation rapidly or slowly, and the narrator may instruct the reader, either before or 
after the fact, that the quoted speech itself has been choppy or mellifluous, elongated 
or terse. Yet The Body Artist – or any novel that similarly pits different temporalities 
against one another – will find in quotation a formal resistance to temporal 
experimentation, because a quotation must appears as a unit in order to appear at all. 
Even in the free indirect style, one must either be able to identify certain elements of 
the language as belonging to the diegetic world or one must suspend one’s decision 
about the discourse’s attribution. 
 The passage I am quoting helps to illustrate the role that quotation plays in 
establishing the relation between discourse time and story time that Genette and 
Chatman call “scene.” I have already noted that the excerpt above includes narration 
as well as speech, and we may ask how that narration interacts with the present-ness of 
the quotation that it embeds. Here is part [2], which immediately follows what I have 
quoted above. 
[2] She said, “I bought some lotion yesterday. Which I meant to tell 
you. It’s a muscle rub. It’s in a green and white tube on the shelf in the 
big bathroom upstairs. It’s greaseless. It’s a muscle rub. Rub it in, my 
love. Or ask me nice, I’ll do it for you.” (27) 
 
As in my first selection, the narration is minimal. Here it does no more than attribute 
quoted speech to a character (“She said”), although earlier it also specified the 
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speakers’ context in time and place and added an explicitly visual dimension to the 
flow of the verbal exchange (“She saw him standing in the doorway” and “He looked 
at her”). Usually, when narration intervenes between one segment of dialogue and 
another, a tension develops between discourse time and story time, and the quotation 
itself recalibrates the pace of the narrative to the pace of the events as we suppose the 
characters to experience them. In part [1], the pace of narration presumably 
approximates the pace of the story most closely when we get one line from Robles, 
“Have you seen my keys?,” without any narratorial commentary at all.  
 However, the temporalities of the quotations in [1] and [2] differ, because the 
quotations themselves reach into different times. While Robles asks about the past in 
[1] (“Have you seen my keys?”), the interrogative mode of his utterance and of both 
Hartke’s responses (“What?” and “Which keys?”) keeps the quoted speech from 
branching off into a new narrative. By contrast, in [2] Hartke’s speech narrates a past 
action (her buying some lotion) and a past intention (her meaning to tell Robles), and 
thus the immediacy of her description of the muscle rub and of her imperatives to 
Robles is tempered by a digression into summary. Not only this, but Hartke’s failure 
to respond to Robles’s question in [1] primes us to notice how Hartke’s speech in [2] 
continues through the spaces in which Robles might be expected to reply. No matter 
how minutely we describe it, there is no textually-grounded alternative to accepting its 
unity, continuity, and identity as a quotation, in particular as a sequence of consecutive 
words spoken by the character Lauren Hartke. In other words, there is no arguing 
against the quotation marks that here demarcate Hartke’s speech. Yet the quotation has 
syntactical, punctuational, and rhythmic features that work against its unity and imply 
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a back-and-forth between Hartke and Robles, or within Hartke herself. By implying 
this back and forth, they raise the possibility that story time is, peculiarly, compressed 
here, even as we sense that for Hartke the moment extends uncomfortably in Robles’s 
non-response. The quotation in [2] thus evokes competing experiences without 
providing definitive contextual or formal evidence for choosing among them. In The 
Body Artist, then, even easily attributable dialogue exploits quotation’s present-ness to 
destabilize the narrative’s duration. 
 To complete this close reading of a series of quotations that are fairly easy to 
naturalize, I turn to the segment that closes this passage and that concludes The Body 
Artist’s first chapter:  
[3] “All my keys are on one ring,” he said.  
 She almost said, Is that smart? But then she didn’t. Because 
what a needless thing. Because how petty it would be to say such a 
thing, in the morning or any time, on a strong bright day after a storm. 
(27) 
 
Here we see how narrative discourse, in contrast to quoted speech, can rapidly open up 
a world of summary (in Chatman’s terms) and possibility: what Hartke might have 
said, but didn’t. We have here both a counterfactual response to Robles (“She almost 
said [….] But then she didn’t”) and an apparently timeless narratorial stipulation 
(“what a needless thing […] how petty […]”) whose specific language we have some 
reason to assign to Hartke. The reason is that if we take these judgments to be 
narratorial in their origin, then they problematically imply a personal narrator whom 
the narration never clearly situates. As instances of free indirect discourse, however, 
they complicate, rather than clarify, the relation between story time and discourse 
time. Should we assign this language to the time of Hartke’s “almost” saying 
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something? To the white space that follows the chapter’s close? Assigning it to the 
time of narration doesn’t help, since we cannot with any certainty assimilate the time 
of reflection on the scene just ended to the story’s timeline.  
 In any case, it should be clear now that determining the duration of a passage, 
the relationship between its discourse time and its story time, depends very much on 
the scale of one’s selection of the text, especially when the selection crosses the 
boundaries of quotation by, for example, including free indirect discourse. The 
passage that I have reproduced above may still feel like “scene,” even after I have 
dissected it. But the judgments passed in [3] make it possible for us to imagine this 
passage as a “stretch,” where the narrative discourse runs markedly longer than the 
story time that it relates. Problematically, the duration of the scene might depend on 
the speed of Hartke’s thought, and we thus arrive at a limit to traditional narratological 
analysis, where the descriptive and taxonomic work that ought to underpin 
interpretation requires some kind of interpretive decision before it can be carried out.59 
This is not a reason to give up on description, however, because formal description 
can remain empirical, even when it is constructed.60 Instead it is a reason to draw 
attention to the plurality of descriptive forms that metafictions make available and to 
consider how well a metafiction’s self-descriptions might travel. 
 
                                                
59 Fludernik makes a related point about how unnatural readings “cannot resist interpretation, though 
their manner of interpretation differs from that of mimeticists since they tend to foreground the 
projection of alternative worlds (Coover’s ‘The Babysitter’) or metafictional policy” (“How Natural” 
361). 
60 See Bogel’s work to “replace the givenness of form with the interpretive production of form” (9). As 
Levine makes clear, forms are the products of observation and description; but they can nonetheless 
“travel” without changing and are hence not relative to their makers. 
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3. An Experiment with Quotation: “Don’t Touch it. I’ll Clean it up Later.” 
 I have so far argued that quotation in general ruptures the flow of narrative 
discourse and limits narration’s usual power to compress time or stretch it out. The 
Body Artist suggests its own, more specific, poetics of quotation through the effects of 
strangely voiced language and quoted gesture on its characters. These effects are both 
affective and narratological. This is to say, (1) that the narration recounts how 
characters like Hartke, Mr. Tuttle, and Hartke’s friend Mariella Chapman respond 
emotionally to the recurrence of certain phrases and certain gestures, and (2) that the 
construction of these characters via The Body Artist’s discourse is put into question by 
the difficulty we have in attributing certain quotations. Echoing the language I use to 
describe Elaine Risley’s ontology in Cat’s Eye, we might say that the construction, the 
unfolding, or the discursive rehearsal and performance of these characters is 
suspended when the language or gesture of the story-world impresses itself in The 
Body Artist’s narrative discourse. The characters’ fictiveness becomes the matter of 
concern; and yet, paradoxically, these moments offer readers and critics an 
opportunity to handle directly the linguistic materials of which these narrative objects 
are composed. The objects that come to the fore, then, seem both to reveal themselves 
and, simultaneously, to withdraw somewhere behind their accessible features. The 
complex ontology of quotation infects the ontology of other narrative objects in The 
Body Artist. So by sidestepping the hierarchy of character, setting, and plot in order to 
focus on quotation as the unit of analysis, I return to the ontology of narrative objects 
more generally via the novel’s own metafictional concerns. 
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 The novel amply prepares the reader for this dual emphasis on quotation and 
the performance of discursive form by conferring otherworldly imitative abilities on 
the characters of Hartke and Mr. Tuttle. Hartke achieves the power to transform utterly 
her appearance and the way she moves. After months of what she calls “body work,” 
she so fully embodies the characters that she portrays on stage that she becomes 
unrecognizable to Chapman (107). After her show, at the house she and Robles had 
rented and where she has renewed the lease for the winter, she even verges on failing 
to recognize herself: “I am Lauren. But less and less” (119). As for Mr. Tuttle, that 
cipher of a character apparently speaks only in quotation, in the words and voices of 
past and future dialogues that he overhears. Given quotation’s resistance to temporal 
modification, we should not be surprised to learn that Mr. Tuttle “didn’t know how to 
measure himself to what we call the Now” (68). Instead, “this man’s consciousness” is  
his walking talking continuum.  
 Nice word. What does it mean? (93). 
 
Mr. Tuttle only appears to Hartke (and is only plainly manifest in the novel’s 
discourse) during the period of her grief for Robles, but he was apparently present in 
the house for a while before Robles’s suicide. As Hartke attempts to converse with 
him, he slowly emerges as an observer and a recorder of Hartke’s interchanges with 
her late husband. She discovers that he is even capable of “do[ing] Rey” by speaking 
in Rey Robles’s voice (73), and it is through Mr. Tuttle’s quoting Robles (and later 
Hartke herself) that DeLillo brings Hartke to confront the complexities that arise when 
quotation turns on its context. In this novel, the words in Mr. Tuttle’s mouth 
frequently unhinge themselves from spatial, temporal, and personal markers, so that 
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the narration may have snapped into a flashback; or Hartke, listening, may be 
remembering the past; or she may be experiencing the past’s bizarre resurrection or a 
visitation from her deceased husband. The narration doesn’t permit Hartke a decision 
among these alternatives. 
 Because in a literal way Mr. Tuttle cannot speak for himself, and because the 
narration never adopts Mr. Tuttle’s point of view, he becomes something like a surface 
for Hartke’s projections (both of remembered scenes and of metaphysical and 
psychological speculations). Yet he remains not only outside of her control, his words, 
autonomously as it were, intruding on her consciousness, but also in a way unreadable. 
Hartke struggles to assimilate his speech. She gropes for the right way to frame Mr. 
Tuttle’s quotation of Robles’s words:  
She followed what he said, word for word, but had to search for the 
context. The speech rambled and spun. He was talking about cigarette 
brands, Players and Gitanes, I’d walk a mile for a Camel, and then she 
heard Rey’s, the bell-clap report of Rey’s laughter, clear and spaced, 
and this did not come from a tape recorder. 
 
He was talking to her, not to a screenwriter in Rome or Los Angeles. It 
was Rey in his role of charming fatalist [...] (63) 
 
Hartke must “search for the context” that Mr. Tuttle does not provide, but it is not the 
same context that the narration offers the reader. In this scene, Hartke is reading aloud 
to Mr. Tuttle from a biology textbook when she notices that he has begun speaking. 
The narration tells us that his “voice,” “accent,” “dragged vowels,” and “articulation” 
are familiar to Hartke because they are Robles’s, and after a period of intense 
listening, the words, too, become familiar (62, 63). In this story-context, Tuttle’s 
performance of Robles has already begun; but the narrative discourse has not yet been 
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shunted into quotation. It has only promised the quotation’s precision in advance.61 
The crucial moment for both Hartke and for the reader arrives when Hartke finally 
recognizes the words, “I’d walk a mile for a Camel” and hears Robles’s laughter, not 
Mr. Tuttle’s. From the reader’s perspective, the mid-sentence arrival of that first-
personal pronoun (“I’d”) enacts something of the transformation that confronts Hartke, 
too. The quoted phrase, “I’d walk a mile for a Camel,” interrupts the third-person 
account of Mr. Tuttle talking, and, at that same moment, Robles’s laughter intervenes 
and temporarily shuts down Mr. Tuttle’s voice. It is as though the laughter responds to 
a narratological demand that the shift in discursive mode be marked at the level of 
story, when the discourse itself doesn’t acknowledge any change (by typography or 
punctuation, for example). The arrival of Robles’s words, marked off from the flow of 
the story by Robles’s laughter, is an ontological bomb; it momentarily destroys 
context, even though the reassertion and reassembly of a context immediately follow. 
The laughter responds to a similar ontological slippage in the story-world, since “I’d 
walk a mile for a Camel” is presumably funny to Robles just because a cigarette has 
morphed somehow into a desert quadruped.  
 To reestablish the solidity of the narrated moment, the narration shifts from 
Robles’s laughter to Hartke’s free indirect discourse. “This [laughter] did not come 
from a tape recorder,” she thinks to herself – for what other narrative use could the 
assertion have than to produce Hartke’s interior monologue for the reader? There is no 
                                                
61 Pardis Dabashi notes that despite the guarantee of verbal reproduction, textual quotation of speech is 
still an abstraction that elides the tone, timbre, pace, and rhythm of the utterance. A narrator may even 
specify, as in Henry James’s The Bostonians, that the quotation will not account for a feature like accent 
or dialect. Here, DeLillo’s narration specifies the accuracy of Mr. Tuttle’s reproduction, but cannot 
produce that reproduction in full. (Personal communication, 4/13/2016, Cambridge, MA) 
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reason for the reader to consider that the laughter comes from a tape recorder, 
although of course the reader also will not read the laughter as coming from Robles, 
unless explicitly so directed. Yet, however much this movement from third person, 
extra-diegetic narration into Hartke’s free indirect discourse begins the work of re-
securing the eruptive quotation (“I’d walk a mile for a camel”) within a progression of 
story-events, the narration’s dependence on Hartke’s interior language makes the 
quotation’s context uncertain. To naturalize the scene in terms of character and setting, 
we might say that Mr. Tuttle is channeling Rey Robles, or that Tuttle becomes Robles 
at this moment in the story. Or we might conclude that Hartke (crazily? mistakenly? 
driven or riven by grief?) hears her dead husband’s voice and feels his presence at this 
moment, in a way that doesn’t implicate Mr. Tuttle’s ontology at all. To read through 
character this way obscures the novel’s interrogation of quotation itself, the way 
Robles’s language and laughter perform his presence not only for Hartke but for us.  
  Although the narration slides temporarily toward Hartke’s language and point 
of view (“Rey in his role as charming fatalist”), it soon moves back toward an external 
perspective on Hartke’s recollection of a night with Robles, their sex and their 
conversation, “two people passing through each other” (63). This phrase in turn can 
help to explicate the narration’s contradictory accounts of the moment of Mr. Tuttle’s 
quotation. On the one hand, “This was not some communication with the dead. It was 
Rey alive in the course of a talk he’d had with her, in this room, not long after they’d 
come here. She was sure of this” (63). On the other hand, the scene Hartke remembers 
gives way in a subsequent paragraph to the reality of Tuttle, the chair, and the space 
that Hartke physically occupies while her memory runs away with her: “All this a 
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white shine somewhere, an iceblink of memory, and then the words themselves, Rey’s 
words, being spoken by the man in the chair nearby” (64). “Two people passing 
through each other” refers to Hartke and Robles in a phrase that moves its sentence 
from sexual relations to discursive ones. The possibility of such “passing through” 
attenuates Hartke’s and Robles’s corporeal separateness by way of the language they 
exchange, and so when Mr. Tuttle brings forth Robles’s voice and speech, both Hartke 
and the narration have to work to distinguish the two characters. When their speech 
coincides, in quotation, they are both present (in the story; in the discourse); then, 
when, the narration resumes, it refers to “the words themselves” as though this 
emphasis could keep the characters apart. It asserts that they are Rey’s, though spoken 
by Mr. Tuttle. Via such gestures, The Body Artist concerns itself with the ownership of 
quoted speech and gesture, with the tenuousness of a quotation’s connection to its 
source, and with alchemy of performances that make identity permeable.  
 The pattern of quotation interrupting narration and narration reasserting itself 
continues through this scene. The description of “Rey’s words, being spoken by the 
man in the chair nearby” immediately precedes a new quotation, in a separate 
paragraph, that the narration refuses to demote syntactically by making it an object of 
any subject’s speech, even though it does enclose the new words in quotation marks: 
“I regain possession of myself through you. I think like myself now, not like the man I 
became. I eat and sleep like myself, bad, which is bad, but it’s like myself when I was 
myself and not the other man” (64). Supposing the words to belong to Robles, we can 
infer that he has struggled with his personal identity and that now another character, 
Mr. Tuttle, walks himself exactly through Robles’s phrases, without comprehending 
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them or providing an iota of commentary. Indeed, throughout The Body Artist, Mr. 
Tuttle does not or cannot contextualize himself, even though each word he utters 
implies an alternative context to the present narrative moment. This reading depends, 
however, on relegating the production of those words to some time in Robles’s life, 
rather than the present moment, when Robles has perhaps become “the other man” – 
Tuttle. Furthermore, a flat narratology may even suppose that this syntactically 
isolated quotation is in a position to speak for itself: Its enigmatic pronouncements 
about personal identity in effect perform the transition between a quotation’s potential 
and its realization – it becomes actual by being uttered or heard, written or read. The 
present tense claim, “I think like myself now, not like the man I became,” suggests 
that Rey Robles’s words in the mouth of Mr. Tuttle are freed in the present moment of 
the utterance from the work of characterization to which they eventually contribute. 
Unmarked by attribution, they are formally free from characterization, and in so far as 
we attribute them to the very weird person of Mr. Tuttle, they have been torn from 
their context as much at the story level as at the level of discourse. Indeed, Mr. Tuttle 
with his “cartoon head and body, chinless, stick-figured,” resists naturalization so 
successfully – how can he be real even to Hartke? – that even when quotation is 
attributed to him, he may best be understood as a device for producing dislocated 
language, a narratological innovation. 
 Mr. Tuttle’s quotations of Robles drive Hartke temporarily out of her 
experience of the present moment, and repeated encounters with two concatenated 
phrases, “Don’t touch it” and “I’ll clean it up later,” cause something similar. These 
phrases appear together six times in the course of chapters 5 and 6. Of those six 
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occurrences, two are surrounded by quotation marks (83, 95); two are contextually 
marked as discourse, but not punctuated as such (100); and two are syntactically 
divorced from their context and not explicitly attributed to any speaker (87, 102). 
Since in the first instance Mr. Tuttle is the speaker, talking “in a voice that wasn’t quite 
his,” we can infer at once that these words (will) also belong to another moment in the 
story’s chronology, and we can begin to speculate about whose words these (also) are 
and when (else) they are spoken (83). The second time they occur, they stand alone as 
a paragraph that bears no obvious relation to what surrounds it, and the mystery, the 
suspense, is perpetuated. We (may) infer that the words have occurred to Hartke in the 
scene that is discursively adjacent, but there is no further explanation, and such an 
inference depends on convention, rather than textual evidence. 
 Only in the third instance do these phrases have their everyday meaning as 
imperatives addressed from one character to another. “He,” presumably Mr. Tuttle, 
drops a glass of water on the floor, the glass breaks, and Hartke, apparently without 
the immediate awareness that she is quoting anyone, says, “Don’t touch it” and “I’ll 
clean it up later” (95). I would like to give a sense, though, for what this paraphrase 
elides and presumes and to elaborate on the temporal dynamics of the story and the 
discourse in this scene, which is delimited in the text by white space above and below: 
The wind started blowing at noon and was still shaking the windows 
when she walked along the halls five hours later. 
The phone was ringing. 
In the kitchen he dropped a glass of water and she extended an arm, 
seeing the speckled wet begin to spread on the plank floor. 
The shrill wind made her uneasy, turning her inward, worse in a way 
than obliterating snow or deposits of ice that bring down power lines. 
She built a fire and then walked out of the room and up the stairs, 
listening to the walls take the wheezy strain. 
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In the kitchen she said, “Don’t touch it.” 
The best things in this house were the plank floor in the kitchen and the 
oak balustrade on the staircase. Just saying the words. Thinking the words. 
She said, “Don’t touch it,” and extended an arm, held out a hand to 
forestall any effort he might make to pick up the pieces. “I’ll clean it up later.” 
There’s something about the wind. It strips you of assurances, working 
into you, continuous, making you feel the hidden thinness of everything around 
you, all the solid stuff of a hundred undertakings – the barest makeshift flimsy. 
She cleaned it up now. She didn’t wait for later. There was something 
in the moment that she needed to keep. (95) 
 
Here, as so often in The Body Artist, the reader must negotiate the looseness of the 
referential scheme. The scene quoted here provides only local temporal markers: a 
day, a period of five hours (noon to five p.m.), the duration of a windstorm. Within the 
scene, a sentence like “The phone was ringing” gets no temporal placement, and so it 
could be that the phone was ringing continuously for five hours, that the phone rang 
often during that time, or that – at some particular moment – the phone had started 
ringing previously and was continuing to do so but was going to stop before long. A 
reader’s grounds for deciding among these options will depend on the reader’s cultural 
and generic expectations and on the reader’s resultant gestalt sense of The Body 
Artist’s fictional world and its narrative framing. It is easy to imagine the narration so 
fully inhabiting Hartke’s perspective that it recounts her memories or fantasies as 
though they were materially present to her. If so, the scene quoted above might be set 
before Robles’s suicide and include Robles as the referent of the pronoun “he.” If 
Robles once dropped a glass of water in the kitchen, and not Mr. Tuttle, then the scene 
would narrate the origin and not the upshot of the phrases, “Don’t touch it” and “I’ll 
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clean it up later.”62 Taken macroscopically, however, the text gives no indication that 
this particular form of temporal disorder is its modus operandi, although within this 
scene it seems clear that we must reorder the narrated events so that the sentences 
beginning “In the kitchen” occur sequentially, while Hartke’s making the fire and 
climbing the stairs occur either earlier or later. This local disordering of the story 
events calls for naturalization, even though the novel more broadly thwarts our efforts 
to make the story fit within the conventional realist limitations of flesh-and-blood 
human characters and their psychologies. This is to say that, however plausible it 
might be for a person in a situation like Hartke’s – grieving for a lost spouse, isolated 
in a house by the shore, and deeply immersed in an artistic project – to imagine or 
hallucinate a character like Mr. Tuttle – a ghost, an avatar of loss, a thwarted fantasy 
of companionship – the narration doesn’t cue us to doubt that Mr. Tuttle is as real as 
Hartke, except through Hartke’s own self-conscious reflections. 
 We have no cause, then, to abandon the presumption that the quoted scene 
happens within the temporal sequence that Chapter 6 more broadly (however weakly) 
establishes. Hartke has been in the house with Mr. Tuttle for weeks; she has been 
studying him and preparing her body and her voice for her upcoming performance. 
Hartke has also been speculating about Mr. Tuttle’s origin, psychology, and way of 
being in time, and among the descriptions she provides is one that jibes especially well 
                                                
62 In contrast, if this were a time travel narrative, this sequence might be analyzed as an example of the 
so-called “Bootstrap Paradox” in which “A loop in time eliminates the origin of things that already 
exist” (Klosterman 58). Say Hartke only utters exactly these phrases because she has been hearing Mr. 
Tuttle say them; but Mr. Tuttle, the timeless one, can only speak the phrases he has heard already (albeit 
in the future). Then perhaps all the instances of these phrases are quotation and the original utterance 
never occurred. On the narratology of time travel see also: Gomel. 
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with my reading of the novel as a whole: “He had no protective surface. He was alone 
and unable to improvise, make himself up. […] He was there in the howl of the world. 
This was the howling face, the stark, not-as-if of things” (92). The Body Artist’s 
protagonist navigates the rawness of an encounter with a creature totally unable to 
seem, while she herself is a perfect master of seeming. The novel, in addressing the 
complicated process of building characters, sequences of events, and identities atop 
the flimsy foundation of words, asks in turn which type of relation links its verbal and 
narratological components to the world that it presents. Does fiction make words into 
worlds with the rawness of Mr. Tuttle’s turning into Robles, into Hartke herself, or 
into another persona? Or does fiction rather suspend worlds on words, allowing the 
verbal components to act, as Hartke acts when she represents a variety of personae 
while remaining herself underneath?  
 There is no theoretical advantage in demoting The Body Artist’s narrative 
complexities to a metaphor for individual psychological crisis. The novel does, 
however, offer useful figures for its central puzzle about words’ relationship to their 
contexts and their effects. In the scene most recently quoted, for example, the wind’s 
effects on Hartke are interspersed with sentences that recount specific actions. It seems 
clear that these sentences (“In the kitchen he dropped a glass of water[…]”; “She built 
a fire and then walked out of the room and up the stairs […]”; “In the kitchen she said, 
‘Don’t touch it.’”) do not appear in the discourse in the same order that they occur to 
the character Hartke, and yet “the wind… strips you of assurances,” and the wind, like 
the “howl of the world,” constitutes a non-verbal intrusion upon an otherwise 
completely verbal context. Such unspoken intrusions into The Body Artist’s narrative 
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define a space for some unarticulated affective content that only a reader can supply. 
The fictional wind strips “you” the reader of assurances, even if one also takes the 
“you” to be evidence of Hartke addressing herself. The crisis, then, is a crisis of 
language more than a crisis of personal grief, and the wordless wind’s continuity, its 
refusal to be divided into syntactic units, “mak[es] you feel the hidden thinness of 
everything around you.”63  
 
4. Hidden Thinness and Flat Narratology 
 How does thinness get hidden? In “Close Reading and Thin Description” 
(2013), Heather Love suggests that literary scholars have discounted the importance of 
a first layer of description, “thin” rather than “thick,” in their rush to embrace Clifford 
Geertz’s “insistence on interpretation against observation” in sociology (409). Love 
argues that in the social sciences, the necessity of building interpretation atop a base 
layer of observation was understood and accepted, hence not emphasized by Geertz in 
his 1973 essay, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture.” In 
Love’s account, literary critics (represented by Stephen Greenblatt) missed the 
importance of thin description in Geertz’s proposed methodology: “Greenblatt’s 
interpretive utopia is one in which ‘the literary and the nonliterary seem to be each 
other’s thick description.’ Thin description has no role in such a world” (411). 
Encouraged, in other words, by the affinity they found with thickly-descriptive social 
                                                
63 As a side note, Hartke’s response to the broken glass of water is analogous to the naturalizing work of 
a reader-for-plot: “She cleaned it up now,” as the naturalizing reader fits broken narratives back into 
clean ones. But DeLillo’s statement of Hartke’s action blocks the reader from effective cleanup work, 
since the past-tense “cleaned it up” is so plainly at odds with the “now” in which it keeps happening. 
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sciences, literary critics in the 1970s continued to do what they had been doing already 
for some time, filling in the layers of meaning that were not obvious from the surface 
of a text itself. As Love notes, “given that the field is grounded not in the observation 
of human behavior but in the reading of texts, a purely interpretive version of thick 
description is more obviously useful than one that makes central the observational 
practice of thin description” (410); and yet Love goes on to argue for the value of thin 
description in literary analysis at this moment when the field is under pressure for its 
loss of, or detachment from, empiricism. 
 As Love points out, to distinguish thin description from thick is not to eschew 
interpretation. Nor does Geertz’s thin description depend on a naive notion of 
objectivity (which he critiques). Rather, “Geertz’s attack was aimed at traditional 
empiricism, the habit of thought that tendentiously identified the bottom slice [of 
description] as the ‘factual basis’ of reality. But Geertz also saw the bottom slice the 
way [language philosopher Gilbert] Ryle did, as a stripped-down account that could be 
separated out analytically, if not practically, for observation and study” (Love, “Close 
Reading” 409). Noting that certain strands of Best and Marcus’s “surface reading” 
“defer[] virtuosic interpretation in order to attempt to formulate an accurate account of 
what the text is like,” Love suggests that literary practices of thin description might do 
likewise (412). She characterizes thin description as “[e]xhaustive, fine-grained 
attention to phenomena” (404); and she writes that in the traditions of Ryle, Geertz, 
and the later “Natural History of an Interview,” “Thin description means, in effect, 
taking up the position of the device; by turning oneself into a camera, one could – at 
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least ideally – pay equal attention to every aspect of a scene that is available to the 
senses and record it faithfully” (407). 
 It is just here that I wish to adapt Love’s defense of thin description in literary 
studies for my own rather different project. In proposing thin description as “a model 
for close reading after the decline of the linguistic turn,” Love implies that the 
empiricism of literary reading might be clarified if we “reframe reading as a social 
science, one that along with more traditional social scientific methods can contribute 
to the project of showing ‘what the real world is really like’” (404, 430). But literary 
reading need not show what the external world is really like in order to be empirical. 
Instead, I draw on Love’s accounts of thin description to explain the role of 
interpretation in formulating narratological description; and I propose that a basic 
narratological account of The Body Artist requires something very like what Love calls 
“taking up the position of the device” in order to avoid depending too heavily on the 
naturalization of its narrative scenarios in advance of describing what the text is like. 
So while Love emphasizes that “novelists have always insisted on visible behavior,” I 
counter that the narratological complexities of contemporary metafictions recall us, 
instead, to the hidden thinness of narrative objects which require something like a 
“device” – an interpretive program, say, or a set of genre conventions – to make them 
available for thick, interpretive work. 
 When The Body Artist parcels language out into quoted units and attenuates 
quotation’s connections to characters, it throws up barriers to traditional narratology 
by hindering the construction of “thick” narrative units, such as characters whose 
intentional and psychological attributes are the customary constructions of literary 
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interpretation. It offers, instead, discourse itself as a narrative object that participates 
in driving the story – and this makes thin description somewhat easier. The Body Artist 
even introduces a device, the tape recorder, that dramatizes Hartke’s efforts to describe 
Mr. Tuttle to herself (67); that provides Mr. Tuttle with access to aspects of Hartke that 
she had thought were private (hidden) (58-59); and that mediates Mariella Chapman’s 
experience of her face-to-face interview with Hartke (111). And this is not a complete 
account of the recordings that populate the novel, since it excludes answering 
machines, recordings in Hartke’s show, Body Time, and the electronic infrastructure 
that relays silent images of Kotka, Finland, to the room where Hartke watches them 
alone. 
 Of course, neither The Body Artist’s metafictional accounts of registering 
sound and sight nor the descriptions I offer here of the novel’s narrative organization 
are anywhere near exhaustive. The necessity of interpretation even in constructing a 
thin description means that exhaustive accounts are impossible. From the perspective 
of object-oriented ontology, too, no record of an object’s features and relations can 
exhaust its being, precisely that which is withdrawn from access and relation (see 
Introduction, section 6). However, by tracing the outlines of narrative objects at 
different scales than traditional narratologies, flat narratology unmoors them from the 
restricted relations that narratology has conventionally assigned them; and it helps us 
to recognize how novels themselves sometimes theorize the process of description-
building and redescription, from thin to thick description, and back again. 
 Let us return for a moment to how DeLillo deploys the phrase, “the hidden 
thinness of everything”: “There’s something about the wind. It strips you of 
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assurances, working into you, continuous, making you feel the hidden thinness of 
everything around you, all the solid stuff of a hundred undertakings – the barest 
makeshift flimsy” (95). To ask the question that Love ascribes to Erving Goffman, 
who reads fictional and real-world scenarios in a “documentary” mode, “What is it 
that is going on here?” (“Close Reading” 426).  
Our answer might begin, “There’s something about the wind,” and if we recall 
the strange way that Robles’s voice passes through Mr. Tuttle’s body, we can perhaps 
add that “the wind” is itself a redescription of voice. Having said “Don’t touch it” and 
“I’ll clean it up later,” Hartke has passed along these phrases that she heard Mr. Tuttle 
say first, just as Tuttle himself passed along Robles’s words. But a thinner description 
of voice than the words, the tones, and the sounds that are repeated might call the 
voice just wind. What is happening outside (“the shrill wind” (95)) is happening 
inside, too. This is the recursive form of The Body Artist’s narration, which it shares 
with Cat’s Eye and John Henry Days in various ways. The Body Artist, by driving 
readerly attention towards the mechanics of quotation and the mechanics of voice that 
underlie it, and by placing certain phrases in the mouths of multiple characters at the 
same time or in the mouths of none, makes more (and more fundamental) descriptive 
methods available to critics.  
 
5. Documentary Metafiction in The Body Artist 
 Goffman’s habit of treating “a range of texts, up to and including ‘great 
literature’ as documentary” bears further attention here, because The Body Artist treats 
itself much the way Goffman might (Love, “Close Reading” 427). In Love’s words, 
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Goffman “cut[s] text up into strips of activity,” and thus “he makes a wide range of 
situations available for analysis and study. Because he stops at the threshold of the 
person, refusing to speculate about affect, motivation, and character, the products of 
Goffman’s method are perspectives, not persons; situations, not traits; behavior that 
belongs to no one” (ibid.). I began this chapter by exploring the difficulty of 
describing how story time and discourse time relate to one another, what Genette and 
Chapman term “duration.” The form of this narratological challenge depends upon 
how one divides up a given narrative text, and here I want to show how The Body 
Artist itself both “cut[s] text up into strips of activity” and documents its own process 
of doing so. The narration does not necessarily refuse to speculate, and it certainly 
portrays Hartke speculating about Robles and Mr. Tuttle, but its isolation of quoted 
matter and its emphasis on the tenuousness of attribution do highlight the interpretive 
activity that goes into assigning a phrase or utterance to a character, where a text does 
not do this explicitly.  
 When we attribute mentality, agency, intention, and a host of other human-like 
qualities to characters, despite their being textual objects (not persons at all), we imply 
a thick interpretation of the fictional world’s existential order. The Body Artist, 
however, is committed to articulating its own “seeming” and to marking off gestural 
and linguistic performances as such. It thus performs a skepticism about such thick, 
interpretive play and documents this skepticism as its different moves unfold, from the 
opening sentence, in which “Time seems to pass,” to the closing line, where Hartke 
“wanted to feel the sea tang on her face and the flow of time in her body, to tell her 
who she was” (126). The indeterminacy of time’s relation to this novel’s performances 
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(those it recounts and those it enacts) mean that Hartke’s closing desire goes 
unanswered in the story-world. By suspending Hartke in the desire to feel this “flow of 
time in her body,” The Body Artist both asserts that (she thinks) she has a body and 
denies her the experience that a body might provide. Although it might seem 
paradoxical, one way to read these two assertions together would be as a textual self-
description, where “what is going on” illuminates both the ontology of the (particular) 
narrative world and the ontology of narrative objects more generally as well. Hartke, 
the particular textual object, thinly described, “wanted to feel the sea tang on her face 
and the flow of time in her body.” As Love notes with respect to the social scientists 
who emphasized exhaustive description over the formulation of theory, “precise 
accounts of particular instances offer a strong ground for the work of generalization” 
(“Close Reading” 417). It seems like no more of a stretch to assign such a desire to 
Lauren Hartke [the textual object of metafictional commentary] than to Lauren Hartke 
[the imagined person co-constructed by readers of The Body Artist and the novel’s 
text]. 
 Another way The Body Artist “cuts itself up” is by reproducing two story-
world documents, an obituary of Rey Robles and Chapman’s interview/theater review 
of Hartke, in the interstices of the narratorial discourse. They appear between Chapters 
1 and 2 and between Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Even as they afford contrastive 
breaks with the chapters’ narrative modes, these documentary interventions 
paradoxically affirm the novel’s realism in two ways,. First, they buttress the novel’s 
setting in physical, cultural, and psychological domains with clear analogies in the 
geographic and cultural spaces of the late twentieth-century northeast United States. 
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Second, they confirm the novel’s overall realist attitude toward the events that it 
recounts. Unlike, say, Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler, in which each 
chapter promises the fictionality of the subsequent one, The Body Artist treats Rey 
Robles’s life as if it were real, quoting his obituary without narratorial framing. Given 
this strand of realism in the novel, The Body Artist’s self-reflexivity does not serve to 
wink at its reader on the way to asserting some moral or psychological truth – as a 
fable might. Rather, the self-reflexivity appears as self-theorization, as the chapters’ 
narration pares down the mechanics of quotation (and other narrative operations) and 
makes them available for thin description. 
 Like many of the seven chapters’ quoted phrases (e.g. “Don’t touch it” and 
“I’ll clean it up later”), the obituary and the interview appear within The Body Artist’s 
narrative discourse with less framing or context than one might expect. It’s true that 
both documents ground The Body Artist’s exposition, providing a reader with useful 
details for assimilating events and emotions that the novel explores elsewhere. It’s also 
true that neither of these documents points in any way to its own “seeming.” 
Nonetheless, for all the ease and comfort with which these documents may be read, 
and however typical they are of their respective expository forms, their status as 
quotation contributes importantly to the novel’s directing of attention to “hidden 
thinness.” 
 To put this in narratological terms, while the two documentary quotations 
introduce biographical and professional backgrounds for both Robles and Hartke; and 
while they provide points of view that are not subject to the wavering that the reader 
elsewhere observes (between third-person and second-person narration, say); the 
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documents’ appearance also precludes the story being told “naturally” in the voice of a 
single narrator to an explicitly or implicitly designated audience.64 Instead, these 
documents, like quotations more generally, constitute elements of the story-world that 
have welled up, as it were, into the narrative discourse. Lacking any preface or any 
narratorial comment and sitting as they do between chapters 1 and 2 and between 
chapters 6 and 7, they appear to be reproduced from elsewhere than the narration’s 
point of view. Although we might read the documents primarily for their thematic 
contributions to our understanding of Hartke and Robles and as ancillary sources of 
reliable biographical evidence, we can also read the obituary and the interview as 
offering their own alternative narratological and ontological investigations of Robles 
and Hartke respectively. 
 Indeed, the construction of character over time (rather than the particular 
aspects of these characters) becomes the subject of inquiry in both documents. Robles, 
the obituary reveals, “was born Alejandro Alquezar” and later “adopted the name Rey 
Robles, after a minor character he played in an obscure film noir” (29, 30). Robles’s 
filmography, in turn, “‘at its best extends the language of film,’ wrote the critic Philip 
Stansky. ‘His subject is people in landscapes of estrangement. He found a spiritual 
knife-edge in the poetry of alien places, where extreme situations become inevitable 
and characters are forced toward life-defining moments’” (31). Robles, in other words, 
a minor character in The Body Artist whose suicide temporarily erases him after the 
novel’s first chapter, has ostensibly modeled himself on a forgotten minor character in 
                                                
64 My paraphrased definition is derived from Fludernik’s account of Labov in “How Natural Is 
‘Unnatural Narratology’” (360). 
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a fictional film, and he has grappled with characterological crises (“life-defining 
moments”) in his own art. The obituary quotes him as saying, “The answer to life is 
the movies” (30). Yet the overall effect of the obituary’s arrival as a quotation in The 
Body Artist is to cast doubt on the reliability of what can be said: “Mr. Robles’s 
accounts of his early life were inconsistent,” we learn, “but the most persuasive 
independent versions suggest he was 64 at his death” (29). From the perspective of 
this obituary’s putative author, a verbal act can be measured by its persuasiveness, but 
it remains the kind of thing that interposes itself like a curtain between discourse and 
event, or like a device between representation and world. DeLillo’s deployment of the 
obituary at the same level as the chapters’ narrative discourse ironically generates a 
persuasive statement about Robles’s life that, because it is quoted and not stipulated, 
sheds more light on Robles’s textual qualities than on his personal ones. 
  Mariella Chapman’s review, “Body Art in Extremis: Slow, Spare and Painful,” 
also reinforces the novel’s wonder about characterological becoming, although it tests 
an alternative thesis, that quotation can generate proximity, even intimacy. “Hartke’s 
work is not self-strutting or self-lacerating,” Chapman writes. “She is acting, always in 
the process of becoming another or exploring some root identity” (DeLillo 107). 
Quotation in these terms lets Hartke approach another person, and yet Chapman does 
not fail to mark Hartke’s own, somewhat colder account of what she does. Chapman 
quotes Hartke saying, “The body has never been my enemy[…]. I’ve always felt smart 
in my body. I taught it to do things other bodies could not. It absorbs me in a 
disinterested way. I try to analyze and redesign” (107). Thus, contra Chapman, Hartke 
registers her own body as an instrument (a device) for gestural and vocal quotation 
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that keeps her “disinterested.” From the outside, the body work has physical costs to 
Hartke. As Chapman puts it, Hartke “has transformed herself shockingly for this event 
and although the brief run is over, she continues to look – well, wasted” (105). The 
narration’s formal distance from Chapman’s assessment may undercut this view, 
however. Indeed Hartke’s physical transformations make a fascinating example of 
what happens when quotation predominates over character, setting, or event and 
speaks for itself through some medium. For Hartke the costs are physical; for Mr. 
Tuttle, temporal; and they are formal for The Body Artist as a whole. In eschewing the 
construction of clear narrative through-lines in favor of an exploration of quotation’s 
ontology, The Body Artist’s chapters approach the verge of narrative collapse. DeLillo, 
however, quite elegantly patches this threatened narrative together, allowing the 
discourse to cite two documents that organize the novel’s performances within an 
intelligible sequence of events. 
 Hartke’s ability to switch into Mr. Tuttle’s voice is analogous to the uncanny 
power of quotation that narrative discourse frequently wields. Like free indirect 
discourse and other forms of telepathic narration,65 Hartke’s transformation, which 
happens both on stage and during the interview, can elicit emotional investment and 
concern in the reader/perceiver, even though the structure of quotation is alienating. 
Chapman marks the alienation with her shift in pronouns, even as she reaffirms her 
admiration for Hartke in her description of the interview’s strangest moment: 
Then [Hartke] does something that makes me freeze in my seat. She 
switches to another voice. It is his voice, the naked man’s, spooky as a 
                                                
65 On telepathy as a model for various forms of narration, including the now out-dated “omniscient” 
narration, see Nicholas Royle. 
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woodwind in your closet. Not taped but live. Not lip-sync’d but real. It 
is speaking to me and I search my friend’s face but don’t quite see her. 
I’m not sure what she’s doing. I can almost believe she is equipped 
with male genitals, as in the piece, prosthetic of course, and maybe an 
Ace bandage in flesh-tone to bleep out her breasts, with a sprinkle of 
chest hair pasted on. Or she has trained her upper body to deflate and 
her lower body to sprout. Don’t put it past her. (DeLillo 111) 
 
Here we see the disturbing effects of quotation translated from speech to gesture and 
from printed words to the corporeal domain. Not being sure what Hartke is doing with 
her voice (or at all?), Chapman elides Hartke and instead recounts what “it,” the voice, 
does. Chapman also dares her reader to consider whether Hartke might be capable of 
spontaneously altering her physical form, even her sex. From one perspective, then, 
Hartke’s embodied performance of the voices and gestures of others becomes just 
another way for the narrative to display the disruptiveness of quotation in general. At 
the same time, however, we might consider whether Chapman’s perspective on 
Hartke’s pluripotency speaks to artistic production and reproduction specifically, 
highlighting how the forms that a critic interprets are built up layer by layer from 
components no longer available for description.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 Perhaps it is strange that a novel promising from its title to explore body art 
should, instead, become so caught up in voices and language and temporality. My 
approach to The Body Artist reconciles this apparent contrast by examining the body 
of quotation itself, attempting thin descriptions of how quotation works in this novel. 
Conventional narratives and naturalizing reading strategies both do the work of 
suturing quoted speech to its narrative context and (thereby) delivering their readers as 
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immediately as possible to a speaker’s present moment. The Body Artist, conversely, 
attacks and destabilizes such strategies and conventions in order to see what quotation 
might do or be on its own. DeLillo’s novel plays with the formal properties of the 
quotations it deploys, and in so doing it enables comparative thin descriptions of those 
properties. I will conclude by noting, however, that quotation’s present-ness remains 
resilient. For all the novel’s formal experimentation, its discourse winds up reshaping 
the present tense itself, rather than moving quotation into a different temporality. The 
Body Artist’s narrative present becomes a speculative temporality for which Mr. 
Tuttle’s “walking talking continuum” makes a rather nice image: 
It isn’t true because it can’t be true. Rey is not alive in this 
man’s consciousness or in his palpable verb tense, his walking talking 
continuum. 
Nice word. What does it mean? 
 She thought it meant a continuous thing, a continuous whole, 
and the only way to distinguish one part from another, this from that, 
now from then, is by making arbitrary divisions. (93) 
 
“Continuum” here becomes the form that might – but apparently doesn’t – invite the 
dead Rey Robles back to life. Does any novel form a continuum, and does The Body 
Artist? This elliptical passage doesn’t address novel forms explicitly, but it does speak 
to character forms. Mr. Tuttle is at one extreme, since making arbitrary divisions “is 
exactly what he doesn’t know how to do” (93). At the other extreme is Robles, whose 
suicide arbitrarily divides him from Hartke and also divides time into a before and 
after that even this novel acknowledges. In between, however, we have Hartke herself, 
torn (formally) between Mr. Tuttle’s hard-to-parse utterances and Robles’s silence. 
This distinction among the characters is especially marked in the obituary and the 
interview. Although the former makes use of the present tense to explore uncertainties 
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about Robles’s life, it otherwise speaks of Robles and his actions in the past tense, 
where his suicide confines him.66 What is more, the conventions of filmography and 
the reproducibility of film as a medium give his character a narrative fixity that Lauren 
Hartke lacks. Even the small phrase “bit parts” underscores Robles’s discontinuity 
from role to role, and in the characterology of The Body Artist, discontinuity makes it 
possible to mark time and close off a history – or a life (30). In so far as Robles seems 
to be quotable without ever quoting, Robles is dead in this novel even where he walks 
and talks, in Chapter 1. The narration excludes the reader from Robles’s interiority 
while it delivers many of Hartke’s minute speculations. Robles is thus a qualitatively 
different character from Hartke, one whose being may be summed in an obituary, even 
if that obituary acknowledges various holes in his narrative past. 
 The Body Artist is in large part about the power of quotation to disrupt the 
narrative or bodily forms that demarcate it, and indeed the novel derives much of its 
force from the ontological difference between quotation and narratorial prose; but it 
still remains to us to develop a fuller poetics of quotation, a rubric for describing and 
cataloging the variety of quotation’s relations to its prior and succeeding context. It 
can help to keep these descriptions both thin, minimally interpretive, and flat in the 
sense of dropping hierarchical frameworks and allowing these under-studied narrative 
objects to try to speak for themselves. It is also helpful to borrow habits of thinking 
from object-oriented philosophy that may help us mark the distortions imposed by 
                                                
66 For example, “it isn’t clear how many years he spent in the USSR or whether he was ever reunited 
with his mother,” although “[i]t is known that he lived in Paris as a young man, hauling trash, 
performing as a street juggler and playing bit parts in several movies, cast as a thief or pimp” (30). 
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narrative objects on their discursive contexts, whether narrative, interpretive, or 
theoretical. 
 If the narrative poetics of The Body Artist can feel like an ungovernable mess, 
it might be that DeLillo is playing a joke on us by repeating the phrases, “Don’t touch 
it” and “I’ll clean it up later.” We might also be tempted to agree with one of The Body 
Artist’s narrative stipulations: “This is the rule of time. It is the thing you know 
nothing about” (101). To do so, however, would be to concede a little too much to 
fiction. We should, however, allow fictional objects, and especially metafictions, to 
open up a speculative time and space within which we might try to meet narrative 
objects on their own grounds. 
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Conclusion – Talking About Reality 
 
The way of reading I have modeled here takes it as a premise that literary-
fictional worlds are subspaces of the empirical world we inhabit. This means that 
taking an objective view of what there is in the world need not – indeed cannot – 
ignore the fictional; and like Bruno Latour and Heather Love, I have the view that 
objective practices need not exclude care.67 By that I mean that empiricism is 
compatible with affective, intellectual, and evaluative relations to one’s objects of 
study, and flat narratology’s privileging of what discourse has to say for itself is, 
expressly, a value-laden choice. As I suggest in Chapter 2, aesthetics may have a 
proper role in one’s choice of an organizational scheme, and in trying to let these 
metafictions speak for themselves, I have sought an economy of description-in-
interpretation: why not take up the taxonomies and frameworks that fictions 
themselves bring to hand?  
 It might be objected, however, that “flat narratology” sets off in the wrong 
direction when it proposes studying narrative outside the hierarchies of character, 
setting, and plot. My readings of Cat’s Eye, John Henry Days, and The Body Artist go 
out of their way to avoid treating the novels’ protagonists as though they were people. 
Probably, in highlighting characters’ constructedness and the strange temporal and 
narrative logics of these novels’ metafictional discourse, I have passed up the best 
opportunities to examine what is most human in them, depictions of people struggling 
                                                
67 Love notes that Latour’s endorsement of care has seemed minimal to many critics, for whom 
“Latour’s focus on objects and networks skirts crucial questions of power, inequality, and social 
structure” (“The Temptations” 51-52). 
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to make their own stories in the world, often by way of art. If care is what is called for 
in investigating the literary real, why not double down on those features that speak 
most obviously to lived human lives? 
 Martha Nussbaum advocates such a way of reading in Poetic Justice: The 
Literary Imagination and Public Life. Characterizing literature as “subversive” and 
calling the novel “a morally controversial form,” Nussbaum promises to focus her 
attention on “the characteristics of the literary imagination as a public imagination, an 
imagination that will steer judges in their judging, legislators in their legislating, 
policy makers in measuring the quality of life of people near and far” (2, 3). But which 
characteristics of the literary imagination are these? Nussbaum’s view is much 
narrower than Love’s (or my own). Her “central subject is the ability to imagine what 
it is like to live the life of another person who might, given changes in circumstance, 
be oneself or one of one’s loved ones” (5). In other words, the literary imagination she 
values is the one that facilitates people’s “wonder about themselves” (ibid.). But now, 
more than twenty years after the publication of Poetic Justice, it seems clear that the 
imaginations of judges, legislators, and policy makers would be enhanced if they 
adopted other points of view, such as animals’, plants’, or ecosystems’ – or even 
machines’.68 
I want conclude then by returning to Love’s idea of “taking up the position of 
                                                
68 The relationship between postcritical reading and the “posthuman turn” has not, I think, been fully or 
clearly articulated. But those who are most critical of Latour’s recent influence in the humanities are 
concerned for the humanities’ diminishes status and diminished ambition in the academy. Love ascribes 
to Nathan K. Hensley, for example, the view that empiricism as advocated by Latour might constitute 
no more than “a capitulation to the given rather than a way of reaching toward new possibilities not yet 
materialized in the social world” (“The Temptations” 65). 
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the device” that I cite in Chapter 3. Might the practice of taking up such a position be 
generalized, so that novels themselves, however outlandish their imaginations, are 
read for how they register and make visible various real-world conditions?69 Could we 
make a politics out of such readings? Whatever can be seen in a novel tells the viewer 
something (though perhaps nothing definitive) about the worlds in which the novel is 
produced, disseminated, and read; and I have been arguing here that fictional 
techniques, along with critical ones, are responding to the changing relationship 
between world and discourse that is a product of, among other things, the Internet age 
and the academy itself.  
 The flat narratological readings that have made up the bulk of this dissertation 
engage fiction’s discursive forms to make this argument. But a thematic example from 
The Body Artist underscores just as effectively how the rapid technological and social 
change associated with the information revolution (and postdating Poetic Justice) have 
altered what novels make visible or conceal. Lauren Hartke, the novel’s protagonist, 
can “spen[d] hours at the computer screen looking at a live-streaming video feed from 
the edge of a two-lane road in a city in Finland” (DeLillo 40). The narration of this 
action alone might date the novel to sometime after the mid-1990s (unless the novel 
were science-fictional or futuristic). But Hartke’s reflection on her own behavior tells 
us rather more about how humans’ complicity in networks that reach far beyond their 
bodies (and that behave, in some ways, autonomously) have altered what counts as a 
                                                
69 Here I am inspired by feminist science studies scholar Michelle Murphy’s work on quite a different 
subject, sick building syndrome. In Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty, Murphy 
theorizes “regimes of perceptibility” as the ways that “a discipline or epistemological tradition 
perceives and does not perceive the world” (Murphy 10). Any interpretive method, like any scientific 
instrument, “can detect some things and not others” (9).  
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scene or an event. Here and now, an audience can be compelled by discursive 
transmission as such: “It was interesting to [Hartke] because it was happening now, as 
she sat here, and because it happened twenty-four hours a day, facelessly, cars 
entering and leaving Kotka, or just the empty road in the dead times” (ibid.).  
 Paradoxically, the network transmits immediacy, or rather its illusion. By 
providing continuous coverage, it erases its own visibility to Hartke, for whom “[t]he 
dead times were best” (ibid.). For her, the transmission of a static scene is “real 
enough to withstand the circumstance of nothing going on” (ibid.). “[N]othing going 
on” conceals how the video signal from Kotka must be generated, encoded, 
transmitted, and ultimately decoded again into light and dark patterns on a screen. The 
verb elides the medium by which the “nothing” becomes apparent, and the illusion is 
appropriate to Hartke’s circumstance, unmoored as she is by her husband’s suicide. 
Ironically, however, the “realness” of Kotka depends in part on the display of local 
time as it progresses: “It was the sense of organization, a place contained in an 
unyielding frame, as it is and as you watch, with a reading of local time in the digital 
display in a corner of the screen. Kotka was another world but she could see it in its 
realness, in its hours, minutes and seconds” (40).70 
 Here it is not by taking up the damaged position and limited vision of Hartke 
that we can care about the world – either the fictional world of The Body Artist or the 
wider world in which that fiction is enmeshed. By taking up the position of the device, 
however, we can situate ourselves in the position of what connects worlds to each 
                                                
70 Schuster notes: “The screen thrives on the circumstance of nothing going on precisely because the 
‘nothingness’ heightens the screen’s significance; what matters is not what is happening on the screen, 
but how the screen frames each moment” (167). 
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other, what transmits the conviction of their shared reality, and what marks off time. 
The device is Hartke’s screen, but also the network that enables it show what it shows. 
It could as easily be The Body Artist itself. 
 Or, additionally, the body artist herself. This dissertation’s readings of Hartke 
and of Cat’s Eye’s Elaine Risley suggest a conception of art in non-literary media as 
engaged with the same questions about art objects’ ontology and about how best to 
amplify and examine their real-world agency. In this vein, I plan to extend this project 
to Tom McCarthy’s Remainder and the short fictions of Lydia Davis. The former 
renders a protagonist for whom seeming really is being, and it imagines such a person 
as deeply threatening to real-world logics of commerce and social performance. 
Davis’s fictions are of interest in a different way, since they depend for their effects on 
a collectivity that transcends the usual borders of narrative but still relies on the 
material proximity different units of discourse.  
 Davis’s fictions and interviews also make inescapably clear that her 
experiences in and around the academy have shaped her writing, and while it is not 
new to argue that theory has changed the history of the novel – that there is a formal 
and intellectual back-and-forth between the institutions of literature and those of the 
academy – there is more work to be done on the literature’s critical capacity and vice 
versa.71 
 Flat Narratology was slow to find its form. Over several years of course work, 
research, and critical writing, a project that might have focused narrowly on the 
                                                
71 I am thinking here of works as different at Mark McGurls’s The Program Era; Judith Ryan’s The 
Novel After Theory; and Raymond Federman’s Critifiction. 
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poetics of character or on the diversity of narrative temporalities became an attempt to 
orient narrative poetics toward the field’s pressing debates about how to read and 
interpret; and in turn to seek out among those debates the positions and methods that 
might be of particular use to narrative poetics. For this dissertation I have considered 
recent metafictional novels, but of course, literature in other genres and cultural 
objects of other materials than linguistic discourse are also engaged in self-critical and 
self-descriptive operations. Since “discourse is a material practice,” however, as 
Donna Haraway points out, it may be that flat narratology is applicable in the realms 
of visual, plastic, and sonic art as well (Primate Visions 111, qtd. in Love, “The 
Temptations” 62). Because flat narratology undermines or at least provisionally sets 
aside narrative hierarchies, seizing on textual objects like quotations, taxonomies, and 
frameworks, it has some promise for examining how even non-narrative forms make 
worlds, including the ones we live in. 
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